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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation deals with two topics in the fields of public and regulatory economics: pref-
erences for income redistribution (Chapters 2 to 5) and regulation of markets for renewable
energy (Chapters 6 and 7). While dealing with seemingly different topical issues, the main
focus of the dissertation is on the analysis of public policy with regard to allocative effi-
ciency (Chapters 6 and 7) and redistributive justice (Chapters 2 to 5). The first three essays
(Chapters 2 to 4) provide a positive analysis with their focus on experimental measurement
of preferences for redistribution and empirical explanation of their determinants. By way of
contrast, the next three essays deal with normative questions. In particular, Chapter 5 de-
rives policy implications as to the sustainability of the Swiss welfare state based on results
from the previous chapters. Further, Chapters 6 and 7 provide an analysis of optimal policy
instruments for the regulation of markets for renewable energy.
Chapter 2, “Why does the amount of income redistribution differ between the United States
and Europe? The Janus face of Switzerland”, is a result of an extensive review of literature
on demand for income redistribution. In this essay, economic, political, and behavioral deter-
minants of the amount of public social expenditures elaborated in the literature are reviewed.
By using empirical data from the majority of OECD countries, this chapter compares the lev-
els of income redistribution in the United States, the European Union, and Switzerland and
relates them to the possible determinants. Lying in between the two poles, Switzerland pro-
vides unique evidence about the relative merits of competing hypotheses. It tips the balance
against the economic explanations, which are based on income inequality and social mobility
and predict more rather than less income redistribution in the United States compared to
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the EU. It only weakly supports the political and institutional explanations linking propor-
tional representation to redistribution. However, behavioral explanations receive a good deal
of support from the case of Switzerland, a country that shares with the United States the
belief that effort rather than luck and connections determine economic success. In this way,
the Janus face of Switzerland helps to explain the difference in the amount of public social
spending in the United States and the European Union.
The next three essays, presented in Chapters 3 to 5, are an outcome of a Discrete Choice
Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Through this DCE, preferences for
income redistribution in Switzerland were elicited. In addition to the amount of redistribution
as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (working poor, the unemployed, old-age
pensioners, families with children, people with ill health) and nationality of beneficiary (Swiss,
Western European, others).
In Chapter 3, “Economic well-being, social mobility, and preferences for income redistribution:
evidence from a discrete choice experiment”, citizens’ willingness to pay for redistribution is
elicited and analyzed with respect to their possible economic determinants. Based on the
simple model that relates choices to the attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss
citizen is shown to require a compensation of some CHF 12 per month for an additional
percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In addition, a very marked sta-
tus quo bias would have to be overcome. Furthermore, several hypotheses concerning the
determinants of the demand for redistribution can be tested without significant supply-side
influences. By including one of three measures of current economic well-being at a time, the
extended model allows us to test a static hypothesis, stating that demand for redistribution
decreases with current economic well-being. However, it is found to increase with level of
education and (in part) with personal income as well as higher self-positioning on a social
scale, thereby contradicting the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. With the inclu-
sion of five measures of social mobility, the dynamic Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM)
hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973), Benabou and Ok (2001)] could be tested as
well. It is shown to receive partial empirical support.
Due to the mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants, Chapter 4,
entitled “Do religious beliefs explain preferences for income redistribution? Experimental
evidence”, focuses on behavioral factors, in particular, on religious and cultural beliefs as
2
possible determinants of preferences for income redistribution. Estimated marginal willingness
to pay (WTP) is positive among those who do not belong to a religious denomination, and
negative otherwise. However, the marginal WTP is shown to increase with a higher degree
of religiosity. Moreover, those who state that luck or connections rather than work effort
determine economic success exhibit significantly higher WTP values than those who believe
in the ‘just world’. In summary it can be said that cultural and religious beliefs seem to
provide far better predictions of demand for redistribution than the economic factors treated
in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5, “Is the welfare state sustainable? Experimental evidence on citizens’ preferences
for redistribution”, goes beyond the positive analysis of preferences for redistribution and
contributes to the political debate by deriving implications for social policy. We argue that
the sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens’ preferences for income
redistribution. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who
deem benefits too low, and negative otherwise. However, even those who state that govern-
ment should reduce income inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average. The major finding
is that estimated average WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP, clearly below the current value
of 25%. Thus, the present Swiss welfare state does not appear sustainable.
Guidance for policy is also at the center of Chapters 6 and 7, dealing with optimal regulation
instruments in markets for renewable energy. Chapter 6, “Promoting renewable electricity
generation in imperfect markets: price vs. quantity policies”, contrasts price and quantity
control policies, starting within a framework of a perfectly competitive energy market and
extending the analysis for the case of market imperfections. The search for economically
efficient policy instruments designed to promote the diffusion of renewable energy technologies
in liberalized markets has led to the introduction of quota-based tradable ‘green’ certificate
(TGC) schemes for renewable electricity. However, there is a debate whether the TGC, a
quantity control policy, is advantageous in comparison with guaranteed feed-in tariffs, a price
control policy. In this chapter it is shown that both policies are equivalent in terms of social
welfare if the electricity markets are perfectly competitive. The main result of the essay is,
however, that the price control policy dominates the quantity control policy in terms of social
welfare if the assumption of perfect competition is relaxed.
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Chapter 7, “Renewable energy policy in the presence of innovation: does government pre-
commitment matter?”, extends the basic model of Chapter 6 by considering a perfectly
competitive market with a possibility of technological innovations. Once again, guaranteed
feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables and tradable green certificates are contrasted
from the point of view of social welfare as well as that of dynamic efficiency. The decisions
about the technological innovation are modeled in a game-theoretic framework. In terms of
social welfare, subsidy and quota policies are shown to be equivalent as in the static model
of Chapter 6. The main finding is that subsidy policies are preferable in terms of dynamic
efficiency. Further, no pre-commitment policies are shown to be at least as good as the pre-
commitment ones.
Note that Peter Zweifel co-authored Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6, Reinhard Madlener co-authored
Chapters 6 and 7, Sule Akkoyunlu, Chapter 2, and Weiyu Gao, Chapter 6. Chapter 3 is cur-
rently under review at International Tax and Public Finance, Chapter 4 at CESifo Economic
Studies. Chapter 6 has been invited at Energy Economics for a resubmission. Chapter 2 will
be submitted to the Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Chapter 5 to Public Choice.
Chapter 7 still has a working paper status. Its abridged version will be submitted to a journal
on industrial organization.
This introduction is concluded with a note to the readers concerning the structure of this
dissertation. Each chapter of this dissertation can be considered as self-contained, in most
cases each having its own appendix. Since Chapters 3 to 5 are based on the Discrete Choice
experiment conducted in 2008, methodological sections as well as appendices in these chapters
are identical. However, for the sake of better readability, all references across chapters are
made explicit. Moreover, the common list of references appears at the end of this dissertation.
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Abstract: In this paper, the amount of income redistribution in the United States, the Eu-
ropean Union, and Switzerland is compared and empirically related to economic, political,
and behavioral determinants elaborated in the literature. Lying in between the two poles,
Switzerland provides unique evidence about the relative merits of competing hypotheses.
It tips the balance against the economic explanation, which predicts more rather than less
income redistribution in the United States compared to the EU. It only weakly supports
the political model linking proportional representation and multiparty structure (which also
characterize Switzerland) to redistribution; yet the Swiss share of transfers in the GDP is
low. Behavioral explanations receive a good deal of support from the case of Switzerland, a
country that shares with the United States the belief that hard work rather than luck, birth,
connections, and corruption determine wealth. In this way, the Janus face of Switzerland may
help to explain the difference in the amount of U.S. and EU income redistribution.
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Chapter 2
Why does the amount of income
redistribution differ between the
United States and Europe? The
Janus face of Switzerland
2.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to compare the amount of income redistribution of the United
States, the European Union (EU), and Switzerland. While a European country, Switzerland
is not a member of the EU and has some institutional features reminiscent of the United
States. Like the Roman god Janus it is therefore predicted to “look both ways”. Indeed,
EU social programs will be found to be more extensive, generous, and pro-poor and tax
systems to be more progressive than those of United States. Invariably, Switzerland stands
in between. What are the economic, political, and behavioral factors that may be responsi-
ble for this? Possible economic explanations are the variance and skewness of the before-tax
income distribution, the social costs of taxation, expected future changes in income for me-
dian voters and volatility of income over time. However, Alesina et al. (2001) argue that
these economic determinants cannot explain observed differences in redistributive policies
between the United States and the EU. They find that while the before-tax income in the
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United States has higher variance and more skewness than in the EU, redistribution in the
United States is less although the deadweight losses from taxation seem to be about the same.
Switzerland will be shown to lie in between. On the other hand, the “Prospect of Upward
Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis, originally suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) and
formulated by Benabou and Ok (2001), is confirmed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) who
empirically show that people with high expected future income do not favor redistribution
in the United States1. In the EU, income mobility is relatively low, with Switzerland again
situating in between but having a lower level of public expenditure than the EU average.
Thus, contrary to theoretical predictions, we observe a negative correlation between income
mobility and public expenditure on the aggregate level. As to political explanations, Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) cite U.S. institutions that prevent minorities from gaining political power
which could be used for income redistribution. At the federal level, the United States applies
majority rule for election to the Congress and for president; moreover, courts have consis-
tently been rejecting popular attempts at redistribution. The constitutions of EU member
countries are more oriented toward proportional representation and less toward protection
of private property. Switzerland on the one hand has a degree of proportional representation
that even exceeds the EU average; on the other hand, its courts strongly protect private
property [cf. Moser (1994)]. Extensive direct democratic control might serve to limit public
welfare spending while enforcing efficiency in redistribution. But then, Switzerland is com-
parable to the EU average when it comes to the amount of transfers and subsidies. The
behavioral explanations for redistribution [Fong et al. (2006)] emphasize reciprocal altruism.
This hypothesis states that U.S. voters dislike giving money to the poor whom they perceive
as lazy. Moreover, Gilens (1999) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that troubled race
relations are a major reason for the absence of an American welfare state. EU citizens, by
way of contrast, tend to believe that the poor have been unfortunate, and until recently,
immigration from non-white countries has been too limited to make race a relevant category.
Between these two poles, Switzerland seems to be similar to the United States in all of the
three dimensions cited above, giving rise to the correct prediction that it spends relatively
little on public welfare. It should be noted that all of these explanations abstract from the
1Using a data set from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) have shown that even those who are currently
rich may tend to support redistribution if they expect their welfare to fall. This is known as a ”tunnel effect”.
Molna´r and Kapita´ny (2006a,b) find that people who have no clear knowledge about the immediate and the
distant future favor redistribution more than those with negative expectations.
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incentives of politicians, acting as entrepreneurs, to redistribute income and wealth in order
to secure (re)election [cf. Brunner and Meckling (1977), Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)]. This
ultra-political explanation hinges on the fact that the cost of redistribution usually takes on
the form of efficiency losses that have to be borne by all citizens, whereas its benefits can be
channeled to those lobbies that provide support or those voters who are pivotal at the next
election. Of course, the institutional differences cited above make it easier for politicians to
pursue their objectives in some countries and more difficult in others. Yet, politicians have
a permanent incentive to push back those constraints that limit their freedom of action. In
all, this hypothesis predicts that redistribution occurs largely regardless of preferences in the
population. For simplicity, it will not be pursued in detail but may serve as an explanation
of why the amount of redistribution keeps growing over time [for an analysis in the case of
social health insurance, see Zweifel (2007)]. The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2.2, the size and structure of redistribution in the United States, selected EU countries,
and Switzerland are presented. Section 2.3 tests the economic explanations for redistribution,
which are contradicted by the case of Switzerland. Section 2.4 again finds that political expla-
nations are not confirmed by Swiss experience. Section 2.5 presents behavioral determinants
which are not only successful in explaining the differences between the United States and
the EU but are also confirmed by Switzerland. Section 2.6 provides a final assessment of the
determinants of public social spending in a multivariate model. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Size and structure of redistribution in the United States,
the EU, and Switzerland
In this section, the basic facts concerning redistribution in the United States, the EU, and
Switzerland are presented, starting first with government spending and revenue, and then
turning to regulation designed to achieve income redistribution, such as minimum wage laws.
2.2.1 Government spending
Table 2.1 shows the size and composition of government expenditure. Total government ex-
penditure in the EU-15 averages 46 percent of GDP; it reaches 53 percent in France and even
56 percent in Sweden but only 37 percent in the United States. Switzerland is just below the
11
country total government consumption subsidies social fixed
expenditure (appropriation account) benefits investment
total goods and wages
consumption services
US 36.6 15.8 6.1 9.7 0.4 12.0 3.3
EU-15 46.0 20.4 10.2 10.2 1.2 16.3 2.5
Austria 49.2 18.0 8.7 9.3 3.1 18.3 1.1
France 53.4 23.6 10.5 13.1 1.5 17.8 3.4
Germany 45.7 18.3 11.1 7.2 1.2 18.6 1.4
Sweden 55.5 26.8 11.1 15.7 1.6 16.7 3.1
UK 45.0 22.0 10.6 11.4 0.4 13.0 1.8
Switzerland 36.3 10.9 2.8 8.1 4.0 12.0 2.3
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, Dec.
2007). Details may not sum to totals because of excluded categories.
Table 2.1: Composition of general government expenditure in percent of GDP, 2006
U.S. value with 36 percent. However, it is the share of transfers (subsidies and social bene-
fits) where differences are most marked. In fact, the sum of these categories amounts to 17.5
percent of GDP in the EU compared to 12.4 percent in the United States. Here Switzerland
sides with the EU, its share being 16 percent.
Table 2.2 presents the breakdown of social expenditure (which notably includes old-age ben-
efits). First, the United States is far below the EU average with 15 and 24 percent of GDP,
respectively. Switzerland even exceeds the EU average with 26 percent, coming close to full-
fledged welfare states such as Germany (27 percent) and France (29 percent). The main
reason are old-age benefits, where U.S. public expenditure makes up a low 5 percent of GDP,
compared to the EU share of 9 and the Swiss share of 12, respectively. In relative terms,
the differences in family benefits are even more pronounced. Here, the United States spends
one-fifth of the EU value (0.4 compared to 2.2 percent of GDP in the EU-15), with Switzer-
land once more falling in between (1.2 percent). However, this does not necessarily mean that
countries such as France, Germany, or Sweden are pro-poor because social security systems
typically redistribute from the young to the old.
2.2.2 Government revenue
Government expenditure of a country may be pro-poor; yet if it is financed in a highly regres-
sive manner, the net effect of government activity may turn pro-rich. Table 2.3 summarizes
the composition of government revenue in the EU, the United States, and Switzerland. First
of all, the EU governments claim a much larger share of the GDP (46 percent on average)
12
country total old-age family unemployment health incapacity other
US 14.7 5.3 0.4 0.5 6.2 1.1 1.2
EU-15 23.8 8.8 2.2 2.1 6.1 2.9 1.7
Austria 26.0 10.7 2.9 1.3 5.2 2.5 3.4
France 28.5 10.6 2.8 2.9 7.2 2.1 2.9
Germany 27.4 11.7 1.9 2.3 8.0 2.3 1.2
Sweden 29.8 9.2 3.8 2.4 7.4 5.2 1.8
UK 21.8 8.1 2.2 0.6 6.1 2.5 2.3
Switzerland 26.4 11.8 1.2 1.0 6.4 3.8 2.2
Source: OECD (2004) Social Expenditure database.
Table 2.2: Public social expenditure in percent of GDP, 2001
country total tax revenue social security property other
receipts contributions income
direct taxes indirect taxes
total households businesses
US 34.0 13.6 10.3 3.3 7.3 7.0 0.8 5.3
EU-15 45.6 12.2 9.3 2.9 13.6 15.5 0.9 3.4
Austria 47.8 13.1 10.7 2.4 14.0 16.0 1.2 3.5
France 50.8 11.8 8.7 3.1 15.4 18.3 0.7 4.6
Germany 43.8 10.6 9.2 1.4 12.1 17.3 0.6 3.2
Sweden 57.9 20.2 16.5 3.7 17.1 13.2 2.2 5.2
UK 41.9 17.2 13.1 4.1 12.8 8.4 0.6 2.9
Switzerland 35.4 14.9 11.3 3.6 7.2 7.1 1.4 4.8
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic Outlook database (No 82, Dec.
2007).
Table 2.3: Composition of general government revenue in percent of GDP, 2006
than their U.S. counterpart (34 percent). The figures do not match precisely those of Ta-
ble 2.1 because in 2006, governments were accumulating debt at a different pace. The Swiss
government showed the best budgetary discipline among the countries sampled, its expendi-
ture share in the GDP of 36 percent exceeding its revenue share of 35 percent by relatively
little. Second, governments substitute direct taxes by social security contributions. In the
United States, the ratio of the former to the latter is 14/7, while in the EU it amounts to
12/16, and in Germany, even 11/17. With a ratio of 15/7, Switzerland definitely resembles
the United States here. Thus, in terms of direct taxation, some EU countries might look like
tax havens compared to the United States and Switzerland but they make up by charging
much higher social security contributions. Whether this reflects a more marked pro-poor ori-
entation depends on the relative progressiveness of social security and income taxation. By
way of contrast, indirect taxation is generally regarded as regressive. The ratio of direct to
indirect taxes is 14/7 for the United States, 12/14 for the EU, but 15/7 for Switzerland. On
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country 1980 1990 2000 2006
US 12.9 13.7 14.9 16.6
EU-15 21.3 21.8 21.7 21.7
Austria 25.5 26.6 27.4 26.1
France 21.3 22.7 24.2 25.4
Germany 21.5 21.2 24.0 23.2
Sweden 25.9 27.8 25.9 25.7
UK 16.3 15.1 17.0 18.4
Switzerland n.a. 14.9 18.9 20.5
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from OECD Economic outlook database (No. 82,
Dec. 2007).
Table 2.4: Government expenditure on subsidies, social benefits and other current transfers
in percent of GDP, 1980-2006
this account, both the United States and Switzerland look more pro-poor than the EU, with
France (12/15) marking an extreme.
However, not only does the status quo reveal important differences; developments during the
last few decades differ, too. Table 2.4 tracks the government expenditure categories “subsi-
dies” and “social benefits” of Table 2.1 (complemented by “current transfers”, not evidenced
there) since 1980. By that time, countries such as Austria, France, and Germany were full-
fledged welfare states with GDP shares above 20 percent, while the United States stood at
13 percent. Since then, it has caught up somewhat, reaching some 17 percent in 2006. While
data for 1980 are not available for Switzerland, in 1990 its share of 15 percent was close to
that of the United States. However, Swiss transfer payments have increased particularly fast
since then, attaining 21 percent in 2006, not far from the EU average of 22 percent anymore.
Summing up the findings so far, Switzerland resembles the EU in terms of its government
expenditure but is more similar to the United States in terms of its government revenues. It
used to be close to the United States with regard to transfers but has been approaching the
EU during the last two decades.
2.2.3 Redistribution through private charity
The preceding data suggest that EU countries and Switzerland provide more public welfare
than the United States. However, the World Values Survey (Table 2.5) shows that Americans
engage in more private provision of welfare through charity than EU and Swiss citizens.
Roberts (1984) hypothesizes that public provision of welfare in part crowds out private charity.
14
country active member inactive member not a member
US (1995) 27.3 14.9 57.8
Germany (1997) 7.9 13.8 78.3
Sweden (1996) 6.7 15.8 77.5
Switzerland (1996) 5.8 15.3 78.9
Source: World Values Survey.
Table 2.5: Membership in charitable organizations in percent of total population, 1995-1997
country percent of GDP
US 1.67
France 0.14
Germany 0.22
Ireland 0.47
Netherlands 0.45
UK 0.73
Switzerland 0.37
Sources: Charities Aid Foundation, ZEWO Foundation.
Table 2.6: Charitable giving as a share of GDP, 2005
Potential donors, seeing government transfers on the rise, have a weakened motivation to give.
Being altruistic, they might also be willing to donate through the government. However, the
symmetry of substitution effects leads to the prediction that those who donate privately prefer
to limit public transfers.
Therefore, a low level of public expenditure in the United States could be partially explained
with high private donations. Table 2.5 tends to support this view. In the United States, 27
percent of the population report to actively participate in a charitable organization, compared
to 8 percent in Germany and a mere 6 percent in Switzerland. Conversely, only 58 percent
of U.S. citizens indicate not to be involved in any charitable organization, whereas their
European counterparts are close to the 80 percent level. Table 2.6 shows that the amount
of charity giving in the US is also higher than in EU countries and Switzerland, suggesting
that public transfers cause a reduction in voluntary donations in Europe, as predicted by the
crowding-out literature. On this score, Switzerland definitely sides with the EU rather than
the United States.
15
country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
US 42.3 39.3 39.7 42.7 45.7 45.0
EU-15 35.1 35.1 31.2 29.6 30.3 29.9
Austria - 29.5 31.6 26.3 29.2 26.0
France 49.0 39.8 36.4 28.0 28.2 28.0
Germany 38.0 39.2 36.6 30.8 29.8 28.0
Sweden - 29.5 19.4 21.9 27.2 23.0
UK 25.5 25.4 25.3 33.5 34.6 35.0
Switzerland - - 35.9 33.8 31.8 31.1
Source: WIID database, World Institute for Development Economics Research 2006.
Table 2.7: Gini coefficients in the U.S., EU, and Switzerland, 1960-2005
2.3 Economic explanations of income redistribution
One of the main economic explanations of income redistribution states that the more marked
the pre-tax income inequality, the higher the demand and the political pressure for redistri-
bution. This is the basic idea behind the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard (RRMR) model2
stating that the lower the income of the median voter relative to the income of the average
voter, the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
Indeed, U.S. income inequality was high in 1960 [Gini coefficient of 42, see Deininger and
Squire (1996)] and has been again increasing since 1970 to reach a Gini of 45 in 2005. In the
same period, the average value of EU countries has fallen from 35 to 30. The most notable
decrease occurred in France, from 49 to 28. As to Switzerland, the first measurement dates
back to 1980. Since then, its Gini coefficient has been decreasing even faster, from 36 to
31 (the U.S. and EU values being 43 and 30, respectively, at the time). Therefore, in 1980
Switzerland lay right in between the two poles but has been approaching the EU fast since.
In view of the marked pre-tax income inequality in the United States, combined with low
government expenditure and few labor market interventions, the RRMR model finds very
weak support by the evidence. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) point out that the main failure
of this model rests on its simplistic assumptions, viz. the ‘one person, one vote’ rule and
the median-voter outcome. Barenboim and Karabarbounis (2008) show empirically that the
very rich have more weight above and beyond the ‘one person, one vote’ rule in the political
process, while the very poor do not vote at all. Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) [see Chapter 3 of
this dissertation] conduct a discrete choice experiment in Switzerland and elicit willingness
2Romer (1975); Roberts (1977); Meltzer and Richard (1981)
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Figure 2.1: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (% of GDP in 2007) and income
mobility parameter x defined as the ratio of the income in the fourth quintile to the income
in the third quintile
αˆ = 26.2112, βˆ = −2.6698, R¯2 = 0.0036 for the whole sample (the t statis-
tic is -0.2636, i.e. not significant); αˆ = 36.81, βˆ = −10.838, R¯2 = 0.0493 if
Denmark excluded (the t statistic is -0.966, i.e. still not significant). Country labels:
A=Austria, AUS=Australia, BEL=Belgium, CAN=Canada, CH=Switzerland, D=Germany,
DK=Denmark, E=Spain, F=France, FIN=Finland, GRE=Greece, I=Italy, IRE=Ireland,
JAP=Japan, NL=Netherlands, NOR=Norway, POR=Portugal, S=Sweden, UK=United
Kingdom, US=United States, EU-15=simple average of old EU member countries without
Luxembourg (A, BEL, D, DK, E, F, FIN, GRE, I, IRE, NL, POR, S, UK). Data source: CIA
World Factbook 2008.
to pay for income redistribution. Their analysis of preference heterogeneity with respect to
current economic well-being shows that willingness to pay for redistribution increases with
income and education, contradicting the RRMR model.
However, as hypothesized by Benabou and Ok (2001), earnings mobility may dampen a poor
but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for redistribution [for empirical support using U.S.
data, see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)]. In their study of willingness to pay for redistribu-
tion, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) [see Chapter 3] use five alternative mobility measures and
show that this Prospect of Upward Mobility (POUM) hypothesis receives partial empirical
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support, albeit for only four of five measures used. However, individuals with no mobility at
all display the highest resistance against redistribution, contradicting the POUM hypothesis
but underscoring the importance of a high status quo bias. As a partial test, Figure 2.1 plots
public transfers (GDP share) against the ratio of average income in the (relatively wealthy)
fourth and average income in the (middle class) third quintile. Admittedly, this is a rather
poor measure of mobility, as discussed in Muren and Nyberg (2005). One would prefer to take
into account probabilities of transition from the third to the fourth quintile. However, the
data on these transition probabilities are currently available for six countries only [see OECD
(1996)]. Still, since the quintile transition probabilities are shown to be quite similar among
the OECD countries [Muren and Nyberg (2005)], a large inter-quintile income difference can
serve as a rough indicator of income mobility. In the United States, the difference between the
third and the fourth quintile is indeed large (1.55 or 55 percent more income), whereas it is
around 1.3 in the EU on average. When the outlier Denmark (DK in Figure 2.1) is excluded
as an outlier to a negative relationship, the negative slope of the regression becomes slightly
more marked, providing weak support for the POUM hypothesis of Benabou and Ok (2001).
However, the coefficient of determination remains low, and United States (US in Figure 2.1)
as well as Canada (CAN), Australia (AUS), Japan (JAP), and Ireland (IRE) lie far below
the regression line.
Some authors establish a link between openness of the economy and the level of income redis-
tribution by postulating the compensation hypothesis [Cameron (1978); Katzenstein (1985);
Garret (2000); Adsera and Boix (2002)]. This hypothesis states that small open economies
compensate their losers from international liberalization with government interventions in the
domestic economy, mainly with an increase in transfer payments. Higher levels of trade imply
growing risks associated with the international business cycle and thereby cause higher levels
of income volatility and income inequality. As stated in Section 2.1, under the veil of un-
certainty, risk-averse individuals may be willing to support income redistribution programs,
especially if designed to help those who suffered an unexpected loss in their assets (health,
wealth, wisdom, i.e. skills). Emphasizing the former effect, viz. that open economies expose
citizens to more income volatility because they are subject to external shocks, Rodrik (1998)
relates income redistribution to the openness of the economy. Other authors [Adsera and Boix
(2002), Balcells Ventura (2006)] emphasize the latter effect, the increasing inequality based
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Figure 2.2: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (% of GDP in 2003) and openness
x, defined as sum of exports and imports 2007 over GDP in 2007
αˆ = 19.609, βˆ = 0.0473, R¯2 = 0.1094, t statistic is 1.433 (not significant). Data source: CIA
World Factbook 2008.
on the idea that openness to trade creates winners and losers within economies. They show
that the impact of openness on income redistribution crucially depends on income per capita
and the size of potential loser sectors. While trade has a positive effect on the size of the
public sector in rich countries (those abundant in high-income factors), it negatively affects
the level of income redistribution in poor countries. Figure 2.2 plots3 transfers as a share of
GDP against an indicator of openness, the ratio between the sum of exports and imports
and GDP. Indeed, the United States, being a rather closed economy, has the lowest transfer
share. And in general, increased openness does go along with more transfers for ’rich’ OECD
3Given that transfers are associated with inefficiencies, one could argue that transfers as a ’type of insur-
ance against the vagaries of openness’ should progressively increase with openness. However, a regression of
transfers on openness and (openness)2 yields a negative but insignificant term. The nonlinear relationship
between political (and social) openness and welfare is examined by Koster (2008). The author finds weak
evidence of nonlinearity for social openness, but no evidence for political openness.
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Figure 2.3: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between the natural logarithm of transfers y (in % of
GDP in 2003) and the natural logarithm of openness x, defined as ratio of the sum of exports
and imports 2007 over GDP in 2007
αˆ = 2.4068, βˆ = 0.1716, R¯2 = 0.1716, t statistic is 1.977 (significant at the 6.4 percent level).
Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008.
countries, thus seemingly supporting the result of Balcells Ventura (2006). However, with a t
statistic of 1.433, this bivariate regression does not provide conclusive evidence of a positive
relationship.
In a next step, Figure 2.3 plots the natural logarithm of the share of transfers in GDP against
the natural logarithm of the indicator of openness as defined above. Now the t statistic has
the value of 1.977 and thus implies weak evidence (at the 6.36 percent significance level) of
a positive elasticity of transfers as a share of GDP with respect to the indicator of openness.
One might argue that openness as defined by Rodrik (1998) fails to measure the impact of
foreign trade shocks on the welfare of a population. Shifts in the terms of trade, however,
directly indicate changes in the gains from trade a country can reap and hence in welfare.
During the period 1960-2006, the U.S. terms of trade exhibited a standard deviation of 0.133
percentage points p.a. While comparable data are lacking for the EU, Austria and Germany
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come in with 0.05 and 0.085 points, respectively4. Once more, Switzerland is in between
with 0.106 points. Note that the high U.S. value would lead one to predict a high amount
of redistribution, contrary to the empirical evidence. At best, one could argue that social
mobility in the United States serves as a substitute for redistributive policies.
On the whole, economic explanations do not seem to be very successful in predicting the
amount of income redistribution, at least when relying on government expenditure and trans-
fers as indicators. If one is willing to use Janus-faced Switzerland as a test case, this country
is never even close to the regression line. Thus, it causes the balance to be tipped against
economic explanations.
2.4 Political explanations
The United States, the EU, and Switzerland differ in terms of their political institutions. The
first aspect relates to the electoral level. The United States has a majoritarian system where
the plurality rule is applied in federal elections (i.e. each district delegates the representative
with the most votes), while all EU countries (with the exception of the United Kingdom and
France) have proportional representation. Proportional representation tends to produce mul-
tiparty parliaments and governments, while majority rule favors a strict two-party system as
in the United States or a multiparty system dominated by two players as in the United King-
dom. The political science literature [Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002),
Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003)] predicts that proportional representation tends towards
universal programs benefitting various groups (pensioners, workers, poor, minorities, etc.),
while majority rule results in targeted ‘pork barrel’ programs. Persson and Tabellini (2000,
2003) find supporting empirical evidence in that countries with proportional representation
have GDP share of government expenditure that ceteris paribus is 5 percentage points higher
than with majority rule.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the effect of electoral rules on fiscal policy, plotting transfers as a share
of GDP against a measure of proportional representation for most OECD countries. There
is indeed weak evidence of a positive correlation. While the EU-15 is close to the regression
line, the United States constitute an outlier. This is true of Switzerland too, in spite of its
4Authors’ calculations from OECD Economic Outlook Database, No. 82, Dec. 2007, World Bank and
WMM.
21
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
Degree of Proportional Representation
Tr
an
sf
er
s 
(%
 of
 G
DP
)
A
S
CH
EU−15
UK
AUS
CAN
US
F
I
D
JAP
IRE
GRE
E
NL
FIN
POR
NOR
BEL
DK
Figure 2.4: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the
degree of proportional representation x
αˆ = 20.058, βˆ = 4.16, R¯2 = 0.1663, t statistic is 1.91 (significant at the 7.22 percent level).
Degree of proportional representation is the natural logarithm of the size of electoral districts,
defined as the number of electoral districts in a country divided by the number of seats in
the lower or single house for the most recent legislature. Data source: CIA World Factbook
2008, Persson and Tabellini (2003).
system of proportional representation and a system with several strong parties that is similar
to continental EU countries. The reasons for this divergence are discussed below.
The second aspect of political institutions relates to the government. The United States has a
presidential system while all EU countries are parliamentary democracies (with the exception
of France, whose government is controlled by the majority in the parliament, however). Pres-
idential regimes at first sight result in a concentration of power; however, they tend to have a
stronger separation of powers designed to prevent abuse [cf. Persson et al. (1997)]. Since this
abuse goes along with increased government expenditure and transfers to supporting clientele
groups, presidential systems are predicted to induce less income redistribution.
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The third aspect is the party system. Barriers to entry for parties are particularly high in
the United States, likely due to the country’s vast size and low population density, both of
which help to diffuse social conflict. This has resulted in the absence of a strong socialist
party, whereas the European left was able to organize and divulge its ideas, resulting in a
higher amount of income redistribution.
The fourth aspect of political institutions of relevance for redistribution is fiscal decentraliza-
tion. This creates obstacles to an excessive role for the central government in fiscal matters,
making it more difficult to tax the rich in some part of the country in favor of the poor
localized in other parts. Again, the United States is characterized by a higher degree of fiscal
federalism than most EU countries [Inman and Rubinfeld (1992)], which may help explain
its lower amount of income redistribution.
As to Switzerland, it is on the U.S. side on items three and four (Supreme Court, fiscal de-
centralization) but on the EU side on items one and two (proportional representation, low
barriers to entry for political parties). However, the distinguishing feature of Switzerland in
this context is its direct democracy with popular initiatives and referenda. Feld et al. (2007)
find that public expenditure tends to be better tailored to the needs of the electorate in direct
than in representative democracies. If the electorate wishes to be pro-poor, Swiss redistribu-
tive policies might attain its objectives at a lower value of total transfers than representative
democracies. As noted in the context of the first aspect cited (proportional vs. majoritarian
representation), this observation is not discriminating because Switzerland is below the re-
gression line in Figure 2.4. However, the Netherlands and Spain, two countries with almost no
direct democratic control, have the same GDP share of transfers as Switzerland. Therefore,
direct democratic control cannot alone explain why Switzerland has low transfers in spite of
its high degree of proportional representation.
Summing up, four aspects of political institutions seem to be relevant for income redistribu-
tion. One of them (degree of proportional representation) could be quantified; it did show the
predicted relationship with the transfer share in GDP. Using again Switzerland for corrobo-
rating evidence, the country shares institutional features both with the United States and the
EU. However, it is unique in its degree of direct democratic control, yet has the same GDP
share of transfers as the Netherlands and Spain, two countries with quite different political
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institutions. Therefore, political explanations appear only slightly more convincing than the
economic ones.
2.5 Behavioral explanations
Behavioral explanations of income redistribution importantly revolve around the concept of
imperfect altruism. While prefect altruism is exclusively governed by recipients’ preferences,
imperfect altruism also reflects donor preferences. In particular, it predicts that people will
oppose public welfare if they believe that recipients take advantage of the system, a behavior
that is often attributed to members of ethnic minorities. Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina et al.
(2001), Luttmer (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), and Luttmer and Singhal (2008) find
that people oppose redistribution favoring ethnic or racial groups other than their own as
well as minorities that are overrepresented among the poor.
As a first piece of evidence, Figure 2.5 plots the bivariate relationship between public transfers
and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. While most EU countries are quite homogeneous with
respect to ethnicity and language, Belgium and Spain display a degree of heterogeneity that
exceeds that of the United States (Canada is the extreme case here). There is a negative
correlation, supporting the hypothesis. Switzerland has a high heterogeneity too, reflecting the
strong division between the German-speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-speaking parts
of the country. However, this time it lies right on the regression line, providing corroborating
evidence.
A second aspect of fragmentation is migration. Immigration serves to increase the heterogene-
ity of a society. The net migration rate is defined as the difference between the immigration
rate and the emigration rate. It would be preferable to consider the immigration rather than
the net migration rate. However, data on the immigration rate are available for selected
countries only. Still, in all OECD countries under consideration the rate of emigration is sig-
nificantly lower than the immigration rate. Therefore, the net migration rate can be used as a
rough approximation of the immigration rate. As Figure 2.6 shows, countries with higher net
migration rates tend to spend smaller fractions of their GDP on transfers. The corresponding
bivariate regression comes very close to conventional significance levels. The United States
constitutes an outlier with especially low transfers, presumably due to a third aspect, racial
heterogeneity (which is more pronounced there than in the majority of EU countries). Indeed,
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Figure 2.5: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the
ethno-linguistic fragmentation x
αˆ = 23.87, βˆ = −9.915, R¯2 = 0.0675, t statistic is -1.18 (not significant). The index of
ethno-linguistic fragmentation is the level of lack of ethnic and linguistic cohesion within a
country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fragmented) and averaging five different
indices, see Persson and Tabellini (2003). Data source: CIA World Factbook 2008, Persson
and Tabellini (2003).
work by Kinder and Sanders (1996) reveals that racial resentment is the most powerful de-
terminant of whites’ (who are overrepresented among payers) opinions on welfare, affirmative
action, school desegregation, and the plight of the inner city. Switzerland lies close to the
regression line. On the one hand, its rate of net migration and share of foreign population
are very high, similar to those of the United States. But on the other hand, being foreign is
not necessarily associated with (permanent) poverty, similar to most EU countries.
Following Razin and Sadka (1995), the birth rate may be seen as a third indicator of frag-
mentation. A high rate of fertility calls for a great deal of intra-family redistribution, which
squeezes out public transfers. This argument suggests a negative correlation; however, a posi-
tive relationship cannot be excluded due to reverse causality. A high birth rate could be argued
to trigger a great deal of transfers in the guise of family allowances. Moreover, many govern-
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Figure 2.6: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and net
migration rate x
αˆ = 26.047, βˆ = −1.458, R¯2 = 0.1948, t statistic is -2.093 (significant at the 5.08 level). Data
source: CIA World Factbook 2008.
ments see family allowances as a means to increase the birth rate. When transfers are plotted
against the birth rate, a negative relationship obtains (see Figure 2.7). The United States has
a fertility rate that is only exceeded by Ireland, one-half higher than the EU average, which
reflects very low rates in countries such as Germany, Austria, and Italy. Switzerland again
lies close enough to the regression line to provide some support to the hypothesis.
A fourth behavioral element is beliefs. The hypothesis is that a society who believes that
luck, birth, connections, and corruption determine wealth will choose a high degree of redis-
tribution, financed by high taxes, see Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina and Angeletos
(2005). By way of contrast, the conviction that high income and wealth are the result of
work effort goes along with little income redistribution. Beliefs do differ sharply between the
United States and the EU. Most Americans believe that anyone can get out of poverty by
hard work and that the poor remain poor only because they refuse to make the effort. By
way of contrast, Europeans generally think that poverty is due to bad luck and not the in-
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Figure 2.7: Relationship y = αˆ + βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and birth
rate x
αˆ = 31.469, βˆ = −0.834, R¯2 = 0.1058, t statistic is -1.526 (not significant). Data source:
OECD, CIA World Factbook 2008.
dividual’s responsibility. Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) measure the willingness-to-pay for
justice in the United States using dictator games. Dictators were given $10 to split between
themselves and recipients. The authors find that one third of the dictators are willing to pay
one dollar out of ten for obtaining the information whether poverty was due to disability or
substance abuse. Finally, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) show that a history of misfortune in the
recent past such as unemployment and personal trauma makes people more risk-averse and
less optimistic about upward mobility. These changes in beliefs are found to have a positive
and significant effect on redistribution.
Figure 2.8 plots transfers against a score that ranges from 1 (hard work always brings a better
life) to 10 (hard work does not bring any success). The Unites States is the observation closest
to the score of 1 but still lies below the regression line. Germany (D) and Denmark (DK)
mark the other extreme. With a coefficient of determination of 0.3 and a t statistic of 2.778,
this is one of two best-fitting bivariate regressions designed to explain the share of transfers
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Figure 2.8: Relationship y = αˆ+ βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and the belief
x that luck determines success (median value for each country, measured as an index from 1
to 10, with 10 indicating strongest belief)
αˆ = 6.319, βˆ = 3.495, R¯2 = 0.3006, t statistic is 2.778 (significant). Data Source: OECD,
World Values Survey.
in GDP. Here again, Switzerland lies right near the regression line, lending additional support
to the hypothesis.
A fifth behavioral element is political attitudes. For a long time, political scientists have been
relating left-wing orientation to attitudes in favor of income redistribution [Downs (1957)]5.
However, the relationship between the political orientation of the median voter and the actual
amount of redistribution (measured by the share of GDP devoted to transfers, as before) turns
out amazingly weak. In Figure 2.9, political attitudes of the median voters range on a scale
between 1 (left-wing) and 10 (right-wing). Note that there is little variation, with the EU-15
at 5.3 and the United States at 5.8. Switzerland lies close enough to the regression line to
5Frohlich and Boschmann (1986) provide supporting empirical evidence for the United States and Canada.
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Figure 2.9: Relationship y = αˆ+ βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and political
orientation x (median value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating
the right-wing orientation)
αˆ = 41.099, βˆ = 3.444, R¯2 = 0.0506, t statistic is -1.063 (not significant). Data Source:
OECD, World Values Survey.
provide supporting evidence, which however is weak to begin with in view of the very low
coefficient of determination.
As a sixth and final behavioral dimension, one can cite religiosity. There are three strands of
theory, all of them predicting a negative relationship between religiosity and income redis-
tribution. First, Benabou and Tirole (2006) model collective cultural beliefs, one of which is
religion. In their ‘highly religious’ (Protestant) equilibrium, hard work and industriousness
are believed to have rewards in the afterlife, the amount of redistribution is low, and average
effort and output are high. In their ’less religious’ equilibrium, there is less effort and more
redistribution (e.g. through alms). Second, Scheve and Stasavage (2006a,b) argue and pro-
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Figure 2.10: Relationship y = αˆ+βˆx between transfers y (in % of GDP in 2003) and religiosity
x (median value for country, measured as an index from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the highest
importance of God in life)
αˆ = 33.695, βˆ = −1.877, R¯2 = 0.3175, t statistic is -2.906 (significant at the 1 percent level).
Data Source: OECD, World Values Survey.
vide evidence that religion provides insurance against adverse events. Therefore risk-averse
religious individuals express less demand for redistribution as a collective insurance device,
resulting again in a negative predicted relationship between religiosity and redistribution.
A third strand argues that public welfare crowds out participation in church and charitable
activities, giving once more rise to a negative correlation. Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and
Hungerman (2007) find evidence that public insurance spending indeed crowds out religious
charitable spending. Figure 2.10 shows the strength of religious orientation (1 = no impor-
tance of God in life, 10 = maximum importance) to vary considerably, with the United States
marking the high end. With a coefficient of determination of 0.32 and a t statistic of -2.906,
this is the best-fitting bivariate regression designed to explain the share of transfers in the
GDP. Hence, the partial correlation between religiosity and the share of transfers in GDP is
clearly negative, supporting the theories expounded above. On this score, Switzerland shares
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the somewhat guarded attitudes prevailing in the EU. Being located close to the regression
line, it provides additional evidence supporting the theoretical arguments relating religion to
redistribution.
2.6 Final Assessment
In sum, out of six behavioral factors that according to the existing literature influence atti-
tudes with regard to income redistribution, all (with the exception of ethno-linguistic fragmen-
tation) were found to be at least partially correlated with the amount of income distribution
as measured by public transfers as a share of GDP. And in all cases, Switzerland, located
between the United States and the EU, is on or close to the regression line, in contradistinc-
tion to the economic and political explanations considered. This observation is informative:
Switzerland consistently lies between the United States and the EU average on all six scales
used as explanatory variables. If the estimated relationships have validity, it should there-
fore be located on or close to the regression line rather than constituting an outlier. Since
this prediction is confirmed, it tips the balance in favor of behavioral explanations of income
redistribution.
A final assessment can be based on multivariate analysis relating the share of transfers in
GDP to mobility, openness (both economic), proportional representation (political), ethno-
linguistic fragmentation, migration rate, birth rate, belief that luck determines success, politi-
cal orientation, and religiosity (all behavioral). Applying the stepwise reduction procedure by
excluding the least significant regressors, one arrives at the final model of Table 2.8. The two
explanatory variables retained are both behavioral, viz. the belief that luck determines suc-
cess and religiosity. Moreover, their coefficients do not significantly differ from the coefficients
in the respective bivariate regressions. They are both significant at the 5 percent significance
level in the final model as shown in Table 2.8 (compared to a 1 percent significance level in
the bivariate regressions, cf. Figures 2.8 and 2.10). However, these two variables are jointly
significant at the 1 percent level, as indicated by the test statistic F (2, 17) = 7.19 [0.0055].
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coefficient standard error t value
constant 19.290 7.925 2.434
belief in luck 2.537 1.215 2.089
religiosity -1.457 0.654 -2.229
Joint significance test: F (2, 17) = 7.19 [0.0055]
Table 2.8: Final model for the share of public transfers in GDP
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, an attempt was made to explain the difference in the amount of public income
redistribution between the United States and the European Union (EU), based on an empir-
ical examination of three sets of determinants, economic, political, and behavioral, with the
most recent data for 20 developed OECD countries6 listed in Figure 2.1. The previous liter-
ature [Alesina and Glaeser (2004)] looks at bivariate relations between the amount of public
redistribution and various economic, political, and behavioral variables for large data sets
including developing countries. In addition to the variables in Alesina and Glaeser (2004), we
included further variables in our study such as a measure for social mobility, migration rate
and birth rate. Since Switzerland, a non-EU country, is almost always located between the
two polar cases, we use it as a test case providing corroborating or contradicting evidence.
Economic determinants predict more rather then less income redistribution in the United
States than in EU, contrary to facts. Before-tax income inequality is higher, the income dis-
tribution is more skewed, and incomes and terms of trade are more volatile in the United
States than in the EU countries. However, U.S. income mobility is higher, too, possibly serv-
ing as a substitute for redistribution. Pertinent bivariate regressions have poor statistical fit.
Moreover, Switzerland lies rather far from the respective regression lines, providing contra-
dicting rather than corroborating evidence.
Political variables include district rather than proportional representation, a two-party vs.
multiparty system, a presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, courts emphasizing property
rights, and failure of a strong and lasting socialist party to form; all distinguishing the United
States from the EU. However, once again, the bivariate regressions do not have much explana-
tory power. And again, Switzerland comes close to being an outlier, thus failing to buttress
the weak supporting evidence.
6However, the regression on the belief about luck vs. effort as well as the final multivariate regression do
not include Greece due to a lack of data.
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Behavioral explanations include ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the country, the migration
rate, the birth rate, the belief that luck determines success, the degree of left-wing orientation,
and the strength of religious belief. On several of these scores, the U.S. population constitutes
an outlier. In particular, it sees hard work rather than luck as a determinant of success,
contrary to the population of a typical EU country. Two bivariate regressions (with belief that
the luck determines economic success and religion as the explanatory variable, respectively)
attain coefficients of determination of 0.3 or more. In addition, the Swiss observation is on
or close to the regression line, thus providing supporting evidence. In a final assessment, we
identify the most significant variables based on a multivariate regression, complementing the
bivariate analyses by Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
Both the bivariate and the multivariate regressions suggest the following conclusions. The
United States has less income redistribution than the European Union for three main reasons.
The first is political. With its absence of proportional representation (a feature shared with
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, countries with a low amount of redistribution,
too), the United States has an impediment against resolving political conflict through buying
off minorities, a tradition characterizing notably Austria and Sweden (see Figure 2.4 again).
Using Switzerland as a test case, its observation is off the regression line by about the same
amount as the United States (and on the same side). Therefore, it does contribute a measure
of confirmatory evidence. The other two reasons are behavioral. The U.S. population does
not believe that chance determines economic success, contrary to the EU population (see
Figure 2.8 again). Further, it believes that God is of critical importance in life, which is held
to a comparable degree by the Portuguese but certainly not by the EU population on average
(see Figure 2.10 again). On both scores, the Swiss observation is on or close to the respective
regression line, providing a bit of supporting evidence. And on both scores, Switzerland is
located between the United States and the EU, showing its Janus face.
It is appropriate to point out the limitations of this analysis. First, it does not rest on a
unifying theoretical basis, drawing on economics, political science, and sociology in an eclectic
manner. Second, possible determinants are tested mainly one by one in a series of bivariate
regressions. This of course entails the risk of attributing influence to a factor that should
be attributed to another factor not controlled for. Third, the evidence relates to a point in
time. Measured values can be subject to transitory shocks causing them to differ from the
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permanent values the theories refer to. Fourth, one could argue that while accepting the
view that the United States and the European Union constitute two polar cases with regard
to income redistribution, some country other than Switzerland should have been selected
as a test case in between. All these limitations have to be taken seriously. Above all, they
call for additional research to answer the question, “Why is there such a marked difference
between the United States and the European Union in terms of income redistribution?” The
present study may provide a few preliminary answers that need to be corroborated. It uses
Switzerland as a test case because that country, while being in the middle of Europe, does
have a few features that are reminiscent of the United States, giving it an intriguing Janus
face.
2.8 Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation (SNF) under Project no. 100012-116398. They received helpful comments from Rosa
Fontes, Philipp Morf, Maurus Rischatsch, Mercedes Sastre, Miche`le Sennhauser, and Philippe
Widmer, participants in the 16th Symposium on Public Economics (5-6 February 2009,
Granada, Spain), and three anonymous referees, and are grateful to Georgios Sismanidis
for help with data collection.
34
Economic well-being, social mobility,
and preferences for income redistribution:
evidence from a discrete choice experiment
Ilja Neustadt and Peter Zweifel
Submitted to “International Tax and Public Finance”.
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Chapter 3
Economic well-being, social
mobility, and preferences for
income redistribution: evidence
from a discrete choice experiment
3.1 Introduction
Politicians and interest groups often claim to know citizens’ preferences with regard to income
redistribution. While the typical right-wing stance is to decry it as excessive, the left points
to pockets of poverty even in rich societies that need to be eradicated through more redis-
tribution. The economists’ contribution to the debate traditionally has been to analyze the
effects of redistributive policies on employment, output, and growth. This paper intends to go
a step further by measuring citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution. Through
a Discrete Choice experiment (DCE), it seeks to determine not only the desired amount of
redistribution but also to test several hypotheses concerning the determinants of this WTP.
The data come from a DCE performed in the fall of 2008 and involving 979 Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants, which will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2 below. One strand relates
the measured amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral factors.
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Examples are Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009). However, the observed
amount of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between demand and supply, with
supply governed by a country’s political institutions and processes. This classical identification
problem would have to be addressed in order to make inference about citizens’ preferences
for redistribution. A second strand of research, exemplified by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
and Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to measure attitudes towards redistribution.
The problem with this approach is its failure to impose a budget constraint. It therefore
cannot predict actual decision making (e.g. voting at the polls), where citizens take into
account the consequences in terms of their own income and wealth. A third approach seeks
to solve this problem through Contingent Valuation (CV) experiments [see e.g. Boeri et al.
(2002)]. The weakness of the CV approach is that it holds all the attributes of the good in
question constant, varying its price only. In the present context, one would want to vary other
attributes of redistribution besides its tax price, viz. its use (for health, old age, etc.) and the
type of beneficiary (foreigner, national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows to measure preferences uncontaminated by supply influ-
ences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it does so in a realistic
way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all attributes are allowed to
vary.
There are two recent contributions whose methodology is similar to the one adopted in this
paper. One is by Andreoni and Miller (2002), who test the consistency of altruistic revealed
preferences in a dictatorship experiment, varying an implicit price. Their method of inferring
preferences through estimating WTP values is close to this paper. The other is by Kuhn
(2005), who asked Swiss respondents to estimate wages earned by different professions as
well as indicate the wages they deemed fair. The difference between these two values was
then used as an indicator of the demand for redistribution. On average, preferences were for
the wages of high-earning professions such as lawyers, physicians or federal ministers to be
reduced by 10 percent while those of low-income groups, to be increased by some 5 percent.
Interestingly, such a redistributive scheme would roughly result in budget balance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a literature review
from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its first part concerns the general deter-
minants of the demand for redistribution, the second, economic well-being, and the third,
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mobility as determinants of preferences for redistribution. Section 3.3 presents a general
description of the method of DCEs as well as the design of the present experiment. The
descriptive statistics of the experiment follow in Section 3.4, and hypothesis tests, in Section
3.5. Section 3.6 summarizes the results and concludes with implications for public policy.
3.2 Literature review and statement of hypotheses
This section first presents research that defines the general background of this paper and then
moves on to contributions that lead to a set of specific hypotheses to be tested.
3.2.1 General determinants of the demand for income redistribution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) [see Chapter 2 of
this dissertation] identify a wide set of factors influencing preferences that can be categorized
as economic, political, and behavioral determinants. As to the economic determinants, Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) empirically analyze the effects of current and future income on the
demand for redistribution in the United States. While low current income bolsters demand,
chances for higher future income reduce it when the tax system is expected to become more
progressive. Another economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that
a preference for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as demand for insurance by
risk-averse individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their
endowment as well as their future position in society [‘veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls (1999)],
they exhibit a positive WTP for an income transfer from more favorable future states to less
favorable ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted as reflecting this hypothetical
demand for insurance.
Beck (1994) investigates individual behavior under the ‘veil of ignorance’ in an experiment.
Placing participants in a hypothetical society with random differences in income, represented
by lotteries, he derives the desired amount of income redistribution. Individuals indeed dis-
play risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme kind implied by the Rawlsian maximin rule1.
Furthermore, they show no preference for income redistribution in excess of what can be
explained by risk aversion.
1The Rawlsian maximin rule uses the maximum improvement of the individual with minimum initial wealth
as the sole criterion.
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As to the political determinants, the literature [Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003), Lizzeri
and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] predicts that proportional representation
tends towards universal programs benefitting various groups (old-age pensioners, working
poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in targeted ‘pork barrel’ programs. Persson
and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical evidence in that countries with proportional
representation have GDP shares of government expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 per-
centage points higher than with majority rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) [Chapter
2] show that there is a weak evidence of a positive correlation between the degree of propor-
tional representation and the transfer share in GDP in OECD countries. Additional politi-
cal determinants of redistribution include two-party vs. multiparty system, presidential vs.
parliamentary democracy, and direct vs. representative democracy, with two-party systems,
presidential, and direct democracies all predicted to induce less public redistribution. Switzer-
land on the one hand has a high degree of proportional representation and a parliamentary
democracy; on the other hand, its extensive direct democratic control might serve to limit
public welfare spending while enforcing efficiency in redistribution [cf. Feld et al. (2007)].
Among the behavioral determinants of income redistribution, beliefs have been at the center of
attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and Angeletos (2005), who develop a model
where society’s belief whether effort or luck determines economic success gives rise to multiple
self-fulfilling equilibria; Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a model for the emergence and
persistence of such collective beliefs. On the empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence
in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that beliefs about the role of luck in
determining economic success are an important determinant of the demand for redistribution.
She also considers the effects of incentives. If effort determines income, then an increased
income tax rate causes a loss in output due to its effect on incentives. This consideration is
hypothesized to qualify the link between beliefs and the demand for redistribution. However,
the data fail to support this hypothesis.
Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension
and unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also perform CV
experiments that impose an explicit trade-off between income and social insurance coverage
on respondents. They find that people oppose an extension of the welfare state, with conflicts
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between young and old, rich and poor, and insiders and outsiders creating significant hurdles
to welfare reform.
3.2.2 Economic well-being and demand for income redistribution
The standard model of income redistribution, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981) [RRMR model], assumes that
identical non-altruistic utility-maximizing individuals are only differentiated by their income
levels and determine their individually optimal consumption and leisure. The utility function
of individual i takes the following quasi-linear form [cf. Persson and Tabellini (2000)],
ui(ci, li) = ci + v(li) (3.1)
where ci denotes individual consumption, li leisure, and v(·) is an increasing and concave
function. The government pays a lump-sum transfer T to all citizens, which is financed by a
linear uniform income tax τ . Thus, the household budget constraint takes the form
ci + (1− τ)li ≤ (1− τ)(ω + yi) + T (3.2)
with ω denoting the household’s time endowment and yi individual productivity
2, distributed
in the population according to a distribution function F (·) with E[yi] = µ and Med[yi] =
m < µ. Solving the utility maximization problem yields the optimal demand function for
leisure given by
lˆi = v
−1
l [1− τ ], (3.3)
with vl denoting i’s marginal utility of leisure (subscript i dropped for simplicity). The gov-
ernment’s budget constraint reads
T ≤ τ
∫
yi
(ω + yi − li)dF (yi). (3.4)
2yi can be alternatively interpreted as (i) personal income before tax, (ii) personal level of education, or
(iii) subjective self-positioning on a social distance scale.
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The utility-maximizing tax rate τˆi for individual i is thus implicitly given by
τˆi = (yi − µ) vll[lˆi[τˆi]]. (3.5)
By concavity of v(·) (vll < 0), individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation
and transfers while individuals with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political
equilibrium, the majority of voters supports a positive tax rate that corresponds to the value
τˆm = (m − µ) vll[lˆi[τˆm]] desired by the median voter, whose income is assumed to be below
the mean (which holds for most economies). The model’s prediction is that the more unequal
the income distribution, i.e. the larger the gap between the mean and the median income,
the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson
and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) find some supporting evidence. Furthermore,
Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four EU countries,
shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redistribution. On the
other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez (1999) fail to find
supporting evidence for this model.
Based on the RRMR model, we can formulate the static Hypothesis 1 relating the demand for
income redistribution to alternative measures of the individual’s current economic well-being,
viz. personal income, personal level of education, or self-positioning on a social distance scale,
respectively.
Hypothesis 1: The demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) personal income,
(b) personal level of education,
(c) higher self-positioning on a social distance scale.
3.2.3 Social mobility and demand for income redistribution
The idea that attitudes toward public redistribution could be explained by individuals’ mobil-
ity was originally introduced by de Tocqueville (1835). More recently, Piketty (1995) consid-
ered a model of learning from income mobility experience and explained persisting differences
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in attitudes towards redistribution. In the long run, those who experienced upward mobility
tend to believe more in effort and demand less redistribution.
This ”Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis, originally suggested by Hirschman
and Rothschild (1973) as the ‘tunnel effect’ and more recently reformulated by Benabou and
Ok (2001), extends the RRMR model by introducing individuals’ expectations, based on
their observations regarding the income mobility of others in society. Thus, upward mobility
may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for income redistribution. The
three premises for this result are: (i) future expected income is a concave function of current
income, (ii) individuals are not too risk averse, and (iii) the government is committed to an
unchanged fiscal policy.
In a simplified version, the Benabou-Ok model can be illustrated by the following two-period
example. Suppose that tomorrow’s income y1 is a concave function of today’s income y0:
y1 = f(y0) with f
′′(y) < 0 for all y ∈ [0, ymax]. Function f(·) is normalized such that
the individual with the mean income µ0 today earns exactly the same income tomorrow,
µ0 = f [µ0]. Then agents with current income below average expect a higher income tomorrow
while those above average will expect a decline of income. By concavity of f(·), total income
gains of the poor are smaller than total losses of the rich. Thus, tomorrow’s average income
µ1 must fall short of today’s average µ0. Therefore, all individuals with current incomes in
the interval (f−1(µ1), µ0) expect their future income to be higher than average µ1 and thus
oppose redistribution in the next period.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
who, using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people who expect high
future income oppose redistribution. This ’tunnel effect’ also works in the opposite direction,
causing forward-looking agents with high incomes but downward mobility expectations to be
in favor of redistribution. This prediction is confirmed by Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) using a
data set from Russia. Furthermore, Molna´r and Kapita´ny (2006a,b) show that individuals who
lack clear expectations about their future income favor redistribution even more so than those
with negative but clear expectations. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use probabilistic expectations
data to show that individuals with a sufficiently large chance of occupational upward mobility
exhibit a lower demand for redistribution; conversely, those with a sufficiently large risk of
occupational downward mobility opt for more redistribution. Checchi and Filippin (2004),
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testing the POUM hypothesis by means of a within-subjects experiment, find corroborating
evidence under several alternative specifications.
According to Guillaud (2008), however, individuals who subjectively experienced upward mo-
bility over ten years tend to be more (rather than less) supportive of redistributive policies.
Moreover, upward intergenerational mobility (measured as the difference in the job prestige
compared to the job of the father) leads to a more positive rather than negative attitude to-
wards redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) review the theoretical literature, providing
a framework for incorporating various effects that were previously studied in isolation. They
examine the empirical evidence for the United States and briefly across countries, concluding
that social mobility (if measured as the change in the occupational prestige) does decrease
demand for redistribution once sociodemographic (age, gender, race) and socioeconomic char-
acteristics (income, education) are controlled for.
Based on the POUM hypothesis, we formulate the dynamic Hypothesis 2 relating the demand
for redistribution to alternative mobility measures, viz. difference in education between indi-
viduals and their fathers, difference in the occupational prestige between individuals and their
fathers (both intergenerational mobility), past income mobility, expected income mobility, as
well as the experienced change in the self-positioning on a social distance scale (subjective
mobility).
Hypothesis 2: The demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) a higher difference between individuals and their fathers in terms of education,
(b) a higher difference between individuals and their fathers in terms of occupational pres-
tige,
(c) higher upward income mobility in the past,
(d) higher upward income mobility in the future,
(e) larger positive change in the self-positioning on a social distance scale.
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3.3 Discrete choice experiments
3.3.1 Theoretical foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ preferences
for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction with classical
Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals to
express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a DCE,
respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical alter-
natives defined by their attributes including their price. By varying the levels of attributes,
different product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always choose the al-
ternative with the highest utility level. From the observed choices, the researcher can infer the
utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from the New Demand
Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere et al. (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain situation
or product is described in detail and respondents are asked to indicate their maximum willing-
ness to pay (WTP) for this fixed product. Only its price attribute is varied, while in Conjoint
Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making it a multi-attribute valua-
tion method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes the product in less detail than
a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product varieties by varying the levels of
relevant attributes [cf. Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-offs among attributes can be
explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes estimated separately (see below).
Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less likely than in CV with its exclusive
emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior. Finally, biases that easily occur when
individuals are directly asked about their WTP are less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan
(2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly impose
the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of income used
to finance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultaneously choose this
share and hence the ’size of the pie’ and the ’slices of the pie’ devoted to different types
of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.). Thus, trade-offs among different attributes of
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the redistribution plan can be calculated to assess the relative importance of the respective
redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977), McFadden (2001), McFadden (1974, 1981, 2001)]. Individual i
values alternative j according to the utility Vij attained, which is given by
Vij = vi(aj , pj , yi, si, εij). (3.6)
Here, vi(·) denotes i’s indirect utility function, aj, the amount of attributes associated with
alternative j, and pj, price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by yi and si, respectively. Finally, εij denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering vi, imparting a
stochastic element to observed choices.
As usual, the utility function is additively split into a systematic component w(·) and a
stochastic one,
Vij = wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij . (3.7)
A utility-maximizing individual i will prefer alternative j to alternative l if and only if
wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj, pj , yi, si) + εij . (3.8)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability Pij of individual i choosing
alternative j rather than alternative l can be estimated, with
Pij = Prob [wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij ] (3.9)
= Prob [εil − εij ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)] . (3.10)
Thus, the probability of choosing j amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
difference wi[j] − wi[l] dominating the ‘noise’, εil − εij . The error terms {εil, εij} can be
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2l and σ
2
j as well as
covariance σlj . Under these assumptions, ϕij := εil − εij is also normally distributed with
48
mean zero and variance σ2 := Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
l + σ
2
j − 2σlj . Thus, equation (3.10) can be
represented as
Pij = Φ
(
wi(aj , pj , yi, si)−wi(al, pl, yi, si)
σ
)
, (3.11)
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. The model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher et al. (1999) provide em-
pirical evidence that a linear specification of the function w(·) leads to good predictions in
its middle ranges. Therefore, one posits
wi(aj , pj, yi, si) = ci +
K∑
k=1
βkak + εij , (3.12)
where ci represents an individual-specific constant, ak, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the attributes of
the alternative, and βk, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the parameters to be estimated. These parameters
can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes. The
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes m and n is given by
MRSm,n = −∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
. (3.13)
In the case of a linear utility function, this can be estimated as the ratio of the respective
slope parameters,
MRSm,n = − βˆm
βˆn
,
representing the marginal WTP for an additional unit of am expressed in units of an. There-
fore, the marginal WTP for attribute am can be calculated by dividing the marginal utility
of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context, the
income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]:
MWTP(am) =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂pj
. (3.14)
Notice that, by Roy’s Identity, xij = −∂v(·)/∂pj∂v(·)/∂yi , the (uncompensated) demand of individual
i for commodity j corresponds to the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the indirect utility
function with respect to price pj and income yi. If one alternative is chosen, then the optimal
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quantity demanded is equal to one, i.e. xij = 1. Therefore, Roy’s Identity yields
∂v
∂yi
= − ∂v
∂pj
,
i.e. the marginal utility of income is equal to the negative derivative of the indirect utility
function with respect to price.
By limiting the specification to the product attributes only (simple model, cf. Section 3.5.1),
one obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility of individual i
between alternative j and the status quo,
∆Vij = ci +
K∑
k=1
βk∆akj + βp∆pj + ϕij , (3.15)
where ∆akj = akj − alj , ∆pj = pj − pl, ci = cil − cij , and ϕij = εil − εij for each j 6= l. This
simple model suffices to estimate WTP values of an average respondent (see Section 3.5.1).
For econometric inference, it is important to take into account that the same individual
makes several choices. The two-way random-effect specification takes this into account with
ϕij = µi + ηij , where µi denotes the component that varies only across individuals but
not across the choice alternatives. The terms µi and ηij are assumed uncorrelated with the
product attributes (ai1, . . . , aiK) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a
probit model, ση = 1. Hence Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
η + σ
2
µ = 1 + σ
2
µ and Corr[ϕij , ϕil] =
σ2µ
1+σ2µ
=: ρ.
The parameter ρ indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated
with each other, or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by
the individual-specific error term. The random-effects specification is justified if ρ is high and
significant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g. income
group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted with the
product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model specification
which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, cf.
Section 3.5.2. By means of a t test we can investigate whether the differences in marginal WTP
values between different socioeconomic groups are statistically significant. The computation
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of the variance of the marginal WTP values can be performed by the delta method, cf. Hole
(2007). The estimate of the variance is given by
Var
[
− βˆk
βˆp
]
=

∂
(
−βˆk/βˆp
)
∂βˆk


2
Var[βˆk] +

∂
(
−βˆk/βˆp
)
∂βˆp


2
Var[βˆp]
− 2
∂
(
−βˆk/βˆp
)
∂βˆk
∂
(
−βˆk/βˆp
)
∂βˆp
Cov[βˆk, βˆp]
=
1
βˆ2p
Var[βˆk] +
βˆ2k
βˆ4p
Var[βˆp] + 2
βˆk
βˆ3p
Cov[βˆk, βˆp].
3.3.2 Experimental design
In order to elicit the preferences of Swiss citizens for income redistribution, a representative
telephone survey with 979 respondents was conducted in the fall of 2008. Prior to the tele-
phone survey, the attributes and their levels used to define ‘income redistribution’ had been
checked in two pretests for their relevance. They form four groups (see Table 3.1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on five types of recipients, viz. the
working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and people
with ill health);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget (to be spent on three groups, viz. Swiss citizens,
western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, defined as a share of GDP;
4. Share of personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible scenarios
that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios define the n rows of the observa-
tion matrix X, with associated covariance matrix Ω = σ2 (X ′X)−1 of parameters β to be
estimated.
So-called D-efficient design calls for the minimization of the geometric mean of the eigenvalues
of Ω,
D efficiency =
(
|Ω| 1K
)−1
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of benefits going to
• Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
• Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
• Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
• Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
• Ill People ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of benefits going to
• Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
• Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
• Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 3.1: Attributes and their levels
where K denotes the number of parameters to estimate [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson (2003)].
Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the number of al-
ternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split in five groups. One alternative was included
twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices per respondent.
In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set and made
in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the attributes
and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the graphical representation of the status
quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3).
3.4 Descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Socioeconomic characteristics
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-speaking
part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent are born in
the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income below CHF 2,000 and
23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reflecting the structure of the Swiss population. However, only
1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
42.6 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, ‘By increasing the income tax
rates for rich families and financially supporting poor families, the government should try to
reduce the income gap between rich and poor.’ while 54.6 percent disagreed. On the other
hand, 36 percent of the respondents stated that the current level of social benefits was too
low, 9 percent stated that it was too high, and 48.7 percent found it exactly right.
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Current 5 years ago In 5 years
Income classes, CHF No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
< CHF 2000 192 20 236 25 135 14
CHF 2000 - 3999 193 20 189 20 187 20
CHF 4000 - 5999 344 36 300 32 349 37
≥CHF 6000 221 23 223 23 264 28
Total valid answers 950 100 948 100 935 100
Missing 29 31 44
Sample 979 979 979
Table 3.2: Current, past, and future expected individual incomes, per month (in CHF)
The frequency distributions of current, past, and expected future incomes are shown in Table
3.2. Note that incomes <CHF 2000, CHF 2000-3999, and ≥CHF 6000 approximately cor-
respond to the first, second, and fifth income quintiles whereas the bracket CHF 4000-5999
contains the third and the fourth quintiles. From the individual responses entered in Ta-
ble 3.2, transition probabilities between the income quintiles were estimated (which are not
available from official Swiss statistics).
Table 3.3 shows the frequency distributions of the respondents’ own as well as their fathers’
educational levels.
Table 3.4 contains the frequency distribution of the differences between the respondents’ and
fathers’ educational levels, which will be referred to as DIFF ED, as well as the distribution
of answers to the question, ‘Is there a difference in occupational prestige in the society between
your job and your father’s job?’, later referred to as DIFF PREST. This is an indicator of
subjective intergenerational mobility INTERG MOB SUBJ.
Table 3.5 shows the current and future expected self-positioning of respondents on a social
distance scale. Using these two variables, one can determine the distribution of the subjec-
tively expected social mobility to occur within a generation.
Respondents Fathers
Educational level No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Less than high school 654 67 670 69
High school 195 20 185 19
College and more 129 13 111 11
Total valid answers 978 100 966 100
Missing 1 13
Sample 979 979
Table 3.3: Respondents’ and fathers’ educational levels
53
Education Occupational prestige
Difference No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Positive 194 20 331 35
No difference 600 62 361 38
Negative 172 18 138 15
Total valid answers 966 100 944 100
Missing 13 35
Sample 979 979
Table 3.4: Difference in education and occupational prestige between respondents and fathers
Current In 5 years
Social class No. % of valid answers No. % of valid answers
Lowest (1) to 3 201 21 138 14
Class 4 405 42 361 38
Class 5 270 28 331 34
6 to highest (9) 98 10 134 14
total valid answers 974 100 964 100
missing 5 15
sample 979 979
Table 3.5: Self-positioning on a social distance scale, current and in 5 years
3.4.2 Respondents’ choice behavior
There was a total of 979 · 8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which almost 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo (see Table 3.6). There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes in
the experiment may not have been sufficiently extreme to make respondents switch. Second,
some attributes (e.g. benefits going to the unemployed; see Table 3.8), may not have been
sufficiently valued to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making because
the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However, there may
simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making situations
(see the large negative constant in Table 3.8). Nonetheless, only 21 percent of respondents
never opted for an alternative (see Table 3.7). Conversely, almost 80 percent departed from
the status quo at least once.
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Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 3.6: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 3.7: Distribution of the numbers of chosen alternatives per respondent
3.5 Estimation results
3.5.1 Simple model: preferences of an average respondent
Estimation of equation (3.15) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of
the indirect utility function. Moreover, it has to take into account that uses and types of
beneficiaries add up to 100 percent (see Table 3.1). In order to avoid perfect collinearity,
PENS (Pensioners) and OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
∆V = c0 + β1W POOR+ β2UNEMP+ β3ILL+ β4FAM+
+γ1SWISS+ γ2WEU FOR+ (3.16)
+δ1REDIST+ δ2REDIST
2 + ηTAX+ ϕ
Estimation of a few of the 5·3 = 15 specifications with alternative exclusions produced results
similar to those displayed in Table 3.8. Specifically, they agree in that additional redistribution
causes respondents to opt for the alternative with a lower probability, which is even more
true of an increase in the income tax to finance it [for the influence of its composition, see
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Variable Coeff. Std. err. z P > |z| Marg. eff.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
χ2(0) 108.87
Prob > χ2 0.000
σu 0.41610
ρ 0.14759
Table 3.8: Random effects probit estimates for the simple model
Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a)]. Moreover, the negative constant points to a strong status quo
bias. By eq. (3.14), the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for redistribution is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂∆V/∂REDIST
∂∆V/∂TAX
= −δ1 + 2δ2REDIST
η
(3.17)
Thus, one obtains an estimated MWTP value of -0.26 percentage points of income share per
additional percentage point of GDP devoted to redistribution, in excess of the status quo.
Evaluated at the mean personal income of the sample, this amounts to CHF -11.78 per month.
However, this figure is dwarfed by the compensation one would have to pay respondents to
depart from the status quo, amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their monthly income,
or 5.27 percent of their annual income.
3.5.2 Extended model: preference heterogeneity
Economic well-being and preferences for redistribution
Here, the simple model is extended by including one of the socioeconomic variables at a
time (personal income, education, self-positioning on a social distance scale) as well as its
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interactions with the attributes. Thus, in the case of income, e.g., eq. (3.15) is modified to
read3,
∆V = c0 + · · ·+ c′0INC+ · · · + β1REDIST+ · · ·+ β′1REDIST · INC+ . . . (3.18)
Variable MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF Std. err., CHF
Income group 1 (low) -1.14215 -11.42 6.08 ***
Income group 2 -0.64081 -19.22 9.37 ***
Income group 3 -0.43293 -21.65 9.83 ***
Income group 4 (high) 0.02117 1.81 13.47
No high school -0.62526 -25.13 7.12 **
High school, no college -0.08911 -4.58 7.70 **
College 0.01501 1.04 14.71
Social group 1 (low) -0.40762 -14.72 8.49 ***
Social group 2 -0.65405 -28.45 8.81 ***
Social group 3 -0.30303 -15.06 12.36 *
Social group 4 (high) 0.25550 17.61 11.01 *
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
Table 3.9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with measures of economic well-being
Hypothesis 1 states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with higher
values of (a) income, (b) education, and (c) social status. Hypothesis 1(a), with its focus on
personal income, cannot be confirmed (see Table 3.9). In fact, MWTP for redistribution as a
percentage of income is most strongly negative in the lowest income group and consistently
increases up to the second-highest. In terms of CHF amounts, negative MWTP values reach
a maximum among the middle groups No. 2 and 3. However, the differences in MWTP
values between Income Groups 1 and 2 (t = 0.65) as well as between Income Groups 2 and
3 (t = 0.75) are not significant. Still, differences in MWTP values within all other pairs of
groups are shown to be significant at the 95 percent level (with the exception of the difference
between Income Groups 1 and 3 being significant at the 90 percent level).
Similarly, Hypothesis 1(b) finds no empirical support, with MWTP values increasing rather
than decreasing with higher levels of education. The evidence is mixed concerning Hypothesis
3The full specification is available from authors on request. The relevant results are shown in Table 3.9.
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Variable MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF Std. err., CHF Test
Downward mobility in education -1.57572 -6.26 3.50 2a:
No mobility in education -0.23996 -1.06 0.53 R
Upward mobility in education -0.32110 -1.84 1.11
Downward mobility in prestige 0.39446 1.62 1.00 2b:
No mobility in prestige -0.38294 -1.84 1.12 (C)
Upward mobility in prestige -0.09002 -0.51 1.22
Downward past income mobility -0.13457 -0.60 1.29 2c:
No past income mobility -0.58353 -2.49 0.69 (C)
Upward past income mobility -0.08165 -0.49 1.38
Downward expected income mobility 0.10437 0.83 1.79 2d:
No expected income mobility -0.55952 -2.60 0.73 (C)
Upward expected income mobility -0.20783 -0.76 0.83
Downward social mobility -0.18929 -0.84 0.68 2e:
No social mobility -0.54176 -2.52 0.75 (C)
Upward social mobility 0.14992 0.77 1.76
Note: (C)=partially confirmed, R=rejected
Table 3.10: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with mobility measures
1(c) since resistance against redistribution seems to increase from the lowest to group No. 2
of the social self-positioning scale. However, the difference between Groups 1 and 2 is only
weakly significant (t = −1.20).
Social Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution
This time, the simple model is extended to include one of the following mobility measures:
(a) intergenerational mobility in education (DIFF ED), (b) intergenerational mobility in
occupational prestige, (c) income mobility in the past, (d) expected income mobility in the
future, or (e) the change in the self-positioning on a social distance scale as well as their
interactions with the attributes. Therefore, in the case of the intergenerational mobility in
education, eq. (3.16) is modified to become
∆V = c0 + · · ·+ c′0DIFF ED+ · · · + β1REDIST+ · · ·+ β′1REDIST ·DIFF ED+ . . .
Hypothesis 2 states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with up-
ward income or social mobility. In its version 2(a), it is rejected because negative MWTP is
maximum among participants whose educational level is lower than their fathers’, with the
differences with the other two groups being highly significant (see Table 3.10). Hypothesis
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2(b), with its focus on mobility in occupational prestige, finds partial support in that the
MWTP of respondents with downward mobility is positive, and, the others, negative. Simi-
larly, Hypothesis 2(c) can be accepted only to the extent that citizens with downward income
mobility in the past exhibit the least resistance against redistribution. As to Hypothesis 2(d),
there are weak signs suggesting that citizens with downward expected income mobility in the
future might have a positive MWTP, in contrast to those with no mobility expectations. But
statistical significance of two of three MWTP values is lacking to begin with, amounting to
partial confirmation of Hypothesis 2(d) only. Finally, Hypothesis 2(e) is merely confirmed to
the extent that individuals with downward social mobility exhibit a higher MWTP than those
with no social mobility, with the corresponding t value suggesting statistical significance of
the difference in MWTP values.
The one consistent pattern seems to be the following. In four out of five cases (except mobility
in education), citizens with no past or future expected mobility display the highest negative
MWTP values both in terms of a share in their income and in absolute amount. This seems
to point to risk aversion in the face of the ’veil of ignorance’ [Beck (1994)]; however, this
argument has been traditionally used to predict positive rather than the observed negative
MWTP for income redistribution. On the other hand, risk aversion constitutes one of the
main explanations of the status quo bias (see Section 3.5.1). Neustadt and Zweifel (2010b)
[see Chapter 5] conduct an analysis of the sustainability of the Swiss welfare state and show
that an average respondent exhibit his maximum WTP for redistribution at the level of 21%
of GDP, clearly below the status quo of 25%. Therefore, this DCE seems to suggest that Swiss
citizens, while markedly risk averse, do not believe the current level of income redistribution
provided by the government to be optimal for the protection against the risk impinging on
their economic and social status. Such an attitude could be justifiably called realistic for
citizens of a small country whose economic fortune has depended on developments abroad
for decades if not centuries.
3.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay for redistribution through a Discrete
Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on the simple model that relates choices to the
attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen must be paid a compensation of
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CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.02 percent of annual income) for an additional
percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In addition, a very marked status
quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another 5.27 percent of annual income.
However, such an experiment also permits to test several hypotheses concerning the determi-
nants of the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side influences. By
including one of three measures of current economic well-being at a time, the extended model
allows us to test static Hypothesis 1, stating that demand for redistribution decreases with
income. However, it is found to increase with level of education and (in part) with personal
income as well as higher self-positioning on a social scale.
With the inclusion of five measures of social mobility, dynamic Hypothesis 2 (POUM) could
be tested as well. Except for mobility in education, citizens with no mobility at all display the
highest resistance against redistribution, contrary to POUM but underscoring the importance
of the status quo bias.
The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, only purely
economic explanations of demand for redistribution (income, social mobility) were tested.
However, recent contributions to the field show that up to 90 percent of cross-country dif-
ferences in public spending can be related to institutional and behavioral factors [see e.g.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Akkoyunlu et al. (2009)]. Thus, future work should be devoted
to an analysis of behavioral determinants of stated willingness to pay for redistribution. A
first step in this direction is made by Neustadt (2010) [see Chapter 4]. Second, the status quo
bias found in this paper calls for more detailed analysis. To the extent that it reflects risk
aversion, it should induce demand for redistribution - contrary to the results presented here.
Finally, the evidence only relates to a point of time and thus may be subject to transitory
shocks. Still, by appealing to citizens’ stated preferences, the present contribution sheds some
light on the debate between those who claim that there is excess redistribution and those
who claim there is too little.
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3.8 Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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Do religious beliefs explain
preferences for income redistribution?
Experimental evidence
Ilja Neustadt
Submitted to “CESifo Economic Studies”.
Abstract: Due to the mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants, beliefs
have been at the center of attention of research into preferences for income redistribution. We
elicit preferences for income redistribution through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed
in 2008 in Switzerland and relate them to several behavioral determinants, in particular to
religious beliefs. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who
do not belong to a religious denomination, and negative otherwise. However, the marginal
WTP is shown to increase with a higher degree of religiosity. Moreover, those who state that
luck or connections play a crucial role in determining economic success exhibit significantly
higher WTP values than those who deem effort to be decisive.
Keywords: Income redistribution, beliefs, religiosity, welfare state, preferences, willingness to
pay, discrete choice experiments
JEL classification: C35, C93, D63, H29
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Chapter 4
Do religious beliefs explain
preferences for income
redistribution? Experimental
evidence
4.1 Introduction
Citizens’ preferences with regard to income redistribution are of crucial importance for the
political debate as to the future of the welfare state. While the typical right-wing stance
is to decry it as excessive, the left points to pockets of poverty even in rich societies that
need to be eradicated through more redistribution. This paper contributes to this debate by
measuring citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for income redistribution through a Discrete
Choice experiment (DCE) and relating it to a set of behavioral determinants. The data come
from a DCE performed in the fall of 2008 and involving 979 Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and
its determinants, which will be discussed in Section 4.2 below. One line of thought relates
the measured amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral factors.
Examples are Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009). However, the observed
amount of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between demand and supply, with
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supply governed by a country’s political institutions and processes. This classical identification
problem would have to be addressed in order to make inferences about citizens’ preferences for
redistribution. A second direction of research, exemplified by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
and Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to measure attitudes towards redistribution.
The problem with this approach is its failure to impose a budget constraint. It therefore
cannot predict actual decision making (e.g. voting at the polls), where citizens take the
consequences in terms of their own income and wealth into account. A third approach seeks
to solve this problem through Contingent Valuation (CV) experiments [see e.g. Boeri et al.
(2001, 2002)1]. The weakness of the CV approach is that it holds all the attributes of the
good in question constant, varying its price only. One would want to vary other attributes
of redistribution besides its tax price, viz. its uses (for health, old age, etc.) and the type of
beneficiary (foreigner, national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows measurement of preferences uncontaminated by supply
influences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it does so in
a realistic way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all attributes are
allowed to vary.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contains a literature review
from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its first part concerns general determinants
of the demand for redistribution and the second, its behavioral determinants, in particular,
religious denomination, religiosity, and beliefs about the role of luck in achieving economic
success. Section 4.3 presents a general description of the method of DCEs as well as the design
of the present experiment. The descriptive statistics of the experiment follow in Section 4.4,
and hypothesis tests, in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes the results and concludes with
suggestions for future research.
1Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also perform CV experiments that impose
an explicit trade-off between income and social insurance coverage on respondents. They find that people
oppose an extension of the welfare state, with conflicts between young and old, rich and poor, and insiders
and outsiders creating significant hurdles to welfare reform.
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4.2 Literature review and statement of hypotheses
This section first presents research that defines the general background of this paper and then
moves on to contributions that lead to a set of specific hypotheses to be tested.
4.2.1 General determinants of the demand for income redistribution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide set
of factors that can be categorized as economic, political, and behavioral determinants of the
demand for income redistribution.
Economic determinants
The simplest framework for the analysis of purely economic determinants is provided by a
model focusing on current economic well-being, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981) [RRMR model]. This model
assumes non-altruistic utility-maximizing individuals differentiated by their income levels
only. The government pays a lump-sum transfer to all citizens, financed by a linear uniform
income tax. Individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation and transfers while
those with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political equilibrium, the majority of
voters supports a positive tax rate corresponding to the value desired by the median voter.
The model’s prediction is that the larger the gap between the mean and the median income,
the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson
and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) find some supporting evidence. Furthermore,
Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four EU countries,
shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redistribution. On the
other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez (1999) fail to find
supporting evidence for this model. Moreover, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) relate willingness
to pay (WTP) for income redistribution elicited from a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE,
see Section 4.3.1 for details) to measures of economic well-being. WTP values are negatively
related to income and education, contradicting the RRMR model.
Another economic explanation is the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis,
suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) as the ‘tunnel effect’ and more recently refor-
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mulated by Benabou and Ok (2001). It extends the RRMR model by introducing individuals’
expectations, based on their observations regarding the income mobility of others in society.
Expected upward mobility may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for
income redistribution.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) who,
using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people who can expect high
future income oppose redistribution. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use probabilistic expectations
data to show that individuals with a sufficiently large chance of occupational upward mobility
exhibit a lower demand for redistribution; conversely, those with a sufficiently large risk of
occupational downward mobility opt for more redistribution. Checchi and Filippin (2004),
testing the POUM hypothesis by means of a within-subjects experiment, find corroborating
evidence under several alternative specifications. According to Guillaud (2008), however, indi-
viduals who subjectively experienced upward mobility over ten years tend to be more (rather
than less) supportive of redistributive policies. Moreover, upward intergenerational mobility
in occupational prestige goes along with more positive rather than negative attitude towards
redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) examine the empirical evidence for the United
States and briefly across countries, concluding that social mobility (if measured as the change
in the occupational prestige) does decrease demand for redistribution once sociodemographic
(age, gender, race) and socioeconomic characteristics (income, education) are controlled for.
In their DCE-based study, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) relate preferences for redistribution
to mobility. They find partial empirical support for the POUM hypothesis.
Another economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that preferences
for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as a demand for insurance by risk-averse
individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their endowment
as well as their future position in society [‘veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls (1999)], they are pre-
dicted to exhibit positive WTP for an income transfer from more favorable future states to
less favorable ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted as reflecting this hypo-
thetical demand for insurance. Beck (1994) investigates individual behavior under the ‘veil of
ignorance’ in an experiment. By placing participants in a hypothetical society with random
differences in income, represented by lotteries, he is able to derive the desired amount of
income redistribution. Individuals indeed display risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme kind
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implied by the Rawlsian maximin rule2. Furthermore, they show no preference for income
redistribution in excess of what can be explained by risk aversion.
Political determinants
As to the political determinants of the demand for income redistribution, the literature [Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000, 2003); Lizzeri and Persico (2001); Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] pre-
dicts that proportional representation tends towards universal programs benefitting various
groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in
targeted ‘pork barrel’ programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical ev-
idence in that countries with proportional representation have GDP shares of government
expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 percentage points higher than countries with major-
ity rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) present weak evidence of a positive correlation
between the degree of proportional representation and the transfer share in GDP in OECD
countries. Additional political determinants of redistribution include two-party vs. multiparty
system, presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs. representative democracy,
with two-party systems, presidential, and direct democracies all predicted to induce less pub-
lic redistribution. In order to sketch the institutional background of the DCE described in
Section 4.3.2, Switzerland can be described as follows. It has a high degree of proportional
representation and a parliamentary democracy. Its distinguishing feature, however, is its ex-
tensive direct democratic control in the guise of popular initiatives and referenda. This might
serve to limit public welfare spending while enforcing efficiency in redistribution [cf. Feld
et al. (2007)].
General behavioral determinants
The mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants of preferences for redis-
tribution calls for a detailed analysis of their behavioral determinants. In particular, beliefs
have been at the center of attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), who develop a model where society’s belief as to whether effort or luck determines
economic success gives rise to multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. Benabou and Tirole (2006)
propose a model for the emergence and persistence of such collective beliefs. Moreover, beliefs
2The Rawlsian maximin rule uses the maximum improvement of the individual with minimum initial wealth
as the sole criterion.
73
can be seen as a source of altruistic preferences and inequality aversion. On the empirical
side, Fong (2001) presents evidence in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggesting that
beliefs about the role of luck in determining economic success are an important determinant
of the demand for redistribution. Fong (2001) also considers the effects of incentives. Fong
(2001) effort determines income, then an increased income tax rate causes an output loss
due to its effect on incentives. This consideration is hypothesized to qualify the link between
beliefs and the demand for redistribution. However, the data fail to support this hypothesis.
While the POUM hypothesis suggests less redistribution than predicted by the RRMR model,
the assumption of altruistic preferences can lead to the opposite prediction. In fact, if indi-
viduals care also about the utility of others, one might expect more redistribution than
predicted by the conventional RRMR model. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a review of
several models of social preferences, in particular, altruism, envy, inequality aversion, fair-
ness, and reciprocity. In a simple model of inequality aversion, it is assumed that individuals
feel envy if their incomes are below that of others but they feel altruistic when their income
exceeds it. Consequently, the decisive median voter demands more redistribution than in the
conventional RRMR model.
Based on the assumption of inequality aversion, Neustadt and Zweifel (2010b) [see Chapter 5
of this dissertation] formulate two hypotheses to be tested. The first predicts that the citizens
with higher inequality aversion exhibit a positive WTP for redistribution while those with
lower inequality aversion, a negative one. The second hypothesis is based on the consideration
that voters exhibiting inequality aversion tend to support the view that the government should
reduce the income gap between rich and poor. Consequently, respondents who state that the
reduction of the income gap is a task of the government are expected to exhibit a positive
WTP for redistribution.
4.2.2 Religious beliefs and demand for income redistribution
There exists a great deal of theoretical literature dealing with religious beliefs as a determinant
of demand for income redistribution, all of them predicting a negative relationship between
the degree of religiosity and demand for income redistribution.
In particular, Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a theory of collective beliefs, based on
endogenous complementarities between individual cognitive choices that arise naturally from
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the interaction of psychological motives and economic rationality. In a simple model, they
analyze an important class of religious beliefs that are linked to the ‘Protestant work ethic’,
namely to a belief that there is a world to come, in which rewards and punishments depend on
the effort and industriousness of a person during his lifetime. Alternative beliefs can be of two
kinds: (i) a belief that there is no afterlife (atheism or agnosticism); (ii) a belief that there is
afterlife but its rewards are not related to efforts in the current world but might be subject to
observance of commandments, good deeds towards other people etc. Thus, the more religious
(in the sense of the ‘Protestant work ethic’) a citizen is, the more effort he exerts. Thus, a
more religious individual prefers lower tax rates in order to avoid income redistribution in
favor of the less religious citizens who do not work as hard. If a low tax rate decided upon
by a majority of religious citizens is anticipated by the population, individuals become more
religious since the belief that hard work leads to rewards in afterlife generates higher utility
given low income redistribution. Conversely, if a majority of citizens who happen to be less
religious votes for a high level of redistribution, it can become profitable to invest in the
non-religious beliefs and thus to exert less effort. In sum, two equilibria are possible:
(i) An equilibrium with a high level of religiosity in the sense of the ‘Protestant work ethic’,
implying a high level of work effort and a low level of income redistribution.
(ii) An equilibrium with a low level of religiosity or a predominance of non-Protestant
beliefs, implying a low level of work effort and a high level of income redistribution.
Moreover, Scheve and Stasavage (2006a,b) propose a model of religious participation as a
substitute for insurance against adverse events. Therefore risk-averse religious individuals
desire less demand for redistribution as a collective insurance device, resulting again in a
negative predicted relationship between religiosity and redistribution.
A further strand of literature, based on preferences rather than beliefs, argues that public
redistribution crowds out religious participation and charitable activities, giving once more
rise to a negative correlation. Hungerman (2005) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) find
evidence that public insurance spending indeed crowds out religious charitable spending.
Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) empirically relate the amount of public social expenditure to the
strength of religious orientation for the OECD countries. They show that the partial corre-
lation between religiosity and the share of transfers in GDP is clearly negative, supporting
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the theories expounded above. Moreover, Switzerland shares the somewhat guarded attitudes
prevailing in the EU rather than the highly religious attitudes of the U.S. population. Being
located close to the regression line, Switzerland provides additional evidence supporting the
theoretical arguments relating religion to redistribution.
Based on the theoretical arguments of Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Scheve and Stasavage
(2006a,b), we formulate two hypotheses to be tested in Section 4.5.2. The first predicts that
members of Protestant churches exhibit a negative willingness to pay (WTP) for redistri-
bution while members of other denominations (who do not share the Protestant work ethic
but still strongly participate in and profit from private charity), a higher but still a negative
one. By way of contrast, citizens with no affiliation at all who presumably share atheistic
or agnostic beliefs are predicted to exhibit a strictly positive WTP for redistribution. The
second hypothesis predicts the WTP for redistribution to fall with a higher level of religiosity
of the individual, alternatively measured as (a) strength of the belief in God, (b) frequency
of attending religious services.
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(A) negative if the individual belongs to a Protestant church,
(B) negative but less so than in (A) if the individual belongs to a religious denomination
other than Protestant,
(C) positive if the individual is unaffiliated.
Hypothesis 2: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to decrease with
(a) a stronger belief in God,
(b) more frequent attendance of religious services.
4.2.3 Beliefs about the role of luck and effort and demand for income
redistribution
The Benabou-Tirole model (see Section 4.2.2) suggests that beliefs about the role of effort
in determining economic success or intertemporal utility are an important determinant of
the preferences for redistribution. The conviction that high income and wealth are the result
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of work effort (belief in a just world) goes along with a low level of income redistribution.
Conversely, a society that believes that luck, connections, social capital inherited from one’s
parents, and corruption (realistic pessimism) determine income and wealth is expected to
choose a high degree of redistribution, financed by high taxes, see also Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005). In their model of collective beliefs, Benabou and
Tirole (2006) derive two possible equilibria with respect to the belief in a just world:
(i) An equilibrium with optimistic beliefs in a just world and a laissez-faire society arises
in a population where the majority of citizens tries to ignore discouraging news about
the efficacy of the individual effort. In turn, the majority chooses a relatively low tax
rate with little redistribution and thus has strong incentives to believe that the world
is indeed just.
(ii) An equilibrium with pessimistic beliefs and a welfare state arises in a population where
the majority takes seriously all discouraging news about the efficacy of the individual
effort. Thus, the majority chooses a high tax rate with a high level of redistribution.
Empirical evidence suggests that beliefs sharply differ between the United States and the
EU. Most Americans believe that anyone can get out of poverty by hard work and that the
poor remain poor only because they refuse to make the effort. By way of contrast, Europeans
generally think that poverty is due to bad luck and not the individual’s responsibility. Fong
and Oberholzer-Gee (2007) measure the willingness-to-pay for justice in the United States
using dictator games. Dictators were given $10 to split between themselves and recipients.
The authors find that one third of the dictators are willing to pay one dollar out of ten for
obtaining the information whether poverty was due to disability or substance abuse. Finally,
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) show that a history of misfortune in the recent past such as
unemployment and personal trauma makes people more risk-averse and less optimistic about
upward mobility. These changes in beliefs are found to have a positive and significant effect
on redistribution.
Therefore, the Benabou-Tirole model suggests that equilibrium (i) with a laissez-faire society
is likely to persist in the United States while equilibrium (ii) with a full-fledged welfare state
is sustainable in Europe. Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) relate the amount of public social spending
to a score that ranges from 1 (hard work always brings a better life) to 10 (hard work does
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not bring any success) using data from OECD countries. The U.S. score is closest to 1 but lies
below the regression line, while Germany and Denmark mark the other extreme. Again, as in
the case of religiosity, this regression is one of two best-fitting bivariate regressions designed
to explain the share of transfers in GDP. Here again, Switzerland as a test case lies right near
the regression line, lending additional support to the hypothesis.
Based on the presented literature review we state Hypothesis 3 to be tested in Section 4.5.2
as follows.
Hypothesis 3: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to increase with a stronger
individual belief that luck rather than effort determine economic success.
4.3 Discrete choice experiments
4.3.1 Theoretical foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ preferences
for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction to classical
Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals to
express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a DCE,
respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical al-
ternatives defined by their attributes including a price. By varying the levels of attributes,
different product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always choose the al-
ternative with the highest utility. From the observed choices, the researcher can infer the
utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from the New Demand
Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere et al. (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain situation
or product is described in detail, and respondents are asked to indicate their maximum
willingness to pay (WTP) for this fixed product. Only its price attribute is varied, while in
Conjoint Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making it a multi-attribute
valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes the product in less detail
than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product varieties by varying the levels
of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-offs among attributes can be
explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes estimated separately (see below).
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Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less likely than in CV with its exclusive
emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior. Finally, biases that easily occur when
individuals are directly asked about their WTP are less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan
(2004)].
A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly impose
the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of income used
to finance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultaneously choose this
share and hence the ‘size of the pie’ and the ‘slices of the pie’ devoted to different types
of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.; see Exhibits No. 1 to 3 in Appendix). Thus,
trade-offs among different attributes of the redistribution plan can be calculated to assess the
relative importance of the respective redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959),
Manski and Lerman (1977) and McFadden (1974, 1981, 2001)]. Individual i values alternative
j according to the utility Vij attained, which is given by
Vij = vi(aj , pj , yi, si, εij). (4.1)
Here, vi(·) denotes i’s indirect utility function, aj, the amount of attributes associated with
alternative j, and pj, price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by yi and si, respectively. Finally, εij denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering vi, imparting a
stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split into
a systematic component w(·) and a stochastic one,
Vij = wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij .
A utility-maximizing individual i will prefer alternative j to alternative l if and only if
wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj, pj , yi, si) + εij . (4.2)
79
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability Pij of individual i choosing
alternative j rather than alternative l can be estimated, with
Pij = Prob [wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij ] (4.3)
= Prob [εil − εij ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)] . (4.4)
Thus, the probability of choosing j amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
difference wi[j]−wi[l] dominating the ‘noise’, εil−εij . The error terms {εil, εij} can be assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2l and σ
2
j as well as covariance σlj .
Under these assumptions, ϕij := εil − εij is also normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2 := Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
l + σ
2
j − 2σlj . Thus, equation (4.4) can be represented as
Pij = Φ
(
wi(aj , pj , yi, si)−wi(al, pl, yi, si)
σ
)
, (4.5)
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher et al. (1999) provide em-
pirical evidence that a linear specification of the function w(·) leads to good predictions in
its middle ranges. Therefore, in the case of the simple model that relates utilities and choice
probabilities to the attributes only (see Section 4.5.1), one posits
wi(aj , pj, yi, si) = ci +
K∑
k=1
βkakj + εij , (4.6)
where ci represents an individual-specific constant, ak, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the attributes of
the alternative, and βk, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the parameters to be estimated. These parameters
can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes. One
obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility of individual i between
alternative j and status quo,
∆Vij = ci +
K∑
k=1
βk∆akj + βp∆pj + ϕij , (4.7)
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where ∆akj = akj − alj, ∆pj = pj − pl, ci = cil − cij , and ϕij = εil − εij for each j 6= l. The
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes m and n is given by
MRSm,n = −∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
. (4.8)
Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute am can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context,
the income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]:
MWTP(am) =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂pj
. (4.9)
For econometric inference, it is important to recall that the same individual makes several
choices. The two-way random-effect specification takes this into account with ϕij = µi + ηij ,
where µi denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across the choice
alternatives. The terms µi and ηij are assumed uncorrelated with the product attributes
(ai1, . . . , aiK) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit model, ση =
1. Hence Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
η + σ
2
µ = 1 + σ
2
µ and Corr[ϕij , ϕil] =
σ2µ
1+σ2µ
=: ρ. The parameter ρ
indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated with each other,
or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by individual-specific
error term. The random-effects specification is justified if ρ is high and significant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g. income
group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted with the
product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model specification
which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses 1 to 3 in
Section 4.5.2. By means of a t test we can investigate whether the differences in marginal WTP
values between different socioeconomic groups are statistically significant. The computation
of the variance of the marginal WTP values is performed by the delta method, cf. Hole (2007)
4.3.2 Experimental design
A representative telephone survey with 979 respondents was conducted in the fall of 2008.
Prior to the survey, the attributes and their levels used to define ‘income redistribution’ had
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of benefits going to
• Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
• Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
• Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
• Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
• People with Ill Health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of benefits going to
• Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
• Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
• Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 4.1: Attributes and their levels
been checked in two pretests for their relevance. Attributes form four groups (see Table 4.1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on five types of recipients (viz. the
working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and people
with ill health);
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on three groups (viz. Swiss citizens,
western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, defined as a share of GDP;
4. Personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible scenarios
that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios define the n rows of the observation
matrix X, with associated covariance matrix Ω = σ2 (X ′X)−1 of parameters β to be esti-
mated. So-called D-efficient design calls for the minimization of the geometric mean of the
eigenvalues of Ω,
D efficiency =
(
|Ω| 1K
)−1
where K denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the number
of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split into five groups. One alternative was
included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices per
respondent.
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In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set and made
in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the attributes
and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the graphical representation of the status
quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3).
4.4 Descriptive statistics
4.4.1 Socioeconomic characteristics
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-speaking
part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent were born
in the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income below CHF 2,000
and 23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reflecting the structure of the Swiss population. However,
only 1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
39 percent of the respondents are members of the Roman Catholic Church while 51 percent
belong to the Reformed Church3. An additional 2 percent are members of other religious
denominations while 8 percent are not affiliated [see Table 4.2]. As to the strength of religious
beliefs, 39 percent indicated no or weak belief in God as well as moderate belief while 22
percent of respondents claimed to have a strong or a very strong belief in God [see Table
4.3]. Moreover, 27 percent of respondents attended a religious service at least once in the
last month. Individuals’ shares whose last service attendance was 1 to 2 months ago and 3
to 6 months ago made up 27 and 22 percent, respectively [see Table 4.4]. Finally, 24 percent
stated not having attended a service within the last 6 months. However, the number of missing
answers with 109 is unusually high, probably due to the fact that many individuals who never
attended a religious service preferred to refuse their answers.
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of answers to the question, “Is work effort or luck and
connections more important for economic success?”, with step 1 indicating the belief that
work effort alone determines success, and step 10, the opposite belief that work effort does
not matter at all. The majority of respondents seem to believe in the role of effort. In fact,
25 percent of respondents placed themselves on steps 1 or 2, 23 percent, on step 3, and 16
3Largest Protestant denomination in Switzerland.
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Religious denomination No. % of valid answers
Roman Catholic Church 383 39
Reformed Church 494 51
Unaffiliated 80 8
Other 19 2
Total valid answers 976 100
Missing 3
Sample 979
Table 4.2: Religious denomination of the respondents
strength of the belief No. % of valid answers
no or weak belief 382 39
moderate belief 384 39
strong or very strong belief 209 22
total valid answers 975 100
missing 4
sample 979
Table 4.3: Level of respondents’ religiosity measured as strength of their belief in God
percent, on step 4. As much as 24 percent chose step 5 while only 12 percent placed themselves
on steps 6 to 10.
4.4.2 Respondents’ choice behavior
There is a total of 979 ·8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which not quite 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo [see Table 4.6]. There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes in the
experiment may not have been sufficiently spaced apart to make respondents switch. Second,
some attributes (e.g. benefits going to the unemployed; see Table 4.8), may not have been
important enough to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making because
the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However, there may
simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making situations,
as suggested by the large negative constant in Table 4.8. Nonetheless, only 21 percent of
respondents never opted for an alternative [see Table 4.6]. Conversely, almost 80 percent
departed from the status quo at least once.
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Last attendance No. % of valid answers
less than 1 month ago 236 27
1 to 2 months ago 193 22
3 to 6 months ago 236 27
more than 6 months ago 205 24
total valid answers 870 100
Missing 109
Sample 979
Table 4.4: Level of respondents’ religiosity measured by time of their last attendance of a
religious service
No. % of valid answers
steps 1 to 2 247 25
step 3 226 23
steps 4 to 5 389 40
steps 6 to 10 112 12
total valid answers 974 100
Missing 5
Sample 979
Table 4.5: Belief whether effort or luck determine economic success on a scale from 1 to 10.
Step 1 indicates the belief that only effort determines success, step 10 indicates the belief
that only luck determines success.
4.5 Estimation results
4.5.1 Simple model: preferences of an average respondent
Estimation of equation (4.7) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of the
indirect utility function with regard to the GDP share of redistribution REDIST. More-
over, the fact that uses and types of beneficiaries add up to 100 percent needs to be taken
into account [see Table 4.1]. In order to avoid perfect collinearity, PENS (Pensioners) and
OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
∆V = c0 + β1W POOR+ β2UNEMP+ β3ILL+ β4FAM+
+γ1SWISS+ γ2WEU FOR+ (4.10)
+δ1REDIST+ δ2REDIST
2 + ηTAX+ ϕ
Estimation of a few of the 5 · 3 = 15 specifications with alternative exclusions produced
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Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 4.6: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 4.7: Distribution of the number of chosen alternatives per respondent
results similar to those displayed in Table 4.8. Specifically, they agree in that alternatives
with additional redistribution are chosen with a lower probability [for details with regard
to ’slices’ of the pie, see Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a)]. Also, note the sizeable and highly
significant coefficient of the price attribute TAX, which is important for the estimation of
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) values [see eq. (4.9)]. For redistribution, the MWTP
value is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂∆V/∂REDIST
∂∆V/∂TAX
= −δ1 + 2δ2REDIST
η
(4.11)
This amounts to -0.25 percentage points of income share per additional percentage point of
GDP devoted to redistribution in excess of the status quo. Evaluated at the mean personal
income of the sample, this equals CHF -11.78 per month. However, this figure is dwarfed
by the compensation one would have to pay respondents to depart from the status quo,
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Variable Coeff. Std. err. z P > |z| Marg. eff.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
χ2(0) 108.87
Prob > χ2 0.000
σu 0.41610
ρ 0.14759
Table 4.8: Random effects probit estimates for the simple model
amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their monthly income, or 5.27 percent of their
annual income [see the large negative constant in Table 4.8].
Neustadt and Zweifel (2010b) [see Chapter 5] construct the (quadratic) WTP function and
show that it attains a maximum at 21.05% of GDP, definitely below the current value of
25%. Therefore, they argue that Swiss welfare state is too big in the light of average citizens’
preferences.
4.5.2 Extended model: preference heterogeneity
Religious denomination and preferences for redistribution
The simple model is now extended by including dummies for the religious denomination [see
Table 4.2]. The four levels of this variable are represented by three dummy variables, REF,
CATH, and OTH DEN. For instance, the former is defined as
CATH =

 1 if the respondent belongs to the Catholic Church,0 otherwise.
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The reference category is UNAFF (unaffiliated), indicating that the respondent does not
belong to a religious denomination. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with re-
ligious denomination, eq. (4.10) is modified to also contain interaction terms involving the
denomination variables, resulting in
∆V ′ = c′0 + · · ·+ α′1CATH+ · · ·+ α′2REDIST++α′3REDIST2 + . . .
+λ′2REDIST ·CATH+ λ′3REDIST2 ·CATH+ . . .
+λ′4REDIST ·REF+ λ′5REDIST2 ·REF+
+λ′6REDIST ·OTH DEN+ λ′7REDIST2 ·OTH DEN+ · · ·+ ϕ′.
exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
Catholics - -0.32857 -15.44 7.34 ***
Reformed - -0.47866 -21.33 11.24 ***
Unaffiliated + 0.71988 37.77 9.77 ***
Others -1.15630 -49.30 86.45
Note: *** denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 4.9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with religious denominations
Hypothesis 1(A) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative for
the respondents belonging to the Reformed Church. It is confirmed, with the MWTP for
one percentage point increase of the total amount of redistribution being a negative CHF
-15.44 [see Table 4.9]. Hypothesis 1(B), stating that Catholics exhibit a negative demand
for redistribution that is, however, higher than that of the Protestants is confirmed, too.
However, a t test shows that the difference in MWTP values between these two religious
groups is statistically not significant. Further, Hypothesis 1(C), predicting the demand for
redistribution of unaffiliated citizens to be positive finds strong empirical support with the
corresponding MWTP of CHF 37.77 for one percentage point increase of the total amount
of redistribution. Moreover, t tests confirm that MWTP values of the unaffiliated individuals
on the one side and Catholics or Reformed on the other side are significantly different (with
t values of 4.35 and 3.97, respectively).
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Religiosity and preferences for redistribution
In this section, the simple model is extended by one of two measures of the level of religious
participation by including the corresponding dummies [see Tables 4.3, 4.4]. For instance, in
the case of the strength of religious beliefs, the three levels of this variable are represented
by two dummy variables, namely WEAK (no or weak belief in God) and STRONG (strong
or very strong belief), with the former being defined as
WEAK =

 1 if the respondent has no or weak belief in God,0 otherwise.
Here, the reference category is MODER, indicating that the respondent stated having beliefs
of moderate strength. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with religious denom-
ination, eq. (4.10) is modified to also contain interaction terms involving the denomination
variables, resulting in
∆V ′′ = c′′0 + · · ·+ α′′1WEAK+ · · ·+ α′′2REDIST+
+α′′3REDIST
2 + · · ·+ κ′′2REDIST ·WEAK+
+κ′′3REDIST
2 ·WEAK+ · · ·+
+κ′′4REDIST · STRONG+
+κ′′5REDIST
2 · STRONG+ · · ·+ ϕ′′
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
no or weak belief -0.47477 -20.67 12.75 **
moderate belief -0.42066 -19.33 7.93 ***
strong belief 0.24983 12.83 8.56 *
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10)
percent level.
Table 4.10: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with strength of religious beliefs
Hypothesis 2(a) with its focus on the degree of religiosity as a determinant of WTP for
redistribution states that the demand for redistribution is expected to decrease with a stronger
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belief in God. The estimated WTP values suggest to reject this hypothesis, however. In
fact, the WTP increases with the strength of religious beliefs [see Table 4.10]. The t test for
preference heterogeneity confirms that theWTP of individuals with strong beliefs significantly
differs from the WTP of the other two groups. However, the difference between respondents
with weak and moderate beliefs, respectively, cannot be shown to be statistically significant.
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
less than 1 month ago (group 1) -0.90140 -38.47 38.43 *
1 to 2 months ago (group 2) -0.35836 -15.54 12.52 *
3 to 6 months ago (group 3) -0.44118 -20.64 10.02 ***
more than 6 months ago (group 4) -0.05989 -2.95 7.38
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10)
percent level.
Table 4.11: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with frequency of attending a religious service
Hypothesis 2(b) states that WTP values are predicted to decrease with a higher frequency of
attendance of religious services. In fact, the estimated WTP values [see Table 4.11] seem to
confirm this hypothesis. However, as indicated by the test for heterogeneity, the confidence
intervals of the estimated WTP values overlap, with the notable exception of group 3 and
group 4 exhibiting a weakly significant difference.
Beliefs about the role of luck and effort and preferences for redistribution
Next, the simple model is extended by including the dummy variables describing the respon-
dents’ beliefs about the role of effort vs. luck for achieving economic success. There are five
corresponding dummy variables defined as follows: LUCK12 (=1 if the respondent placed
himself on steps 1 or 2 on a scale from 1 to 10, =0 otherwise), LUCK3, (=1 if the respondent
placed himself on step 3, =0 otherwise4), and LUCK6+ (=1 if the respondent placed himself
on steps 6 to 10, thereby indicating a strong belief in luck, =0 otherwise) as well as their
4For the distribution of answers, see Table 4.5.
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interactions with the attributes. The reference category is LUCK45 (=1 if the respondent
placed himself on steps 4 or 5, =0 otherwise). Thus, eq. (4.10) is modified to read,
∆V ′′′ = c′′′0 + · · ·+ α′′′1 LUCK12+ · · ·+ α′′′2 REDIST+
+α′′′3 REDIST
2 + · · · + κ′′′2 REDIST · LUCK12+
+κ′′′3 REDIST
2 · LUCK12+ · · ·+ ϕ′′′
MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
steps 1 or 2 (group I) -0.74183 -32.92 13.25 ***
step 3 (group II) -0.59576 -27.23 13.63 ***
steps 4 or 5 (group III) -0.06592 -3.08 8.12
steps 6 to 10 (group IV) 0.71922 35.15 11.83 ***
Note: *** (**,*) denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 (5, 10)
percent level.
Table 4.12: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with beliefs as to whether effort or luck determine
economic success. A higher step indicates a weaker belief in a just world and a stronger belief
in luck.
Hypothesis 3 states that the demand for redistribution is predicted to increase with a stronger
belief that luck determines economic success. Therefore, respondents who chose higher steps
on a scale from 1 to 10 are expected to exhibit higher WTP values. As indicated by the
estimation results presented in Table 4.12, this hypothesis is confirmed. In particular, in-
dividuals who placed themselves on steps 6 to 10, thereby indicating that they deem luck
and connections to be crucial in the determination of income and wealth, exhibit a strongly
positive marginal WTP value of CHF 35.15 for a 1 percentage point increase in the amount
of redistribution as a share of GDP. The corresponding MWTP values for other groups, while
being negative, do increase with higher steps. Furthermore, the t test results confirm that all
differences between the MWTP values of the four groups are significant, the only exception
being the difference between group I (steps 1 or 2) and group II (step 3), both believing in a
just world.
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4.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution through a
Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on a simple model that relates choices
to the attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen would have to be paid a
compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.25 percent of monthly income)
for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In addition, a
very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another 63 percent
of monthly income.
Furthermore, we tested several hypotheses concerning the behavioral determinants of the
demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side influences. In particular, Hy-
pothesis 1 states that it is negative among church members and positive among those without
religious affiliation. An extended model that includes the pertinent variable indicating reli-
gious denomination as a regressor yields confirming evidence for this statement; however, the
additional prediction that Protestants exhibit a lower WTP than Catholics finds only partial
support with the respective difference between the WTP values being statistically not sig-
nificant. Hypothesis 2 predicts that more religious citizens who are more likely to engage in
private charity and frequently consider religion as a means of insurance (crowding-out effect)
do not demand a high level of public redistribution. Here, the extended version of the model
(in both alternative versions) does not support the hypothesis. Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicts
that citizens with a strong belief that luck rather than effort determine economic success ex-
hibit a higher WTP. The corresponding extended model that includes the stated belief about
the role of luck as a determinant of income and wealth empirically confirms this hypothesis.
In fact, Hypothesis 3 is the most successful one in predicting the citizens’ demand for re-
distribution, providing corroborating evidence for the theoretical model of collective beliefs
developed by Benabou and Tirole (2006).
The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, only some behav-
ioral explanations of the demand for redistribution were tested while others (risk aversion,
inequality aversion) were not controlled for. Furthermore, as suggested by recent contributions
to literature in the field of public choice, citizens’ preferences can be importantly influenced
by political institutions, in particular by party programs [see e.g. Schla¨pfer et al. (2007)].
Thus, future work should be devoted to a detailed analysis of political party preferences in
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order to find out whether these factors also influence stated WTP for redistribution. This
analysis would, however, require addressing the identification problem once again, since the
supply of public redistribution is governed by political institutions. Second, the status quo
bias found in this paper calls for more detailed analysis. To the extent that it reflects risk
aversion, it should induce demand for redistribution - contrary to the results presented here.
One possible explanation of this phenomenon can be the fact that there are some preferences
that are not fully formed [see e.g. Stutzer et al. (2007)]. Another possible explanation might
be the redistribution illusion, namely the fact that some respondents are not aware of the
actual status quo. Finally, the evidence only relates to a point of time in one country and
thus may be subject to transitory shocks and country-specific influences. Still, by appeal-
ing to citizens’ stated preferences, the present contribution sheds some light on the question
whether religious and cultural beliefs can explain preferences for income redistribution.
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4.8 Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
96
Is the welfare state sustainable?
Experimental evidence on
citizens’ preferences for redistribution
Ilja Neustadt and Peter Zweifel
Abstract: The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens’ preferences
for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed
in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed,
old-age pensioners, people with ill health etc.), and nationality of beneficiary. Estimated
marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who deem benefits too low, and
negative otherwise. However, even those who state that government should reduce income
inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average. The major finding is that estimated average
WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP, clearly below the current value of 25%. Thus, the present
Swiss welfare state does not appear sustainable.
Keywords: Income redistribution, welfare state, sustainability, preferences, willingness to pay,
discrete choice experiments
JEL classification: C35, C93, D63, H29
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Chapter 5
Is the welfare state sustainable?
Experimental evidence on citizens’
preferences for redistribution
5.1 Introduction
The sustainability of the welfare state is a hotly debated topic between politicians and interest
groups. The economists’ contribution to the debate traditionally has been to analyze the
effects of redistributive policies on employment, output, and growth. However, in full cognition
of these effects, a majority of citizens may still exhibit willingness to pay (WTP) for more
redistribution of income. Conversely, its WTP may be negative even in a situation where these
side effects of redistribution are unimportant. Ultimately, the sustainability of the welfare
state therefore hinges on citizens’ WTP. Through a Discrete Choice experiment (DCE), this
paper seeks to determine not only the desired amount of redistribution but also to test several
hypotheses concerning the determinants of this WTP. The data come from a DCE performed
in the fall of 2008 and involving more than 900 Swiss citizens.
Recently, there has been a great deal of research into the demand for redistribution and its
determinants, which will be discussed in Section 5.2 below. One strand relates the measured
amount of redistribution to economic, institutional, and behavioral factors. Examples are
Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009). However, the observed amount
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of redistribution is the outcome of an interaction between demand and supply, with supply
governed by a country’s political institutions and processes. This classical identification prob-
lem would have to be addressed in order to make inferences about citizens’ preferences for
redistribution. A second strand of research, exemplified by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and
Guillaud (2008), relies on surveys designed to measure attitudes towards redistribution. The
problem with this approach is its failure to impose a budget constraint. It therefore cannot
predict actual decision making (e.g. voting at the polls), where citizens take the consequences
in terms of their own income and wealth into account. A third approach seeks to solve this
problem through Contingent Valuation (CV) experiments [see e.g. Boeri et al. (2001, 2002)1].
The weakness of the CV approach is that it holds all the attributes of the good in question
constant, varying its price only. One would want to vary other attributes of redistribution be-
sides its tax price, viz. its uses (for health, old age, etc.) and the type of beneficiary (foreigner,
national).
By way of contrast, a DCE allows to measure preferences uncontaminated by supply influ-
ences, it imposes the budget constraint through the price attribute, and it does so in a realistic
way by making respondents choose between alternatives where all attributes are allowed to
vary.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 contains a literature review
from which hypotheses to be tested are derived. Its first part concerns general determinants
of the demand for redistribution and the second, attitudes towards reduction of inequality
as determinants of preferences for redistribution. Section 5.3 presents a general description
of the method of DCEs as well as the design of the present experiment. The descriptive
statistics of the experiment follow in Section 5.4, and hypothesis tests, in Section 5.5. Section
5.6 summarizes the results and concludes with an assessment of the sustainability of the Swiss
welfare state.
1Boeri et al. (2001) study international attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension and
unemployment schemes in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They also perform CV experiments that impose
an explicit trade-off between income and social insurance coverage on respondents. They find that people
oppose an extension of the welfare state, with conflicts between young and old, rich and poor, and insiders
and outsiders creating significant hurdles to welfare reform.
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5.2 Literature review and statement of hypotheses
This section first presents research that defines the general background of this paper and then
moves on to contributions that lead to a set of specific hypotheses to be tested.
5.2.1 General determinants of the demand for income redistribution
In their reviews, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) identify a wide set
of factors that can be categorized as economic, political, and behavioral determinants of the
demand for income redistribution.
Economic determinants
The simplest framework for the analysis of purely economic determinants is provided by a
model focusing on current economic well-being, originally proposed by Romer (1975) and
Roberts (1977) and extended by Meltzer and Richard (1981) [RRMR model]. This model
assumes non-altruistic utility-maximizing individuals differentiated by their income levels
only. The government pays a lump-sum transfer to all citizens, financed by a linear uniform
income tax. Individuals with an income below the mean favor taxation and transfers while
those with an income above the mean oppose it. In a political equilibrium, the majority of
voters supports a positive tax rate corresponding to the value desired by the median voter2.
The model’s prediction is that the larger the gap between the mean and the median income,
the higher the level of taxation and redistribution.
The empirical evidence is quite mixed. On the one hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson
and Tabellini (1994), and Milanovic (2000) find some supporting evidence. Furthermore,
Guillaud (2008), conducting a cross-section analysis of survey data from four EU countries,
shows that poorer and less educated individuals are more in favor of redistribution. On the
other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Perotti (1996), and Rodriguez (1999) fail to find
supporting evidence for this model. Moreover, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) [see Chapter 3]
relate willingness to pay (WTP) for income redistribution elicited from a Discrete Choice
Experiment (DCE, see Section 5.3.1 for details) to measures of economic well-being. WTP
2The median voter’s income is assumed to be below the mean. This assumption is satisfied for most
economies.
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values are shown to be negatively related to income and education, contradicting the RRMR
model.
Another economic explanation is the “Prospect of Upward Mobility” (POUM) hypothesis,
suggested by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) as the ‘tunnel effect’ and more recently refor-
mulated by Benabou and Ok (2001). It extends the RRMR model by introducing individuals’
expectations, based on their observations regarding the income mobility of others in society.
Expected upward mobility may dampen a poor but forward-looking voter’s enthusiasm for
income redistribution.
Empirical support of the POUM hypothesis is provided by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)
who, using an actual mobility matrix for the United States, show that people who can expect
high future income oppose redistribution3. Rainer and Siedler (2008) use probabilistic expec-
tations data to show that individuals with a sufficiently large chance of occupational upward
mobility exhibit a lower demand for redistribution; conversely, those with a sufficiently large
risk of occupational downward mobility opt for more redistribution. Checchi and Filippin
(2004), testing the POUM hypothesis by means of a within-subjects experiment, find cor-
roborating evidence under several alternative specifications. According to Guillaud (2008),
however, individuals who subjectively experienced upward mobility over ten years tend to be
more (rather than less) supportive of redistributive policies. Moreover, upward intergenera-
tional mobility in occupational prestige goes along with more positive rather than negative
attitude towards redistribution. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) examine the empirical evidence
for the United States and briefly across countries, concluding that social mobility (if mea-
sured as the change in the occupational prestige) does decrease demand for redistribution
once sociodemographic (age, gender, race) and socioeconomic characteristics (income, educa-
tion) are controlled for. In their DCE-based study, Neustadt and Zweifel (2009) [Chapter 3]
relate preferences for redistribution to mobility. They find partial empirical support for the
POUM hypothesis.
Another economic explanation, suggested by the social contract literature, is that prefer-
ences for redistribution can at least in part be interpreted as a demand for insurance by
3The ‘tunnel effect’ also works in the opposite direction, causing forward-looking agents with high incomes
but downward mobility expectations to be in favor of redistribution. This prediction is confirmed by Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000) using a data set from Russia. Furthermore, Molna´r and Kapita´ny (2006a,b) show that
individuals who lack clear expectations about their future income favor redistribution even more than those
with negative but clear expectations.
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risk-averse individuals. In a hypothetical situation, where individuals do not yet know their
endowment as well as their future position in society [‘veil of ignorance’, cf. Rawls (1999)],
they are predicted to exhibit positive WTP for an income transfer from more favorable future
states to less favorable ones. Redistributive policies can thus be interpreted as reflecting this
hypothetical demand for insurance. Beck (1994) investigates individual behavior under the
‘veil of ignorance’ in an experiment. By placing participants in a hypothetical society with
random differences in income, represented by lotteries, he is able to derive the desired amount
of income redistribution. Individuals indeed display risk aversion, albeit not of the extreme
kind implied by the Rawlsian maximin rule. Furthermore, they show no preference for income
redistribution in excess of what can be explained by risk aversion.
Political Determinants
As to the political determinants of the demand for income redistribution, the literature [Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000, 2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)] pre-
dicts that proportional representation tends towards universal programs benefitting various
groups (old-age pensioners, working poor, minorities, etc.), while majority rule results in
targeted ‘pork barrel’ programs. Persson and Tabellini (2003) find supporting empirical ev-
idence in that countries with proportional representation have GDP shares of government
expenditure that ceteris paribus are 5 percentage points higher than countries with major-
ity rule. Moreover, Akkoyunlu et al. (2009) [Chapter 2] present weak evidence of a positive
correlation between the degree of proportional representation and the transfer share in GDP
in OECD countries. Additional political determinants of redistribution include two-party vs.
multiparty system, presidential vs. parliamentary democracy, and direct vs. representative
democracy, with two-party systems, presidential, and direct democracies all predicted to in-
duce less public redistribution. In order to sketch the institutional background of the DCE
described in Section 5.3.2, Switzerland can be described as follows. It has a high degree of pro-
portional representation and a parliamentary democracy. Its distinguishing feature, however,
is its extensive direct democratic control in the guise of popular initiatives and referenda.
This might serve to limit public welfare spending while enforcing efficiency in redistribution
[cf. Feld et al. (2007)].
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Behavioral Determinants
The mixed empirical evidence bearing on the economic determinants of preferences for redis-
tribution calls for a detailed analysis of their behavioral determinants. In particular, beliefs
have been at the center of attention. The theoretical base is laid by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), who develop a model where society’s belief whether effort or luck determines economic
success gives rise to multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a
model for the emergence and persistence of such collective beliefs. Moreover, beliefs can be
seen as a source of altruistic preferences and inequality aversion [see Section 5.2.2]. On the
empirical side, Fong (2001) presents evidence in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) sug-
gesting that beliefs about the role of luck in determining economic success are an important
determinant of the demand for redistribution. She also considers the effects of incentives. If
effort determines income, then an increased income tax rate causes an output loss due to its
effect on incentives. This consideration is hypothesized to qualify the link between beliefs and
the demand for redistribution. However, the data fail to support this hypothesis. Neustadt
(2010) [see Chapter 4] analyzes the influence of behavioral determinants on willingness to
pay (WTP) for income redistribution in Switzerland and shows that the less religious citi-
zens exhibit a significantly higher marginal WTP than the more religious ones. Further, the
citizens without religious affiliation have a positive marginal WTP while those belonging to
some denomination, a negative one.
5.2.2 Attitudes towards reduction of inequality and demand for income
redistribution
While the POUM hypothesis suggests less redistribution than predicted by the RRMR model,
the assumption of altruistic preferences can lead to the opposite prediction. In fact, if individu-
als care also about the utility of others, one might expect more redistribution than predicted
by the conventional RRMR model. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provide a review of several
models of social preferences, in particular, altruism, envy, inequality aversion, fairness, and
reciprocity. Here, we focus on inequality aversion to derive hypotheses relating it to demand
for income redistribution. In a simple model of inequality aversion, Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
assume that individuals feel envy if their incomes are below that of others [disadvantageous
inequality, see second term of eq. (5.1)], but they feel altruistic when their income exceeds
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it [advantageous inequality, see third term of eq. (5.1)]. An individual i’s utility function is
assumed to have the form
Ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = xi − αi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max {xj − xi, 0} − βi
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
max {xi − xj, 0} (5.1)
with 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi (the disutility from disadvantageous inequality is assumed to exceed that
from advantageous inequality) and βi ≤ 1 (individuals are not willing to waste money in order
to avoid being significantly richer than others). Here xk, k = 1, . . . , N , denotes individual k’s
income, αi, the marginal disutility from disadvantageous inequality, and βi, the marginal
disutility from advantageous inequality. In this model, the decisive median voter demands
more redistribution than in the conventional RRMR model. First, she has disutility from
being richer than those with income xj < xi. Second, she has even more disutility from being
poorer than those with income xj > xi. Thus, in a political equilibrium, larger values of αi,
βi (higher level of inequality aversion) lead to a higher demand for redistribution compared
to that predicted by the RRMR model.
Based on the assumption of inequality aversion, we formulate two hypotheses to be tested in
Section 5.5.2. The first assumes that citizens with higher inequality aversion tend to deem
the current level of social benefits to be too low, while those with lower inequality aversion
deem it to be too high or just sufficient. Thus, the former are predicted to exhibit a positive
WTP for redistribution while the latter, a negative one. The second hypothesis is based on
the consideration that voters exhibiting inequality aversion tend to support the view that
the government should reduce the income gap between the poor and the rich. Consequently,
respondents who state that the reduction of the income gap is a task of the government are
expected to exhibit a positive WTP for redistribution.
Hypothesis 1: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(A) negative if the currently provided level of social benefits is considered too high,
(B) negative but less so than in (A) if the currently provided level of social benefits is
considered to be just sufficient,
(C) positive if the currently provided level of social benefits is considered too low.
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Hypothesis 2: Willingness to pay for redistribution is expected to be
(a) negative if the individual thinks that the government should not reduce the income
gap between the poor and the rich,
(b) positive if the individual thinks that the government should reduce the income gap
between the poor and the rich.
5.3 Discrete choice experiments
5.3.1 Theoretical foundations
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) provide a tool for measuring individuals’ preferences
for characteristics of commodities, the so-called attributes. In contradistinction to classical
Revealed Preference Theory, originating with Samuelson (1938), DCEs allow individuals to
express their preferences for non-marketed as well as hypothetical products. During a DCE,
respondents are repeatedly asked to compare the status quo with several hypothetical al-
ternatives defined by their attributes including a price. By varying the levels of attributes,
different product alternatives are generated. A rational individual will always choose the al-
ternative with the highest utility. From the observed choices, the researcher can infer the
utility associated with the attributes. The proposed method, derived from the New Demand
Theory of Lancaster (1971), is also known as Conjoint Analysis [Louviere et al. (2000)].
The most prominent alternative to a DCE is Contingent Valuation (CV). A certain situation
or product is described in detail, and respondents are asked to indicate their maximum
willingness to pay (WTP) for this fixed product. Only its price attribute is varied, while in
Conjoint Analysis all relevant attributes are varied simultaneously, making it a multi-attribute
valuation method [Merino-Castello (2003)]. While a DCE describes the product in less detail
than a typical CV study, it allows for analyzing many product varieties by varying the levels
of relevant attributes [Louviere et al. (2000), p. 344]. Trade-offs among attributes can be
explicitly taken into account and WTP values of attributes estimated separately (see below).
Furthermore, strategic behavior of respondents is less likely than in CV with its exclusive
emphasis on price, which facilitates strategic behavior. Finally, biases that easily occur when
individuals are directly asked about their WTP are less frequently observed in a DCE [Ryan
(2004)].
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A particular advantage of a DCE in the present context is that it permits to explicitly impose
the budget constraint through a price attribute in the guise of the tax share of income used
to finance the transfers considered. Respondents can be made to simultaneously choose this
share and hence the ‘size of the pie’ and the ‘slices of the pie’ devoted to different types
of recipients and uses (health, old age, etc.; see Exhibits No. 1 to 3 in Appendix). Thus,
trade-offs among different attributes of the redistribution plan can be calculated to assess the
relative importance of the respective redistributive goals.
The econometric method used is based on the Random Utility Theory [see Luce (1959), Man-
ski and Lerman (1977), McFadden (2001, 1974, 1981, 2001)]. Individual i values alternative
j according to the utility Vij attained, which is given by
Vij = vi(aj , pj , yi, si, εij). (5.2)
Here, vi(·) denotes i’s indirect utility function, aj, the amount of attributes associated with
alternative j, and pj, price. The individual’s income and sociodemographic characteristics
are symbolized by yi and si, respectively. Finally, εij denotes the error term, which is due to
the fact that the experimenter will never observe all the arguments entering vi, imparting a
stochastic element to observed choices. As usual, the utility function is additively split into
a systematic component w(·) and a stochastic one,
Vij = wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij .
A utility-maximizing individual i will prefer alternative j to alternative l if and only if
wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj, pj , yi, si) + εij . (5.3)
Due to the presence of the stochastic term, only the probability Pij of individual i choosing
alternative j rather than alternative l can be estimated, with
Pij = Prob [wi(al, pl, yi, si) + εil ≤ wi(aj , pj , yi, si) + εij ] (5.4)
= Prob [εil − εij ≤ wi(aj , pj, yi, si)− wi(al, pl, yi, si)] . (5.5)
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Thus, the probability of choosing j amounts to the probability of the systematic utility
difference wi[j]−wi[l] dominating the ‘noise’, εil−εij . The error terms {εil, εij} can be assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ2l and σ
2
j as well as covariance σlj .
Under these assumptions, ϕij := εil − εij is also normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2 := Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
l + σ
2
j − 2σlj . Thus, equation (5.5) can be represented as
Pij = Φ
(
wi(aj , pj , yi, si)−wi(al, pl, yi, si)
σ
)
, (5.6)
where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of a standard normal distribution. This model is known as the
binary probit model [cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)]. Hensher et al. (1999) provide em-
pirical evidence that a linear specification of the function w(·) leads to good predictions in
its middle ranges. Therefore, in the case of the simple model that relates utilities and choice
probabilities to the attributes only (see Section 5.5.1), one posits
wi(aj , pj, yi, si) = ci +
K∑
k=1
βkakj + εij , (5.7)
where ci represents an individual-specific constant, ak, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the attributes of
the alternative, and βk, k = 1, . . . ,K, are the parameters to be estimated. These parameters
can be interpreted as the constant marginal utilities of the corresponding attributes. One
obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility of individual i between
alternative j and status quo,
∆Vij = ci +
K∑
k=1
βk∆akj + βp∆pj + ϕij , (5.8)
where ∆akj = akj − alj, ∆pj = pj − pl, ci = cil − cij , and ϕij = εil − εij for each j 6= l. The
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes m and n is given by
MRSm,n = −∂v/∂am
∂v/∂an
. (5.9)
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Therefore, the marginal WTP for attribute am can be calculated by dividing the marginal
utility of this attribute by the marginal utility of the price attribute [in the present context,
the income tax rate, see e.g. Telser (2002), p. 56]:
MWTP(am) =
∂v/∂am
∂v/∂pj
. (5.10)
For econometric inference, it is important to recall that the same individual makes several
choices. The two-way random-effect specification takes this into account with ϕij = µi + ηij ,
where µi denotes the component that varies only across individuals but not across the choice
alternatives. The terms µi and ηij are assumed uncorrelated with the product attributes
(ai1, . . . , aiK) and between themselves. By a standard assumption in a probit model, ση =
1. Hence Var[ϕij ] = σ
2
η + σ
2
µ = 1 + σ
2
µ and Corr[ϕij , ϕil] =
σ2µ
1+σ2µ
=: ρ. The parameter ρ
indicates how strongly the various responses of an individual are correlated with each other,
or, equivalently, the share of the total variance that can be explained by individual-specific
error term. The random-effects specification is justified if ρ is high and significant.
The simple model can be extended by including various socioeconomic variables (e.g. income
group, level of education, social mobility). These variables need to be interacted with the
product attributes as well as with the constant, giving rise to the extended model specification
which allows to check for preference heterogeneity and thus to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 in
Section 5.5.2. By means of a t test we can investigate whether the differences in marginal WTP
values between different socioeconomic groups are statistically significant. The computation
of the variance of the marginal WTP values is performed by the delta method, cf. Hole (2007).
5.3.2 Experimental design
A representative telephone survey with 979 respondents was conducted in the fall of 2008.
Prior to the survey, the attributes and their levels used to define ‘income redistribution’ had
been checked in two pretests for their relevance. Attributes form four groups (see Table 5.1).
1. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on five types of recipients (viz. the
working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, and people
with ill health);
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Attribute Label Status Quo Level Alternative Levels
Shares of benefits going to
• Working Poor W POOR 10% 5%, 15%
• Unemployed UNEMP 15% 5%, 25%
• Old-Age Pensioners PENS 45% 35%, 55%
• Families with Children FAM 5% 10%
• People with Ill Health ILL 25% 20%, 30%
Shares of benefits going to
• Swiss citizens SWISS 75% 60%, 85%
• Western European foreigners WEU FOR 10% 5%, 20%
• Other foreigners OTH FOR 15% 10%, 20%
Total amount of redistribution REDIST 25% (of GDP) 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%
Income tax TAX 25% (of personal income) 10%, 15%, 40%
Table 5.1: Attributes and their levels
2. Shares of the total redistribution budget to be spent on three groups (viz. Swiss citizens,
western European foreigners, and other foreigners);
3. Total amount of redistribution, defined as a share of GDP;
4. Personal income tax rate to be paid by the respondent (the price attribute).
Clearly, these attributes and their levels combine to form a total number of possible scenarios
that cannot be realized in an experiment. The scenarios define the n rows of the observation
matrix X, with associated covariance matrix Ω = σ2 (X ′X)−1 of parameters β to be esti-
mated. So-called D-efficient design calls for the minimization of the geometric mean of the
eigenvalues of Ω,
D efficiency =
(
|Ω| 1K
)−1
where K denotes the number of parameters to be estimated [cf. Carlsson and Martinsson
(2003)]. Using this optimization procedure and incorporating several restrictions, the number
of alternatives was reduced to 35 and randomly split into five groups. One alternative was
included twice in each decision set for a consistency test, resulting in 8 binary choices per
respondent.
In order to make sure that decisions were based on a homogeneous information set and made
in a consistent way, respondents were provided with a detailed description of the attributes
and their possible realizations. The Appendix shows the graphical representation of the status
quo (Exhibit 1) and two selected alternatives (Exhibits 2 and 3).
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5.4 Descriptive statistics
5.4.1 Socioeconomic characteristics
too little right amount too much total valid answers missing
Income group, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No. % No.
< CHF 2000 63 35 100 56 16 9 179 100 13
CHF 2000 - 3999 58 32 94 53 27 15 179 100 14
CHF 4000 - 5999 141 43 149 45 39 12 329 100 15
≥CHF 6000 79 37 118 56 14 7 211 100 10
Missing 11 16 1 28
Total answers 352 38 477 52 97 10 926 53
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 5.2: Answers to the question “Do you think that the government is spending too much,
too little or about the right amount on welfare?”, by income group
yes no total valid answers missing
Income group, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No.
< CHF 2000 78 42 108 58 186 100 6
CHF 2000 - 3999 112 59 77 41 189 100 4
CHF 4000 - 5999 124 37 212 63 336 100 8
≥CHF 6000 90 42 122 58 212 100 9
Missing 13 16 29
Total answers 417 45 535 55 952 27
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 5.3: Answers to the question “Do you agree with the following statement: ’By increasing
the income tax rates for rich families and financially supporting poor families, the government
should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?”, by income group
The sample consists of 979 respondents, 70 percent of them residing in the German-speaking
part and 30 percent in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Some 94 percent are born in
the country, 50 percent are men, 20 percent having a monthly income below CHF 2,000 and
23 percent, above CHF 6,000, reflecting the structure of the Swiss population. However, only
1.5 percent of the respondents are unemployed.
38 percent of the respondents stated that the current level of social benefits was too low, 10
percent stated that it was too high, and 52 percent found it exactly right [see Table 5.2]. On
the other hand, 45 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, ’By increasing the
income tax rates for rich families and financially supporting poor families, the government
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yes no total valid answers missing
Income classes, CHFa No. % No. % No. % No.
insurance 164 33 339 67 503 100 10
inequality reduction 219 55 181 45 400 100 13
Missing 34 15 49
Total answers 417 45 535 55 952 27
a1 CHF (Swiss franc) = 0.8 US$ at 2008 exchange rates
Table 5.4: Answers to the questions “Do you agree with the following statement: ’By in-
creasing the income tax rates for rich families and financially supporting poor families, the
government should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?” and “What
is your main motive for redistribution: insurance or inequality reduction?”
should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’, while 55 percent disagreed
[see Table 5.3].
The distribution of answers over income groups of the respondents is obviously in contradic-
tion with the RRMR model. For instance, 35% of respondents with monthly incomes below
CHF 2,000 (the ‘poor’) deem the current amount of social benefits too low, but this holds
true for even 37% of those with incomes above CHF 6,000 (the ‘rich’) [see Table 5.2]. Sim-
ilarly, the percentage of those finding the current size of the welfare state excessive is 9%
among the ‘poor’ but only 7% among the ‘rich’. Moreover, the share of those supporting a
reduction of the income gap by public redistribution is 42% both among the ‘rich’ and the
‘poor’ [see Table 5.3]. Obviously, beliefs do not correlate with income. On the other hand,
they may reflect inequality aversion. These findings motivate examining explanations of the
demand for income redistribution based on beliefs and inequality aversion. However, as noted
in Section 5.2.1, inequality aversion could be due to risk aversion in front of the ‘veil of ig-
norance’. Indeed, 56 percent of the respondents state ’insurance’ as their main motive for
redistribution, compared to 44 percent of those with the ‘inequality reduction’ motive [see
Table 5.4]. Attitudes clearly differ between the two groups, too. Only one-third of respondents
with the ‘insurance’ motivation support the idea of inequality reduction to be provided by
government, compared to 55% of those with the ‘inequality reduction’ motivation. In sum,
‘true’ inequality aversion in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) may well be relevant, at
least in the present sample.
114
5.4.2 Respondents’ choice behavior
There is a total of 979 ·8 = 7, 832 decisions, of which not quite 20 percent were made in favor
of an alternative over the status quo [see Table 5.5]. There are at least three explanations for
this low percentage. First, in spite of checking in the pretests, the levels of the attributes in the
experiment may not have been sufficiently spaced apart to make respondents switch. Second,
some attributes (e.g. benefits going to the unemployed; see Table 5.7), may not have been
important enough to cause a switch. Finally, there may be errors in decision making because
the consistency test revealed 14 percent of choices to be inconsistent. However, there may
simply be marked status quo bias in the face of highly complex decision-making situations,
as suggested by the large negative constant in Table 5.7. Nonetheless, only 21 percent of
respondents never opted for an alternative [see Table 5.6]. Conversely, almost 80 percent
departed from the status quo at least once.
Choices No. in percent
for alternative 1,562 19.94
for status quo 6,088 77.73
No decision 182 2.32
Total 7,832 100
Table 5.5: Total number of choices
# choices for alternative No. in percent
0 209 21.35
1 309 31.56
2 226 23.08
3 131 13.38
4 57 5.82
5 16 1.63
6 10 1.02
7 0 0.00
8 5 0.51
Total valid answers 965 98.57
Missing 14 1.43
Sample 979 100
Table 5.6: Distribution of the number of chosen alternatives per respondent
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Variable Coeff. Std. err. z P > |z| Marg. eff.
Recipients’ Social Group
W POOR 0.02784 0.00714 3.90 0.000 0.00697
UNEMP 0.01134 0.00452 2.51 0.012 0.00284
ILL 0.01600 0.00463 3.46 0.001 0.00400
FAM 0.06378 0.00942 6.77 0.000 0.01596
Recipient’s Nationality
SWISS 0.03656 0.00552 6.63 0.000 0.00915
WEU FOR 0.02925 0.00869 3.37 0.001 0.00732
REDIST -0.00523 0.00176 -2.97 0.003 -0.00131
REDIST2 -0.06619 0.01174 -5.64 0.000 -0.01656
TAX -0.02053 0.00183 -11.21 0.000 -0.00514
Constant -1.29878 0.06132 -21.18 0.000 n.a.
# observations 7,650
Log likelihood -3,566.76
χ2(0) 108.87
Prob > χ2 0.000
σu 0.41610
ρ 0.14759
Table 5.7: Random effects probit estimates for the simple model
5.5 Estimation results
5.5.1 Simple model: preferences of the average respondent
Estimation of equation (5.8) includes REDIST2 to allow for a possible nonlinearity of the
indirect utility function with regard to the GDP share of redistribution REDIST. More-
over, the fact that uses and types of beneficiaries add up to 100 percent needs to be taken
into account [see Table 5.1]. In order to avoid perfect collinearity, PENS (Pensioners) and
OTH FOR (Other foreigners) were dropped to obtain
∆V = c0 + β1W POOR+ β2UNEMP+ β3ILL+ β4FAM+
+γ1SWISS+ γ2WEU FOR+ (5.11)
+δ1REDIST+ δ2REDIST
2 + ηTAX+ ϕ
Estimation of a few of the 5 · 3 = 15 specifications with alternative exclusions produced
results similar to those displayed in Table 5.7. Specifically, they agree in that alternatives
with additional redistribution are chosen with a lower probability [for details with regard
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to ‘slices’ of the pie, see Neustadt and Zweifel (2010a)]. Also, note the sizeable and highly
significant coefficient of the price attribute TAX, which is important for the estimation of
marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) values [see eq. (5.10)]. For redistribution, the MWTP
value is given by
MWTPREDIST =
∂∆V/∂REDIST
∂∆V/∂TAX
= −δ1 + 2δ2REDIST
η
(5.12)
This amounts to -0.25 percentage points of income share per additional percentage point of
GDP devoted to redistribution in excess of the status quo. Evaluated at the mean personal
income of the sample, this equals CHF -11.78 per month. However, this figure is dwarfed
by the compensation one would have to pay respondents to depart from the status quo,
amounting to an estimated 63 percent of their monthly income, or 5.27 percent of their
annual income [see the large negative constant in Table 5.7].
Equation (5.12) serves as the basis for checking the sustainability of the welfare state. Con-
struction of the (quadratic) WTP function yields a maximum (with MWTP=0) at 21.05%
of GDP, definitely below the current value of 25%. Therefore, the Swiss welfare state can be
said to be too big in the light of average citizens’ preferences.
5.5.2 Extended model: preference heterogeneity
Ex-ante evaluation of the current level of social benefits and preferences for
redistribution
The simple model is now extended by one attitudinal variable at a time. The first is respon-
dents’ ex-ante evaluation of the current level of social benefits [SB, see Table 5.2]. The three
levels of SB are represented by two dummy variables, SB TOOHI and SB TOOLOW. For
instance, the latter is defined as
SB TOOLOW =

 1 if the current level of benefits is deemed too low0 otherwise.
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exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
Social benefits too high (Group A) - -0.55946 -26.75 16.70 ***
The right amount (Group B) ≈0 -0.41789 -19.61 8.34 ***
Social benefits too low (Group C) + 0.05487 2.47 8.09
Note: *** denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 5.8: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with ex-ante evaluation of the current level of
social benefits
The reference category is SB RIGHT, indicating that the respondent deemed social benefits
to have the right size. Since an attribute’s marginal utility may vary with attitude, eq. (5.11)
is modified to also contain interaction terms involving the attitudinal variables, resulting in
∆V ′ = c′0 + · · ·+ α′1SB TOOLOW+ · · ·+ α′2REDIST++α′3REDIST2 + . . .
+λ′2REDIST · SB TOOLOW+ λ′3REDIST2 · SB TOOLOW+ . . . (5.13)
+λ′4REDIST · SB TOOHI+ λ′5REDIST2 · SB TOOHI+ ϕ′.
Hypothesis 1(A) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative if the
currently provided level of social benefits is considered too high. It is confirmed, with the
MWTP for one percentage point increase of the total amount of redistribution being a nega-
tive CHF -26.75 [see Table 5.8]. Hypothesis 1(C), stating that the demand for redistribution
should be positive if the level of social benefits is considered insufficient, finds some empirical
support by a positive but insignificant MWTP value of CHF 2.47. However, Hypothesis 1(B),
predicting the demand for redistribution to be negative but close to zero for individuals who
deem the current level of benefits just sufficient, cannot be confirmed. In fact, the average
respondent in this group exhibits a significantly negative MWTP for redistribution of CHF
-19.61 per month. A t test indicates that the difference in MWTP values between respondent
groups A and B is not significant, again contradicting Hypothesis 1(B).
As a check on the sustainability of the welfare state in the face of preference heterogeneity,
group-specific WTP functions are constructed. Group A is found to have their maximum
WTP at a GDP share of 15.89% devoted to redistribution. The values of Groups B and
C are 18.45% and 25.52% of GDP, respectively. Therefore, attitudes with regard to the
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exp. sign MWTP, % of income MWTP, CHF s.e., CHF
should not reduce (Group a) - -0.34515 -16.68 6.35 ***
should reduce (Group b) + -0.08417 -3.63 9.25
Note: *** denotes statistical significance of MWTP in % of income at the 1 percent level.
Table 5.9: Marginal WTP values for redistribution (in percent of monthly personal income
and CHF) derived from the extended model with the assessment whether the government
should reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor
amount of social benefits do go along with heterogeneous preferences with regard to income
redistribution. These discrepancies point to sharp conflicts of interest in the event that the
amount of redistribution were to be reduced to the value preferred by the average citizen.
Assessment of the government’s role in dealing with inequality and preferences
for redistribution
Next, the simple model is extended by including the dummy variable GOV REDUCE (=1
if the respondent thinks that the government should reduce the income gap between the rich
and the poor, =0 otherwise) as well as its interactions with the attributes. Thus, eq. (5.11)
is modified to read,
∆V ′′ = c′′0 + · · · + α′′1GOV REDUCE + · · ·+ α′′2REDIST+
+α′′3REDIST
2 + · · ·+ κ′′2REDIST ·GOV REDUCE+ (5.14)
+κ′′3REDIST
2 ·GOV REDUCE + · · ·+ ϕ′′
Hypothesis 2(a) states that the demand for redistribution is expected to be negative if a
respondent believes that the government should not reduce the income gap between the rich
and the poor. It is confirmed because MWTP in Group (a) is CHF -16.68 and statistically
significant. Hypothesis 2(b) with its prediction for MWTP to be positive if a respondent
wants the government to reduce the income gap cannot be confirmed. If at all, MWTP is
negative in Group (b) (but lacks statistical significance).
Thus, individuals who stated support for inequality reduction by the government seem to
exhibit inconsistent behavior by having a negative willingness to pay for this reduction. How-
ever, the framing of the question, “Do you agree with the following statement: ’By increasing
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the income tax rates for rich families and financially supporting poor families, the govern-
ment should try to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor’?” did not evoke
the trade-off between the reduction of the income gap and the respondent’s own income. By
way of contrast, the WTP values come from a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), where the
budget restriction is inevitably present.
Addressing the sustainability issue once more, recall that the average respondent would prefer
a share of GDP devoted to redistribution of 21% rather than the current value of 25%.
However, construction of the group-specific WTP functions indicates that the optimal values
of REDIST are again somewhat apart, with 19.21% of GDP for Group (a) and 24.09% for
Group (b), respectively. Therefore, demand for income redistribution as measured by this
DCE, while below the amount provided by the government, once more differs importantly
between subpopulations, rendering a reform of the Swiss welfare state difficult.
5.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution through a
Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. Based on a simple model that relates choices
to the attributes of redistribution only, the average Swiss citizen would have to be paid a
compensation of CHF 11.78 (some US$ 9.40) per month (0.25 percent of monthly income)
for an additional percentage point of GDP devoted to public redistribution. In addition, a
very marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by payment of another 63 percent
of monthly income.
Such an experiment also permits to test several hypotheses concerning the determinants of
the demand for redistribution without any confounding supply-side influences. In particular,
Hypothesis 1 states that it is negative (close to zero) among citizens who think that public
welfare currently provided welfare is excessive (sufficient). An extended model that includes
the pertinent attitudinal variable as a regressor yields confirming evidence for the ‘excessive’
component; however, the ‘sufficient’ component is also related to a negative WTP value, con-
tradicting the hypothesis. Hypothesis 2 predicts that citizens who do (not) want government
to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor exhibit positive (negative) WTP for
redistribution. Here, the extended version of the model supports the ‘not’ component of the
hypothesis whereas those in favor of closing the gap fail to exhibit a positive WTP value. The
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major finding of the paper, however, is that estimated average WTP is maximum at 21% of
GDP devoted to redistribution, clearly below the current value of 25%. Moreover, this value
differs importantly depending on attitudes toward the desirable amount of redistribution and
the government’s role in dealing with inequality. Thus, there is reason for concern with regard
to the sustainability of the Swiss welfare state.
The analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, several behavioral
explanations of the demand for redistribution (risk aversion, other beliefs, religiosity) were not
tested. However, recent contributions to the field show that up to 90 percent of cross-country
differences in public spending can be related to institutional and behavioral factors [see e.g.
Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Akkoyunlu et al. (2009)]. Thus, future work should be devoted to
finding out whether these factors also influence stated WTP for redistribution. A first step in
this direction is done by Neustadt (2010) [see Chapter 4]. Second, the status quo bias found
in this paper calls for more detailed analysis. To the extent that it reflects risk aversion, it
should induce demand for redistribution - contrary to the results presented here. Finally, the
evidence only relates to a point of time in one country and thus may be subject to transitory
shocks and country-specific influences. Still, by appealing to citizens’ stated preferences, the
present contribution sheds some light on the question whether a welfare state laying claim to
one quarter of the GDP is sustainable.
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5.8 Appendix
Exhibit 1: Status Quo Card (current state of redistribution)
    Tax Rate              Amount of Redistribution
25% of your 
income 25% of GDP
 Use of Redistribution  Nationality of Beneficiaries  
         
            
citizens of 
Western
European
states
10% 
citizens of other 
states
15%
Swiss
citizens
75%
old-age
pensioners 
45%
families 
with
children 5% 
people
with ill 
health
25%
unemployed
15%
working
poor  10% 
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Exhibit 2: Card for Alternative No. 1
        Tax Rate  Amount of Redistribution
   Uses of Redistribution             Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                            
  Swiss 
citizens
60%
citizens of 
Western European 
states
20%
citizens of 
other states 
          20% 
old-age
pensioners 
      55%
working
poor 15% 
families 
with
children
5%
people with 
ill health 
       20%
25% of your 
income
20% of GDP 
unemployed 
5%
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Exhibit 3: Card for Alternative No. 2
    Tax Rate   Amount of Redistribution
15% of your 
income 10% of GDP
    Uses of Redistribution            Nationality of Beneficiaries
                                                                                         
Swiss citizens 
75%
citizens of 
Western
European states 
10% 
citizens of 
other states 
            15% 
old-age
pensioners 
45%
people
with ill 
health
30%
unemployed 
15%
working
poor
5%
families with 
children 5% 
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Abstract: The search for economically efficient policy instruments designed to promote the
diffusion of renewable energy technologies in liberalized markets has led to the introduction
of quota-based tradable ‘green’ certificate (TGC) schemes for renewable electricity. However,
there is a debate about the pros and cons of TGC, a quantity control policy, compared
to guaranteed feed-in tariffs, a price control policy. In this paper we contrast these two
alternatives in terms of social welfare, taking into account that electricity markets are not
perfectly competitive, and show that the price control policy dominates the quantity control
policy in terms of social welfare.
Keywords: Green certificates; renewable portfolio standard; feed-in tariff
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Chapter 6
Promoting renewable electricity
generation in imperfect markets:
price vs. quantity policies
6.1 Introduction
Electricity generation from renewable energy sources is increasingly recognized to play an
important role for the achievement of a variety of primary and secondary energy policy
goals, such as improved diversity and security of energy supply, reduction of local pollutant
and global greenhouse gas emissions, regional and rural development, and exploitation of
opportunities for fostering social cohesion, value added and employment at the local and
regional level.
The plan of the European Commission of the 1990s to issue an EU Directive on the pro-
motion of electricity from renewables [CEC (1998, 1999a,b)], which eventually led to the
issuance of Directive 2001/77/EC [CEC (2001)], has triggered an intensive political and in-
tellectual debate over the pros and cons of guaranteed feed-in tariffs (FIT) versus tradable
green certificate (TGC) schemes [e.g. Rader (2000); Berry (2002); Lauber (2004); Palmer and
Burtraw (2005); Madlener and Stagl (2005); Kildegaard (2008)].1 Recently, a new and more
comprehensive EU Draft Directive for renewable energy promotion has been published [CEC
1In the literature quota-based TGC schemes are sometimes also referred to as Renewable Portfolio Stan-
dards (RPS).
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(2008a)], in which no clear preference for one or the other instrument is indicated. According
to an accompanying Commission staff working document [CEC (2008b)], however, and given
the track record of the two instruments so far, the preference of the Commission seems to
have shifted away from establishing a uniform European TGC scheme in favor of creating an
investor-friendly climate and optimizing existing national systems.2
Guaranteed FIT provide certainty about the achievable per-unit revenues from selling renew-
able electricity to the grid. While FIT have turned out to be very effective in countries such
as Austria, Denmark, Germany and Spain, they cause market distortions to increase when
electricity generation from renewables expands. In contrast, TGC are based on competitive
market principles, typically featuring mandatory quota targets and certificate trading [e.g.
Menanteau et al. (2003)]. Since TGC promise to enhance static and dynamic efficiency, they
have attracted considerable attention. Over the years, they have been introduced in a number
of countries with liberalized electricity markets [e.g. Berry and Jaccard (2001); Dinica and
Arentsen (2003); Langniss and Wiser (2003); Lorenzoni (2003); Nielsen and Jeppesen (2003);
Verbruggen (2004); Fan et al. (2005); Nishio and Asano (2006); Sa´enz de Miera et al. (2008)].
More recently, the debate has been revolving around the interplay between TGC markets
and markets for tradable CO2 permits [e.g. Morthorst (2001); Jensen and Skytte (2003);
So¨derholm (2008)], and between TGC markets and liberalized power markets [e.g. Amund-
sen and Mortensen (2001, 2002); Jensen and Skytte (2002); Morthorst (2003); Amundsen
and Bergman (2004)], respectively. Another active strand of research concerns financial risk
of investors [Lemming (2003); Dinica (2006)].
While FIT is similar to a subsidy for suppliers of renewables, TGC constitute an internaliza-
tion mechanism in the Baumol-Oates standard-price tradition [Baumol and Oates (1988)].
In fact, comparisons between taxes or subsidies and quota-based certificate schemes have
so far been undertaken mainly in environmental economics, and in particular with regard
to emission control. Denicolo` (1999), for example, analyzes the effects of eﬄuent charges
and pollution permits when innovation is expected. Building on seminal work by Weitzman
(1974, 1978), Pizer (1999a,b) studies the difference between a tax and quota policy under
2This apparent shift has to be seen in light of the very ambitious and binding policy target of achieving a
20% share of renewables in energy consumption by 2020. FIT, due to their relative simplicity in design, seem
to find higher political acceptance and have become widespread in Europe and elsewhere in recent years. In
CEC (2008a) it is reported that by 2007, of all 27 EU member countries, 18 had a FIT (or premium/bonus)
system in place, seven a quota-based TGC system, and only two a tender system (Denmark for offshore wind,
France for large projects).
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uncertainty, finding that uncertainty causes the optimal amount of emission reduction to
increase, which justifies a preference for taxation over quantity control. In the context of re-
newable energy, Madlener and Neustadt (2010) [see Chapter 7 of this dissertation] assess the
impact of pre-commitment by government with respect to policy targets in the presence of
cost-reducing innovation. In an empirical study, Palmer and Burtraw (2005) analyze the cost-
effectiveness of two different renewable electricity policies (TGC vs. tax credits for renewable
power production) in the U.S., and their impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper is devoted to the issue of whether the diffusion of renewable power generating
technologies can be better promoted by means of FIT or TGC, and in particular whether
one of the schemes dominates the other in terms of cost-effectiveness and social welfare. We
find that, given imperfectly competitive electricity markets, social welfare achieved under
the optimal FIT policy is at least as high and likely to be strictly greater than social welfare
under the optimal TGC policy, the latter importantly depending on the outcome of a strategic
game in the market for tradable certificates. Our paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2
introduces the basic models used for contrasting effects of TGC and FIT in perfectly and
imperfectly competitive markets for power. Under perfect competition, the equivalence of
TGC and FIT is shown. This equivalence does not hold in a duopoly with quasi-symmetric
costs, as demonstrated in section 6.3. Section 6.4 contains an evaluation of the two policies in
terms of social welfare. Section 6.5 discusses policy implications, and section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Promoting renewable electricity in a competitive market
We start our analysis with the simplest case, assuming that in a perfectly competitive elec-
tricity market there are N firms with equal electricity generation costs. Let there be only
two options to produce electricity, either from fossil/nuclear or renewable resources (solar,
wind, hydro, biomass etc.), with the second referred to as ‘green electricity’. We assume that
generation costs of fossil/nuclear power are generally lower than those of green electricity.
However, green electricity cannot only help to avoid negative externalities from fossil/nuclear
power generation, but also yield positive externalities in the form of different kinds of socio-
economic benefits (e.g. creation of new employment, local value-added and infrastructure,
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spillovers from R&D in innovative energy technologies and systems).3 The fact that these
externalities are not sufficiently taken into account in decisions regarding the type and level
of electricity production and consumption may motivate policy interventions such as the
introduction of FIT and TGC.
6.2.1 FIT as a subsidy policy
The term ‘subsidy’ here refers to a transfer paid by the government or electricity consumers to
the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive a surcharge s per unit of green elec-
tricity.4 Given a competitive market, a representative generator of power faces the following
optimization problem,
max
xb,xg
[pxb + (p+ s)xg − Cb(xb)− Cg(xg)] , (6.1)
where xb and xg denote the amounts of electricity produced from fossil/nuclear (‘brown’)
fuels and renewable (‘green’) energy sources, respectively, Cb(xb) is the cost function for
electricity produced from fossil/nuclear fuel, Cg(xg) is the cost function for green electricity,
and p denotes the average market price for electricity. For an interior solution, the f.o.c. are
p −C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (6.2)
p +s− C ′g[x∗g] = 0. (6.3)
Inserting (6.2) into (6.3), we find that in an optimum with xb > 0 and xg > 0, the government
subsidy s (or negative tax) has to be equal to the (absolute) difference between the marginal
costs of green and conventional electricity evaluated at the optimum, C ′g[x
∗
g] and C
′
b[x
∗
b], with
C ′g[x∗g] > C ′b[x
∗
b]. The economic intuition behind this result is that if s > C
′
g[x
∗
g]−C ′b[x∗b], all
generators will supply green electricity only; in contrast, if s < C ′g[x∗g]−C ′b[x∗b], then no green
electricity at all will be provided.
3Note that the use of green electricity may also lead to non-negligible negative externalities [e.g. Abbasi
and Abbasi (2000); Tsoutsos et al. (2005)], but we assume here that these are generally smaller than the
positive ones.
4In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site electricity consumption
and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross production. This difference is neglected here for
simplicity.
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6.2.2 TGC as a quota-based policy
Rather than subsidizing green electricity, the government can also impose a green power
production quota on each generator.5 If a generator falls short of the quota, it faces a fine
that increases with the shortfall. For each unit of green electricity produced, the generator
obtains a certificate, providing proof of partial satisfaction of the norm.
Initially, assume that certificates are non-tradable. This assumption is natural given the
assumption of identical costs across generators (no opportunity for trading). In section 6.3
below, the non-tradability assumption will be relaxed and a market for certificates introduced.
For the situation of non-tradable certificates, the objective function that applies to a generator
can be stated as:
max
xb,xg
[p · (xb + xg)− f · (x¯g − xg)− Cb(xb)− Cg(xg)] , (6.4)
where x¯g denotes the green electricity quota of the firm, f is the fine per unit of shortfall
from the norm, and p, xb, xg, Cb(xb), Cg(xg) are the same as before. The f.o.c. with respect
to xg read
p −C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (6.5)
p +f − C ′g[x∗g] = 0. (6.6)
Note the similarity of (6.6) and (6.3). In fact the fine f plays the same role as the subsidy s,
which therefore represents the shadow price of the quota. In an optimum, the unit price of
the certificate should be equal to (slightly lower than) the value of the fine per unit.
5Note that in practice it is often the wholesalers or retailers, and sometimes even the final consumers of
electricity, that are obliged to fulfil the quota.
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6.2.3 Equivalence of FIT and TGC given identical costs
To show the equivalence of FIT and TGC, i.e. subsidy and quota-based policies, in terms of
social welfare, we state the problem of a social planner as follows:6
W (Q,xg) = max
Q,xg
∫ Q
0
p(ν)dν −N · Cb
(
Q
N
− xg
)
−N · Cg(xg) + E(Nxg), (6.7)
where Q = N(xb + xg) stands for total electricity output produced by N firms, p(ν) for
the inverse demand function, and E(Nxg) for the monetary value of the avoided negative
and achieved positive externalities associated with green electricity production. As f.o.c. one
obtains
p[Q∗]− C ′b[x∗b] = 0 (6.8)
C ′b[x
∗
b] = C
′
g[x
∗
g]− E′[Nx∗g], (6.9)
which determine the social optimum values of Q∗, x∗b and x
∗
g. Eq. (6.9) simply says that
optimal aggregate output of green electricity must be such that the difference between the
marginal cost and the marginal external benefit of green electricity is equal to the marginal
cost of conventional power. If these quantities are known, the quota can be set as x¯g = x
∗
g.
The optimal subsidy level is given by s∗ = C ′g[x
∗
g] − C ′b[x∗b] from (6.3), and the optimal fine
by f∗ = C ′g[x∗g]− p from (6.6).
Obviously, subsidy and quota levels that are set according to the optimal values determined by
maximizing social welfare will lead to the same level of green electricity production, yielding
the same welfare. In this sense, and given our assumptions, the subsidy system and quota
system are equivalent. Figure 6.1 illustrates the basic intuition behind these results. Let S∗
denote the supply schedule reflecting that green power creates an external benefit to society.
Therefore, it should be used at a rate x1g > x
0
g, with x
0
g being the outcome of supply S0 based
on private (marginal) cost and demand D. Clearly, the efficient quantity of green power can
be attained by paying the optimal subsidy s∗, or imposing the optimal quota x¯∗g.
6Seminal work on the equivalence of price and quantity control was provided by Bhagwati (1969) in the
context of foreign trade (tariffs vs. quotas) and by Weitzman (1974) in the context of pollutant emission
control (taxes vs. quotas), respectively.
134
‘Deadweight loss’
due to underconsumption
of green power
Quantity
Price
xg
0
p
1
p
0
S
0
S
*
D
x = xg g
*
s*
0
Figure 6.1: Equivalence of subsidy and quota-based policy given equal costs.
6.3 Duopoly market and quasi-symmetric costs
Studying the case of imperfectly competitive power markets as a duopoly game under quasi-
symmetric costs can be justified on the following grounds. First, power markets are dominated
by a few major players. For example, EdF still has a monopoly in France, PowerGen (now
E.ON) has a market share of about 22 percent in the UK, and the four biggest suppliers in
Germany, RWE, E.ON Energie, Vattenfall Europe and EnBW, together control more than
two thirds of the market [cf. Bower et al. (2001); Matthes et al. (2005)]. Second, assuming
the production costs of green power to be the same for all producers is not compatible
with certificate trading. Therefore, we extend the basic model to the case of heterogeneous
production costs in order to derive the potential for trade of green certificates.
Assume there are two generators in the market, firm 1 and 2, that have identical technology
and hence cost functions in using fossil/nuclear fuel but different costs of generating renewable
electricity. In this sense, the firms are ‘quasi-symmetric’. The main reason to expect hetero-
geneous cost structures for green power is that it does not constitute yet a mature technology
like that based on fossil or nuclear fuels, where competition presumably has forced operators
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to adopt the least-cost alternative. Therefore, producers of green power are assumed to em-
ploy different technologies, have more or less favorable siting of plants, use energy resources
of different qualities, and employ different vintage mixes of a given technology.
To keep our model simple and to avoid multiple equilibria, we assume the cost function in
using fossil/nuclear fuel Cb(xb) = cbxb to be linear and the difference of marginal cost between
firm 1 and firm 2, C ′1g(y) − C ′2g(y), to be a positive constant. Without loss of generality, we
assume C1g(y) > C2g(y) for any y > 0. With some loss of generality, but considerable gain in
simplicity, let the demand function take on the following form,
p(x1b, x1g, x2b, x2g) = a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g, a > 0, (6.10)
which implies that consumers’ willingness to pay is the same for fossil/nuclear and green
power.
We start with the subsidy policy, focussing on the Cournot solution because power markets
have been characterized by an absence of the fierce price competition one would expect in a
Bertrand world. Limited price competition may be the result of collusion [Newbery (2002)], a
variant of which is to stick to Cournot strategies. Moreover, under certain circumstances (e.g.,
capacity constraints), Cournot strategies continue to be pursued even under Bertrand-type
competition [Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)]. In such a market set-up, firm 1 (the leader)
believes that firm 2 (the follower) will react to firm 1’s choice of green power produced. Thus
in equilibrium firm 1 will have chosen a higher production level than in the case of a Cournot
equilibrium and, consequently, firm 2 a lower level.7
6.3.1 Effect of subsidy on equilibrium
In this section, we assume that the subsidy is uniform, failing to take the difference in cost
into account; the case of a non-uniform subsidy is discussed in Madlener and Neustadt (2010)
[see Chapter 7 of this dissertation]. Here, the two firms face the following decision problem,
max
xib,xig
(a− xib − xig − xjb − xjg)(xib + xig) + sxig − cbxib − Cig(xig), (6.11)
7A Stackelberg variant of this model would be an interesting extension, which is beyond the scope of this
paper, however.
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where i, j = 1, 2, and i 6= j.
We assume that the subsidy s is exogenous to and equal across firms. Generalizing condition
(6.3), one can distinguish three different cases for the subsidy level (denoted S1–S3).
Case S1: s ≤ C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
If s < C ′2g[x
∗
2g]−cb, it is obvious that no green electricity will be produced because the subsidy
does not make up for the efficient producer’s cost disadvantage. Accordingly, the standard
Cournot solution to the game is [cf. Kreps (1990), p. 326],
x∗1b = x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = x
∗
2g = 0. (6.12)
If s = C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, then generator 2 is indifferent between producing green electricity and
fossil/nuclear electricity.
Case S2: C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb ≤ s < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
In this case, the subsidy makes up for the cost disadvantage of green power for generator
2, but fails to do so for the less efficient generator 1, who therefore refrains from producing
green electricity. The Cournot solution remains the same (in the sense that total electricity
output of each firm remains unchanged), as compared to the case of a uniform quota.
So if s > C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb, then generator 2 switches to green electricity, i.e.,
x∗1b =
a− 2cb + C ′2g[x∗2g]− s
3
(6.13)
x∗2g =
a− 2C ′2g[x∗2g] + cb + 2s
3
(6.14)
x∗1g = x
∗
2b = 0. (6.15)
Note that x∗1b in (6.13) and x
∗
2g in (6.14) are larger than in (6.12).
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Case S3: s ≥ C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb
If s > C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, then the subsidy overcompensates the cost disadvantage of green power
even for the less efficient generator 1. Therefore, both firms produce green electricity only.
Accordingly, the optimal solutions are now
x∗1g =
a+ C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− 2C ′1g[x∗1g] + s
3
(6.16)
x∗2g =
a+ C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− 2C ′2g[x∗2g] + s
3
(6.17)
x∗1b = x
∗
2b = 0. (6.18)
In the limiting case where s = C ′1g[x
∗
1g] − cb, generator 1 is indifferent between producing
green and fossil/nuclear power, while generator 2, being efficient in the production of green
power, supplies green electricity only.
Optimal subsidy level
The results derived in the previous subsection show that the equilibrium solutions to the
Cournot game strongly depend upon the level of the subsidy. This raises the issue of deter-
mining the optimal subsidy level. In analogy to (6.7), let social welfare be given by
W j(Q,x1g, x2g; s) =
∫ Q
0
p(ν)dν − cb(Q− x1g − x1g)
−C1g(x1g)− C2g(x2g) + E(xg), (6.19)
with W j denoting the social welfare gains associated with case j (j = 1, 2, and 3) of Section
6.3.1. We assume that in case 2, s is slightly greater than C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb, and in case 3 slightly
greater than C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb, in order to avoid ambiguity.
To facilitate comparison between the cases, the externality function associated with green
electricity takes the form E(xg) = βxg, β > 0. While it would certainly be interesting
to elaborate on possible alternative functional forms of E(xg), and consequences for the
outcome, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and saved for future research.
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The parameter β (called ‘welfare parameter’ henceforth) implies a constant marginal social
benefit from producing green electricity. Using the equilibrium values given in (6.12) to (6.18),
the welfare associated with the three cases can be written as follows:
W 1 =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cbQ (6.20)
W 2 =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q+ βx2g − cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) (6.21)
W 3 =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q+ βQ− C1g(x1g)− C2g(x2g). (6.22)
As is to be expected, whether or not the welfare parameter β exceeds the marginal cost
parameters is of crucial importance. For β > C ′1g[x
∗
1g] − cb, the welfare parameter is larger
than the additional costs incurred by firm 1, so that it is optimal if both firms produce green
electricity. Conversely, if the positive externality βx2b exceeds the extra costs of producing
green electricity for firm 2, it is optimal if firm 2 produces green instead of brown electricity.
More specifically, we can distinguish the following situations:
(A) if β > C ′1g[x
∗
1g]−cb, thenW 3 > W 2 > W 1. Hence the optimal subsidy is the lower bound
of the subsidy interval in case 3, i.e., s∗A = C
′
1g[x
∗
1g]− cb.
(B) if β = C ′1g[x
∗
1g] − cb, then W 3 = W 2 > W 1. The welfare gains remain the same for
s∗B = C
′
1g[x
∗
1g]− cb and s∗∗B = C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb, though the amounts of green electricity produced
are different.
(C) if C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb ≤ β < C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb, then W 2 > W 3 and W 2 ≥W 1. The optimal subsidy
is thus equal to the lower bound of the subsidy interval in case 2, i.e., s∗C = C
′
2g[x
∗
2g]− cb.
(D) if β < C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, then W 1 > W 2 > W 3. Therefore, the optimal subsidy is zero,
because none of the rates are effective in promoting green power.
Figure 6.2 summarizes the optimal subsidy schedule for different values of the welfare param-
eter β.
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0 
D
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Figure 6.2: Optimal subsidy levels vs welfare parameter β of green electricity, cases A through
D.
6.3.2 Quota-based policy
Building on (6.4) of section 6.2.2, the decision problem faced by the two firms in a duopoly
market can be written as
max
xib,xig
[(a− xib − xig − xjb − xjg)(xib + xig) + z(x˜ig − x˜jg)
− f(x¯g − xig − x˜ig)− cbxib − Cig(xig)],
s.t. xig + xjg = 2x¯,
(6.23)
with x˜ig (x˜jg) denoting the amount of certificates sold (purchased), respectively, i, j = 1 or
2, and i 6= j, f denoting the fine per unit as in (6.4), and z denoting the certificate price.
Note that the constraint implies that the amount of green certificates produced by the two
firms must not exceed the industry quota – i.e. we assume that once the quota is satisfied the
certificate price drops to zero. Thus, there is no incentive to produce more green electricity
than is required by the quota target.
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Figure 6.3: Effects of the TGC policy in a duopoly game
In the above model, each firm has two choice variables. However, given the assumption that
the difference C ′1g(y)−C ′2g(y) is a positive constant for any y > 0, generator 1’s choice of x1g
boils down to a choice between 0 and x¯g, depending on the ordering of f , z, and the level of
the difference in marginal costs of producing green and brown electricity (cf. figure 6.3). If it
is in the interest of generator 1 to purchase green electricity certificates at all, it must also be
(at least weakly) in its interest to go all the way. Therefore, we can find a Nash equilibrium by
comparing the firms’ payoffs for x∗1g ∈ {0, x¯g}, which will be shown in the following section.
Before turning to the Nash equilibrium, however, we briefly discuss the different possible
cases, of which we will examine the two that are desirable from a social welfare point of view.
First, the fine could fall short of the difference in marginal costs for firms 1 and 2, in which
both firms prefer to pay the fine and produce conventional electricity only.
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Second, if the fine is larger than the cost difference for firm 2 but lower than the marginal cost
difference for firm 1 of producing green instead of brown electricity, then we can distinguish
two sub-cases: either the certificate price is larger or smaller than the fine. In the former case,
firm 1 prefers to pay the fine, rather than buying certificates from firm 2, while in the latter
case it would buy certificates from firm 2 up to its quota (provided, of course, that trading
is possible).
Third, the fine is set at a higher level than the difference in the marginal costs of producing
green instead of conventional electricity for both generators. In this case we can again distin-
guish two sub-cases, one where z is lower than the cost difference for firm 1 (so that it has
an incentive to buy certificates up to x¯ from generator 2) and a situation where it is higher
(in which case generator 1 would self-generate green electricity up to its quota8).
In the following, we consider the two cases where certificate trading occurs (case I) and the
case where firm 1 self-produces green certificates (case II).
6.3.3 Nash equilibrium under the quota-based policy
We now elaborate the Nash equilibrium for the quota-based policy, by comparing the firms’
payoffs under the two socially desirable strategies stated at the end of the previous sec-
tion 6.3.2. Hence, in the discussion that follows, we distinguish the two cases I and II.
Case I: x∗1g = 0
Case I refers to a situation where the cost difference for firm 1 of producing green instead of
brown electricity is lower than the fine f but higher than the certificate price z. Therefore,
it is cheaper for firm 1 to buy certificates from firm 2. Given that x∗1g = 0, generator 2 is
required to produce at least 2x¯g units of green electricity in order to satisfy the industry
quota. This can be summarized as follows,
x∗1g = 0⇔ f > C ′1g[x∗1g]− cb > z > C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb (6.24)
or as
C ′1g[x
∗
1g]− cb > f > z > C ′2g[x∗2g]− cb.
8Note that in this situation generator 1 would possibly be forced at some point to leave the market, as its
costs of producing green electricity are too high.
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Firm 1 solves the problem
max
x1b,x1g
Π1 = (a− x1b − x2b − x2g)x1b − cbx1b − zx˜g −max{0, f(x¯g − x˜1g)}, (6.25)
with f.o.c.:
∂Π1
∂x1b
= a− 2x∗1b − x∗2b − x∗2g − cb = 0. (6.26)
Observing the constraint x2g ≥ 2x¯g, firm 2 solves
max
x2b,x2g
L(x2b, x2g, λ) = (a− x1b − x2b − x2g)(x2b + x2g)− cbx2b + zx˜g
−max{0, f(x¯g − x2g + x˜g)} − C2g(x2g) + λ(2x¯g − x2g),
with λ ≥ 0 denoting the Lagrange multiplier. The f.o.c. read,
∂L
∂x2b
= a− x∗1b − 2x∗2b − 2x∗2g − cb = 0 (6.27)
∂L
∂x2g
= a− x∗1b − 2x∗2b − 2x∗2g − cb − C ′2g(x∗2g) + f + λ = 0. (6.28)
From (6.26) and (6.27) we get x∗1b = (a − cb)/3, and from (6.27) and (6.28) we obtain
x∗2b + x
∗
2g = (a− cb)/3.
Given that firm 1 does not produce any green electricity, we need to distinguish two subcases.
In the first subcase (Ia, Appendix 6.7), firm 2 self-generates its own quota, while in the second
subcase (Ib, Appendix 6.7) it produces twice the individual firm’s quota (and hence is able
to sell the excess certificates to firm 1, which faces higher production costs).
Eqs. (6.26) and (6.27) say that the two firms will produce the same total quantity of electricity,
determined by the maximum possible market demand and the cost of producing electricity
from fossil/nuclear fuel. From (6.27) and (6.28) we obtain
λ = C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb − f. (6.29)
Eq. (6.29) indicates that if C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb > f , such that λ > 0, generator 2 will only produce
green electricity up to the industry quota as required by our assumptions, due to the Kuhn–
Tucker condition. Note that trading of certificates is also possible as long as C ′1g[x
∗
1g]−cb ≥ f .
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However, if C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb = f (and hence λ = 0), generator 2 has an incentive to produce at
least the quota required from the industry. Also note that different values of f ∈ [C ′2g[x∗2g]−
cb, C
′
1g[x
∗
1g]− cb] only affect the distribution of profits between the two firms, with no impact
on the amount of certificate trading and social welfare. Therefore, we first focus on the case
C ′2g[x
∗
2g]− cb = f as a benchmark.
The optimal quota continues to be determined as in eqs. (6.7)–(6.9), except that C ′b[x
∗
b] = cb.
Hence x¯g = x
∗
g/2 still holds. As long as 2x¯g ≤ (a− cb)/3 [see eq. (6.40)], generator 2 produces
(a− cb)/3− 2x¯g units of electricity using fossil/nuclear fuel and 2x¯g units of green electricity.
As to 2x¯g > (a − cb)/3, recall that a denotes the willingness to pay for the first kWh of
electricity, while cb symbolizes the (constant) marginal cost of fossil/nuclear power, which
makes a − cb a very large number. It is unlikely for x¯g to exceed one sixth of that number,
justifying that this case is neglected.
So far, we have assumed that generator 1 is the only buyer of generator 2’s extra certificates.
However, there may be another agent willing to purchase the certificates at the market price,
for example, an environmental protection agency or a foundation promoting renewable energy.
Since the equilibrium price of certificates is determined in such a manner that generator 2
is indifferent between producing green or fossil/nuclear fuel electricity, the presence of an
additional bidder might cause generator 2 to produce green electricity in excess of the quota.
However, this would make the system a combination of quantity and price policies. The reason
is that these extra purchases, resulting in an increase of the value of the certificates, can be
viewed as a subsidy. It is possible that such a policy mix is more effective in promoting green
power than either one of the two policy instruments individually. However, a detailed analysis
of such a mixed policy is beyond the scope of this paper.
Case II: x∗1g = x¯g
We now turn to the case of generator 1 producing green electricity to satisfy the quota. This
is possible if the difference in the marginal cost of producing green and brown electricity is
strictly lower than the certificate price (and the fine), or formally,
x∗1g = x¯g ⇔ f > z > C ′1g[x1g]− cb. (6.30)
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With no external agent purchasing, the condition x1g = x¯g or x2g = x¯g continues to hold.
Firm 1’s optimization problem now reads,
max
x1b,x1g
Π1 = (a− x1b − x2b − x¯g − x2g)(x1b + x¯g)− cbx1b − C1g(x¯g),
with f.o.c.,
∂Π1
∂x1b
= a− 2x∗1b − 2x¯g − x∗2b − x2g − cb = 0; (6.31)
while firm 2 solves the problem
max
x2b,x2g
Π2 = (a− x1b − x2b − x¯g − x2g)(x2b + x2g)− cbx2b − C2g(x2g) (6.32)
−max{0, f(x¯g − x2g)}.
Since x∗2g can only take on x¯g or 2x¯g as optimal values, we concentrate on x
∗
2g ≥ x¯g and only
consider the first-order condition concerning variable x2b, which reads:
∂Π2
∂x2b
= a− 2x∗2b − 2x2g − x∗1b − x¯g − cb = 0. (6.33)
From (6.31) and (6.33) we get x∗1b = (a− c)/3 − x¯g and x∗2b = (a− c)/3 − x2g.
As before, we have to distinguish two subcases (IIa and IIb in Appendix 6.7), in both of
which firm 1 self-generates green electricity up to its individual quota, while firm 2 either
produces x¯g or twice x¯g.
Firm 1
Firm 2
x¯g 2x¯g
0 −fx¯g, −cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g) −zx¯g, (z − 2cb)x¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
x¯g cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g), cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g) cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g), 2cbx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
Figure 6.4: Payoffs to producers of green electricity under the TGC policy
If firm 2’s strategy is to produce the minimal quota, then firm 1’s best response is x1g = x¯g if
C1g(x¯g)− cbx¯g ≤ fx¯g. However, if firm 2’s strategy is to produce twice the quota, then firm
1’s best response is x1g = 0 if C1g(x¯g)− cbx¯g ≥ zx¯g. If firm 1’s strategy is to produce 0, then
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firm 2’s best response is 2x¯g, provided the following condition holds: C2g(2x¯g) − C2g(x¯g) ≤
(z − cb)x¯g. This condition holds due to the assumptions made in this paper. If firm 1’s
strategy is to produce the minimal quota, then firm 2’s best response is x¯g, provided that the
following condition is satisfied: C2g(2x¯g)−C2g(x¯g) ≥ cbx¯g. This condition again holds due to
the assumptions made. Therefore, if the condition zx¯g ≤ C1g(x¯g) − cbx¯g ≤ fx¯g is satisfied,
this game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (0, 2x¯g) and (x¯g, x¯g).
6.4 Welfare comparison between subsidy and quota-based
policies
In spite of the simplifying assumptions made, a welfare comparison between a price-subsidy
and a quota policy may be worthwhile because it promises to provide some guidance to
policy-makers regarding the choice of instruments for promoting renewable energy use.
6.4.1 Welfare gains under the subsidy policy
Since our main interest is to discuss how to efficiently promote green power, case S1 (sec-
tion 6.3.1) can be disregarded since it is fossil/nuclear only. In addition, case S3 (section 6.3.1)
is not realistic because it predicts that all firms exclusively produce green power, which would
presuppose extremely high green electricity quota. Therefore, we only examine the case as-
sociated with condition C ′2g[x
∗
2g] − cb ≤ β < C ′1g[x∗1g] − cb, i.e. case S2 of section 6.3.1. The
pertinent welfare function is repeated from (6.21) for convenience,
W s =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) + βx2g, (6.34)
where Q continues to be total production of both types of electricity. Remember that in case
S2 we have x∗1g = x
∗
2b = 0 and the optimal subsidy is given by s
∗
C = C
′
2g[x
∗
2g] − cb, thus the
total production given the optimal subsidy scheme can be determined as Qs = xs1b + x
s
2g =
2(a− cb)/3, with xs2g = (a− cb)/3 denoting the amount of green energy produced by firm 2.
Therefore, social welfare achieved by the optimal subsidy scheme is
W s = (Qs)2 − C2g
(
Qs
2
)
+ (cb + β)
Qs
2
. (6.35)
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6.4.2 Welfare gains under the quota-based policy
If marginal costs of green power are increasing, the optimal quota cannot be determined
directly. To match the production of green electricity in the subsidy case, we simply assume
that x¯g is equal to (a − cb)/6, which may constitute a rather frequent solution [see the
discussion after eq. (6.29) in section 6.3.3]. The welfare function for the quota-based certificate
system can then be specified as
W q =
(
a− Q
2
)
Q− cb(Q− x2g)− C2g(x2g) + βx2g. (6.36)
The total amount of energy Qq = 2(a − cb)/3 produced given the quota-based policy is
identical with Qs. However, w.r.t. to x2g, we have to distinguish the following two possible
pure Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game described in section 6.3.3:
(i) Welfare achieved in the Nash equilibrium (xq11g, x
q1
2g) = (0, 2x¯g),
W q1 = (Qq)2 − C2g
(
Qq
2
)
+ (cb + β)
Qq
2
. (6.37)
Since Qq = Qs, the welfare under the quota-based policy realized in this Nash equilib-
rium is equal to the welfare under the optimal subsidy policy.
(ii) Welfare achieved in the Nash equilibrium (xq21g, x
q2
2g) = (x¯g, x¯g),
W q2 = (Qq)2 − C2g
(
Qq
4
)
+ (cb + β)
Qq
4
. (6.38)
Note that the welfare level W q2 is lower than W q1 =W s if
C2g(2y)− C2g(y) < (cb + β)y for y > 0.
This condition is satisfied if the level of marginal social benefit of green electricity β is
sufficiently high. Hence, the subsidy policy guarantees a welfare level which might not be
achieved with the quota policy if the Nash equilibrium (x¯g, x¯g) is played. A comparison of
both firms’ profits as well as of their sum shows that only firm 1 is better off in the socially
efficient equilibrium (0, 2x¯g). Under our assumptions, both firm 2’s profit and total producer
surplus are likely to be higher in the socially less desirable equilibrium (x¯g, x¯g). Therefore, even
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if the Cournot game were repeated an infinite number of times, no cooperative equilibrium
would occur with both firms choosing the socially desirable strategies.
6.4.3 Welfare of subsidy and quota-based policies in a quasi-symmetric
duopoly
Comparing welfare levels given in (6.35), (6.37), and (6.38), one sees that, for sufficiently high
marginal social benefits of green energy,W s =W q1 > W q2. This result implies that even with
imperfect competition and quasi-heterogeneous costs, subsidies should be preferred to trad-
able certificates. This is intuitive, since outcomes in a duopoly crucially depend on whether
firms pursue price- or quantity-oriented strategies and FIT could be said to be price-oriented
whereas TGC is quantity-oriented. However, the results established above given imperfectly
competitive markets seem to hinge on two crucial assumptions. The first is that TGC are
tradable. This means that price is the signal to competitors, precisely as the subsidy under
FIT. And since the quota and the subsidy are set as to optimally internalize the externalities
present, the information content of price is the same under both regimes. Second, competitors
pursue optimal duopoly strategies regardless of the choice of internalization policy adopted
by the government.
In addition to these two basic premises, there are simplifying assumptions that should be
kept in mind. Specifically, the cost of administering subsidies and/or quota are neglected and
therefore assumed equal. However, when it comes to start-up costs, a certificate system may
require more resources than a subsidy system, especially for establishing appropriate regula-
tion and regulatory control. Also, information regarding cost and marginal revenues on the
part of competitors as well as marginal positive externalities of green power on the part of
government was assumed perfect. Yet due to cost heterogeneity, the amount of information
required for calculating the optimal subsidy typically increases with a growing number of
firms. Although the setting of the optimal quota requires similar information, the hetero-
geneity of firms does not enter their determination, causing it to be relatively straightforward
and hence probably less costly than a subsidy system. These considerations also suggest that
a generalization from duopoly to oligopoly would be straightforward.
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Further, we found that subsidies provide more incentives for green power precisely when its
marginal social benefits are high (as in case S3 of section 6.3.1). A pure quota-based TGC
system lacks this feature.
6.5 Policy implications
Based on several models incorporating imperfect competitiveness of markets for power for
added realism, we find that the subsidy (FIT) approach, when implemented at its socially
optimal value, leads to a welfare gain, which is not necessarily achieved with the quota-
based (TGC) policy. Furthermore, the subsidy policy is generally preferred by utilities, likely
because it does not call into question their right to cause a certain amount of pollution when
using fossil/nuclear fuel input. At the same time, subsidies do provide stronger incentives for
pollution-abating innovation than quotas by directly favoring production of green electricity.
Since the future of green electricity importantly depends on future technological progress for
lowering its cost of production, subsidies are also more efficient dynamically.
On the other hand, the financing of subsidies requires tax revenue. When the (economic or
political) cost of additional taxation is high, like in the United States (but also in Scandi-
navian countries e.g.), the quota-based approach may provide a viable alternative. As found
in the present analysis, tradable green certificates are more efficient than non-tradable ones
regardless of market structure. Trade in certificates is likely to develop because green power
does not yet rely on a mature cost-minimizing technology, contrary to fossil/nuclear genera-
tion. Moreover, since the cost of running a market for certificates is lower once the market is
established, the disadvantage of the quota-based policy will gradually wane, without however
reaching the dynamic efficiency of the subsidy approach.
6.6 Conclusions
This paper starts from the suspicion that the conventional wisdom, claiming a tax/subsidy
(FIT) and a quota/certificate (TGC) policy scheme to be equivalent in terms of static effi-
ciency, might not hold if markets for power are imperfectly competitive. Based on a duopoly
model in which the two competitors differ in terms of their marginal cost of producing ‘green’
power, we show that, if both schemes are implemented at their respective socially optimal
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values, the subsidy policy is at least equivalent, but can be superior to the quota policy de-
pending on the outcome of the game in the market for green certificates. The subsidy and
the tradable certificate contain the same (correct) price information entering competitors’
strategy choices, which are of the Cournot type regardless of the scheme considered. Interest-
ingly, however, only one of two pure-strategy Nash equilibria under the quota-based policy
corresponds to the unique equilibrium outcome under the subsidy policy whereas the other
Nash equilibrium (in which both firms produce green energy) leads to a lower welfare level.
In view of the technological heterogeneity of green power generation, it is important that
certificates are tradable. Also, the possible equivalence breaks down as soon as incentives
for pollution-abating innovation are considered as well. Thus, the subsidy is the preferable
approach; on the other hand, its financing may meet with a high marginal cost of taxation.
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6.7 Appendix
Subcase Ia: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = 0; x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗2g = x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb
3
(6.39)
Firms’ profits:
Π1 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb · a− cb
3
− fx¯g = (a− cb)
2
9
− fx¯g;
Π2 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb ·
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
+ zx¯g − C2g(x¯g)− fx¯g
=
(a− cb)2
9
− cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g)
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Subcase Ib: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
; x∗1g = 0; x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g; x∗2g = 2x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb
3
(6.40)
Firms’ profits:
Π1 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cba− cb
3
− zx¯g = (a− cb)
2
9
− zx¯g;
Π2 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g
)
+ zx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)− fx¯g
=
(a− cb)2
9
+ (z − 2cb)x¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
Subcase IIa (symmetry): x∗1b = x
∗
2b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗1g = x∗2g = x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb
3
(6.41)
Firms’ profits:
Π1 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
− C1g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g);
Π2 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
−C2g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C2g(x¯g)
Subcase IIb: x∗1b =
a− cb
3
− x¯g; x∗1g = x¯g; x∗2b =
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g; x∗2g = 2x¯g
Market demand:
a− x1b − x1g − x2b − x2g = a+ 2cb
3
(6.42)
Firms’ profits:
Π1 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− x¯g
)
− C1g(x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ cbx¯g − C1g(x¯g);
Π2 =
a+ 2cb
3
a− cb
3
− cb
(
a− cb
3
− 2x¯g
)
− C2g(2x¯g) = (a− cb)
2
9
+ 2cbx¯g − C2g(2x¯g)
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Abstract: In a perfectly competitive market with a possibility of technological innovations
we contrast guaranteed feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewables and tradable green
certificates from a dynamic efficiency and social welfare point of view. Specifically, we model
decisions about the technological innovation within the framework of a game-theoretic model
and discuss implications for optimal policy design under different assumptions regarding
regulatory pre-commitment. We find that for the case of technological innovation subsidy
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Chapter 7
Renewable energy policy in the
presence of innovation: does
government pre-commitment
matter?
7.1 Introduction
Renewable energy is considered an important element in a sustainable energy development.
In many countries renewable energy promotion policies have been put into place. As far as
electricity generation from renewables is concerned, there has been much debate in recent
years about the relative merits of guaranteed feed-in tariffs (FIT) and tradable green cer-
tificates (TGC), mainly in the form of qualitative discussion (e.g. Menanteau et al., 2003;
Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003; Berry, 2002), and much less so in the form of more rigorous
formal analysis (e.g. Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001).
Building on seminal work by Weitzman (1974, 1978), Pizer (1999a,b) studies the non-
equivalence of tax and quota policies given uncertainty and shows that uncertainty causes
the optimal amount of emission abatement to increase, which justifies a preference for price
over quantity control. Madlener et al. (2009) show that in terms of static efficiency a price
(subsidy) policy to promote renewable energy is equivalent to a quantity (quota) policy for
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a competitive but not generally a duopoly market for power when competitors have different
production costs for renewable (but not conventional) energy. In this paper, we extend the
static analysis to incorporate technological innovation that lowers the (increasing) marginal
cost of production of electricity from renewable sources.
From environmental economics it is known that the dynamic efficiency of a policy depends on
whether or not the government pre-commits to a certain policy target (e.g. Denicolo`, 1999).
In our analysis we want to find out which of the two policy instruments provides a stronger
incentive for innovation favoring renewable or “green” electricity in two cases, (1) when the
government adjusts its policy in response to innovation (no pre-commitment), and (2) when
it cannot react immediately to innovation (pre-commitment). In contrast to Denicolo` (1999),
we find that the relative merits of the subsidy and quota policies are the same in the two
scenarios from the point of view of social welfare maximization. However, in terms of dynamic
efficiency, this equivalence does not necessarily hold. Rather, the no pre-commitment policy is
shown to support equilibrium outcomes with innovations that might not be attainable under
pre-commitment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives optimal subsidy and
quota policies for assuming no pre-commitment on the part of the government when inno-
vation is present. Section 3 contains the analogous analysis for the pre-commitment case.
Section 4 discusses the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 and concludes.
7.2 Optimal policy in the presence of innovation: no pre-
commitment case
In the no pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to have the information, ability
and obligation to respond to technological innovation by adjusting its subsidy or quota policy,
respectively. Let there be N +1 competitive electricity generators in the market, one of them
being the potential innovator, assumed to possess the patent covering the rights for the new
technology. Innovation reduces the marginal cost of green electricity, and the innovator can
license the new technology to other producers in return of a royalty. Let us assume that prior
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to innovation all firms have an identical cost structure for producing green electricity of the
simplistic form
Cg(xg) = b1xg + b2xg
2, (7.1)
with b1 > 0, b2 > 0, to reflect decreasing marginal returns (DMR) in the production of green
electricity. DMR is a sensible assumption because the use of renewables (in particular solar
and wind) involves technologies that have not yet reached maturity. Accordingly, there is
scope for (exogenous) innovation, resulting in a new cost function of the form
Cgn(xg) = b1nxg + b2xg
2, (7.2)
where Cgn denotes the cost function after innovation and b1n < b1 the reduced part of the
marginal cost. Note that b2 is unaffected by the innovation for simplicity (b1n < b1 is sufficient
to mitigate DMR). Thus, (b1−b1n) reflects the importance of the innovation. The cost function
for brown electricity (i.e. from conventional sources such as coal, nuclear etc.) is assumed to
be linear, Cb(xb) = cbxb.
The R&D investment required for the innovation is denoted by R[Cg(xg) − Cgn(xg)], with
R′(·) > 0 and R′′(·) > 0. This means that the R&D outlay increases progressively as a function
of the size of the achievable cost reduction. Therefore, R&D does not display increasing
marginal returns, reflecting the fact that no particular technology has dominated the market
for renewable electricity to this day. Given the continuity assumptions made in (7.1) and
(7.2), for any fixed value of xg, R[Cg(xg) − Cgn(xg)] can be rewritten as R(b1 − b1n). We
consider a parametric version of function R(·) of the form R(b1 − b1n) = r(b1 − b1n)2, with
parameter r > 0 reflecting the concavity of the function. In particular, the higher r, the
higher the marginal cost of innovation.
On the demand side, we assume that brown and green electricity are perfect substitutes.
Thus the demand function for electricity takes the following linear form:
p(Q) = a−Q = a−
N+1∑
i=1
(xib + xig) ,
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where Q denotes the total quantity of electricity supplied in the market, xib, the quantity
of conventional electricity produced by firm i, and xig, that of green electricity. Further, we
assume that b1 < cb, i.e. marginal costs of green electricity are lower than those of brown
electricity for small quantities, and (cb − b1n) is sufficiently smaller than b2(a − cb), i.e. the
average electricity price on the market, p, will always be given by the marginal cost of brown
electricity cb.
The government observes whether a firm operates with the old or the new technology1 and
is assumed to maximize social welfare. The externality function of green electricity2 (in-
cluding avoided social cost of producing brown electricity) is assumed to have a simple,
linear-quadratic form:
D(xg) = d1xg − d2x2g, d1, d2 > 0. (7.3)
The quadratic term reflects the fact that marginal avoided social cost of brown electricity
decreases with higher quantities of green electricity produced and might attain negative values
if large quantities of green electricity are produced.3 In order to exclude the possibility of
extremely high social cost of additional production of green power, we additionally assume
that parameter d2 is sufficiently small such that d2(N + 1)(cb − b1n) < b2d1.
7.2.1 Subsidy policy
Subsidy (or negative tax) here refers to a transfer paid by the government or electricity
consumers to the suppliers of green electricity. Thus, producers receive a surcharge s per
unit of green electricity.4 The decisions of the agents can be represented by a game with the
following players: firms 1, 2, . . . , N +1, and government G. Without loss of generality, let us
assume that firm no. 1 is the potential innovator.
1This is a plausible assumption since, in reality, the electricity producers are required to file the technical
description of their power generating technology to the regulator.
2Note that, in the real world, the quantification of the (positive and negative) externalities associated with
power generation from renewables is subject to several complications (e.g. So¨derholm and Sundqvist, 2003).
The value of the external benefits (including avoided environmental damages and learning-by-doing effects)
is likely to depend on the particular composition of the technology portfolio used to produce electricity, and
thus also the amount of the brown electricity displaced and the (environmental) benefit incurred.
3This can be motivated by arguing that with more intensive utilization of renewables, environmentally and
socially less benign projects are also being realized.
4In reality it is usually the power fed into the grid that counts, which due to on-site electricity consumption
and transmission losses may be considerably less than gross production. This difference is neglected here for
simplicity.
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Figure 7.1: Extensive-form game representation, no pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
Now we analyze the decision sequencing under subsidy control with no pre-commitment.
There are three decision stages, described in the following and summarized in Figure 7.1.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses in the
competition stage III (IN ), or to innovate and offer no licenses in stage III (I0).
Stage II. Given the decision of firm 1 in stage I, the government determines the subsidy
levels for non-innovating and innovating firms in order to maximize social welfare.
(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, the government introduces a subsidy sNI per unit of output
for all firms (decision node G1).
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage III, the government
introduces two levels of subsidy: sIN for the innovator and the firms that adopted the
new technology and sNIN for the firms that did not adopt the new technology (decision
node G2).
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(IIc) Finally, if firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III,
the subsidies are sI0 for the innovator and sNI0 for the competitors (decision node G3).
Stage III. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government about
the subsidy level, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have identical cost functions Cg(·) and compete in
quantities given subsidy level sNI per unit of green electricity (subgame ΓNI).
(IIIb) If firm 1 did innovate and committed to offer N licenses in stage III, then it first offers
licenses to N competitors in return of a royalty υ given subsidy levels sIN and sNIN .
Firms 2, . . . , N+1 can either accept (I) or reject (NI) this offer. Since firms 2, . . . , N+1
are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the offer and operate with
cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame ΓIN ,NI) or all
of them will accept it and operate with cost function Cgn(·) (competition in subgame
ΓIN ,I).
(IIIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III, then
firm 1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms 2, . . . , N +1, operating with cost
function Cg(·), respectively, compete in quantities given their subsidy levels sI0 and
sNI0 (subgame ΓI0).
These three decision stages define an extensive-form game as shown in Figure 7.1. The in-
formation revealed in the earlier stages of this game is taken as given in the corresponding
subsequent stages. Thus, in the earlier stages, rational players anticipate the equilibrium out-
comes in every subsequent stage. Each game branch starting with an information set can
thus be considered as a subgame, giving rise to the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) as
the solution concept to be applied. As usual, the SPE solution can be obtained by backward
induction.
Lemma 7.2.1. In subgame ΓNI (stage IIIa), all firms’ quantities of green electricity are
given by
xig(NI, sNI) =
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
. (7.4)
Proof: see Appendix on p.180.
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Lemma 7.2.2. In stage IIIb, firm 1’s equilibrium offer υ∗ is given by
υ∗ =


(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
2
otherwise.
This offer is always accepted by a firm of type 2 in equilibrium5. Quantities of green electricity
produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix on p.180.
Lemma 7.2.3. In subgame ΓI0 (stage IIIc), quantities of green electricity produced by firm
1 and firms of type 2 are given by
x1g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.182.
Lemma 7.2.4. In stage IIa (subgame starting at node G1), the government chooses subsidy
level
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.183.
Lemma 7.2.5. In stage IIb (subgame starting at node G2), the government chooses any
combination of subsidy levels
(s∗NIN , s
∗
IN
) =
(
s∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
,
5As usual, we assume that in the case of indifference firms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of the
new technology.
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where
s∗NIN ≥ (b1 − b1n) +
[b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.183.
Lemma 7.2.6. In stage IIc (subgame starting at node G3), the government chooses subsidy
levels
s∗NI0 = s
∗
I0
=
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.185.
Proposition 7.2.7. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path of
the innovation game with subsidy control and no pre-commitment policy are given as follows.
Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) if (r − 1)(∆b1)2 + 2β∆b1 − αβ2 ≤ 0 where
α =
b2
4
(
2(N + 2)3
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 1
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
)
> 0;
β = cb − b1n + d1 > 0;
∆b1 = b1 − b1n
and innovates and offers N licenses (IN) otherwise. The royalty and quantities in equilibrium
are given by
υ∗ =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
;
x∗1g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
; x∗1g(IN ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Government sets subsidy levels
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
s∗NIN ∈
{
s : s ≤ [b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)
2](cb − b1 + d1) + b2(N + 2)(b1 − b1n)
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
+ d1
}
,
s∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
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Firms of type 2 innovate (I) if firm 1 chooses IN and produce quantities
x∗2g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
,
x∗2g(IN ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.185.
7.2.2 Quota-based policy
Instead of subsidizing green electricity, the government can also impose a quota target for
green power on each generator.6 For each unit of green electricity produced, the firm receives
a certificate providing evidence of partial satisfaction of the target imposed7. If a firm falls
short of achieving the quota target, it faces a fine f that increases with the shortfall (cf.
Madlener et al., 2009).
As with the subsidy-based policy, we consider an extensive-form game with the following
structure. There are three decision stages.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses in the
competition stage III (IN ), or to innovate and offer no royalties in stage III (I0).
Stage II. Given the decision of firm 1 in stage I, the government determines the quotas to be
satisfied and the fines for firms falling short of the quota for non-innovating and innovating
firms, in order to maximize social welfare.
(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, the government introduces a quota x¯NI and a fine fNI per
unit of output falling short of the quota for all firms (decision node G1).
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage III, the government
introduces two pairs of quotas and fines: (x¯IN , fIN ) for the innovator and those firms
that adopted the new technology and (x¯NIN , fNIN ) for those firms that did not adopt
the new technology (G2).
6In practice it is often the wholesalers or retailers, and sometimes even the final consumers of electricity,
that are obligated to fulfil the quota target.
7Admittedly, the assumption that the market for tradable certificates is perfectly competitive and efficient
may, especially in poorly designed or managed schemes, be quite a strong one (e.g. Nilsson and Sundqvist,
2007; So¨derholm, 2008).
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Figure 7.2: Extensive-form game representation, no pre-commitment case, quota policy.
The actions of the government σi for each node Gi, i = 1, 2, 3, are defined as follows: σ1 =
(x¯NI , fNI), σ2 = ((x¯NIN , fNIN ), (x¯IN , fIN )), σ3 = ((x¯I0 , fI0), (x¯NI0 , fNI0)).
(IIc) Finally, if firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III, the
quotas and fines set by the government are (x¯I0 , fI0) for the innovator and (x¯NI0 , fNI0)
for the competitors (G3).
Stage III. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government about
the quotas and fines, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have an identical cost function Cg(·) and compete
in quantities given the quota and fine levels (x¯NI , fNI) (subgame Γ
q
NI).
(IIIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage III, then firm 1 first
offers licenses to N competitors for a royalty υq, given the quota and the fine levels
(x¯IN , fIN ), (x¯NIN , fNIN ). Firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1 (firms of type 2) can accept or reject
this offer. Since firms of type 2 are identical, we assume that either all of them will
reject the offer and operate with the new cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities
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will take place in subgame ΓqIN ,NI) or all of them will accept it and operate with cost
function Cgn(·) (competition in subgame ΓqIN ,I).
(IIIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage III, then firm
1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms of type 2, operating with cost function
Cg(·), compete in quantities, given their quota and fine levels (x¯I0 , fI0), (x¯NI0 , fNI0)
(subgame ΓqI0).
These three decision stages define an extensive-form game as shown in Figure 7.2. Like in the
subsidy case, we apply the solution concept of the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
Lemma 7.2.8. In stage IIIa (subgame ΓqNI), all firms produce quantity
xig(NI, fNI) =
cb − b1 + fNI
2b2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.186.
Lemma 7.2.9. In stage IIIb, firm 1’s equilibrium offer υq∗ is given by
υ∗q =


υqmax if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
cb − b1n + fIN
2
otherwise.
where
υqmax =
√
(cb − b1 + fIN )2 + 4b2(fNIN x¯NIN − fIN x¯IN )− (cb − b1n + fIN ).
This offer is always accepted by firms of type 2 in the equilibrium8. Firm 1 produces quantity
x1g(IN , (fNIN , fIN ), υ
q) =
cb − b1n + fIN
2b2
.
8By assumption, firms of type 2 adopt the new technology if indifferent.
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The quantity of green electricity produced by any firm of type 2,
x2g(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN , x¯NIN )), amounts to


2(cb − b1 + fNIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + fIN )2 + 4b2(fNIN x¯NIN − fIN x¯IN )
2b2
if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
cb − b1n + fIN
4b2
otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix on p.186.
Lemma 7.2.10. In stage IIIb (subgame ΓqI0), quantities of green electricity produced by firm
1 and firms of type 2, respectively, are given by
x1g(I0, fNI0) =
cb − b1n + fI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, fNI0) =
cb − b1 + fNI0
2b2
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.188.
Lemma 7.2.11. In stage IIa (subgame starting at node G1), the government chooses fine
level
f∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
while the quota level x¯NI can be deliberately set by the government.
Proof: see Appendix on p.188.
Lemma 7.2.12. In stage IIb (subgame starting at node G2), the optimal decision of the
government is given by any combination of fines
(f∗NIN , f
∗
IN
) =
(
f∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
where f∗NIN satisfies inequality
√
(cb − b1 + f∗IN )2 + 4b2(f∗NIN x¯NIN − f∗IN x¯IN ) ≥
3
2
(cb − b1n + f∗IN ). (7.5)
The government’s choice of quotas x¯NIN , x¯IN is constrained by inequality (7.5).
Proof: see Appendix on p.189.
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Lemma 7.2.13. In stage IIc (subgame starting at node G3), government chooses fine levels
f∗NI0 = f
∗
I0
=
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.190.
Proposition 7.2.14. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path of
this game are given as follows. Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) if ∆b1 ∈
(
0,
√
B2−4AC−B
2A
]
,
where
A =
b2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2 + r
> 0;
B =
d2(N + 1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
x¯NI − 2b2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2β
;
C = −αβ2 −
(
d2(N + 1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
+ d1
)
x¯NI −
(
d2(N + 2)
2 − 2b2N
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
β + d1
)
x¯I < 0
with
α =
b2
4
(
2(N + 2)3
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 1
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
)
> 0;
β = cb − b1n + d1 > 0,
and innovates and offers N licenses (IN ) otherwise. It offers N licenses in return of a royalty
υ∗q =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
and produces quantities of green electricity
x∗1g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
,
x∗1g(IN ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
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Government chooses fine levels
f∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
f∗NIN ≥
{
[2b2N − (N + 2)2d2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
}
x¯I
x¯NI
+
5
[
2b2N(cb − b1n)− d2(N + 2)2(b1 − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1 − 4b2b1
]2
16b2[4b2 + (N + 2)2d2]2x¯NI
,
f∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (I) if firm 1 offered N licenses and produce quantities
x∗2g(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
,
x∗2g(IN ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
.
Proof: see Appendix on p.191.
7.2.3 Comparison between subsidy and quota-based policies
In Madlener et al. (2009) it is shown that, in perfectly competitive markets, subsidy and
quota policies are equivalent in terms of social welfare maximization. In this study, we have
particularly shown that in the subgame-perfect equilibria all fine levels correspond to the
subsidy levels.
However, the allocation of welfare to producer vs. consumer surplus differs under these two
alternative policies. In particular, the profits achieved by the potential innovator as well as
by its competitors are lower under the quota policy (piq) than under the subsidy policy (pis)
regime:
piq1(NI) = pi
s
1(NI)− f∗(NI)x¯NI ;
piq2(NI) = pi
s
2(NI)− f∗(NI)x¯NI ;
piq1(IN ) = pi
s
1(IN )− f∗(IN )x¯IN ;
piq2(IN ) = pi
s
2(IN )− f∗(IN )x¯IN .
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Thus, given a no pre-commitment policy, the firms have a strict preference for price rather
then quantity controls.
Next, we want to investigate under which policy regime (subsidy or quota) the incentives to
innovate are higher. Therefore, we compare the differences of profits of the potential innovator
(firm 1) with or without innovation under both regimes. For the subsidy policy, this gain from
innovation amounts to
∆pis1 = pi
s
1(IN )− pis1(NI).
Under the quota policy, the corresponding profit difference is
∆piq1 = pi
q
1(IN )− piq1(NI).
The incentives to innovate are higher under the subsidy policy if
∆pis1 −∆piq1 = f∗IN x¯IN − f∗NI x¯NI > 0. (7.6)
Suppose that the difference between the quota levels (x¯IN − x¯NI) is sufficiently small. Then
it can be shown that under the assumption that d2(N + 1)(cb − b1n) < b2d1, as made in
our model, condition (7.6) is satisfied. Therefore, not only is the subsidy policy preferred
by profit-maximizing firms but it also provides a higher incentive to innovate, which is an
interesting finding.
7.3 Optimal policy in the presence of innovation: pre-
commitment case
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green electricity policy
(in terms of subsidy and quota) even under innovation. Possible reasons for pre-commitment
include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjustments etc. Compared
to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears to be more realistic, because
in the real world there are always difficulties in adjusting policies, for reasons like the ones
described above. Besides, there may be other costs associated with policy adjustment, similar
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to the menu costs in the price adjustment case, that further stymies quick policy reaction to
innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that the
quota and subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation has occurred.
7.3.1 Subsidy policy
We consider an extensive-form game presented in Fig. 7.3. There are two decision stages.
NI
1
IN
I0
(s˜NI , s˜I)
Γ˜NI
G
(s˜NI , s˜I)
G
(s˜NI , s˜I)
Γ˜I0
G
υ˜
1
NI
Γ˜I,NI
2
I
Γ˜I,I
Figure 7.3: Extensive-form game representation, pre-commitment case, subsidy policy
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses in the
competition stage II (IN ), or to innovate and offer no licenses in stage II (I0). Simultaneously,
the government determines the subsidy levels s˜NI for non-innovating and s˜I for innovating
firms in order to maximize social welfare.
Stage II. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government about
the subsidy level, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
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(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have identical cost functions Cg(·) and compete in
quantities given the subsidy level s˜NI per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ˜NI).
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage II, then it first offers
licenses to N competitors in return of a royalty υ˜ given the subsidy levels s˜I and s˜NI .
Firms 2, 3, . . . , N +1 can either accept or reject this offer. Since firms 2, 3, . . . , N +1
are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the offer and operate with
cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame Γ˜I,NI) or all
of them will accept it and operate with cost function Cgn(·) (competition in subgame
Γ˜I,I).
(IIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage 3, then firm
1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1, operating with cost
function Cg(·), compete in quantities given their subsidy levels s˜I and s˜NI , respectively.
Proposition 7.3.1. There exist two sets of subgame-perfect equilibria in the innovation game
with subsidy control and pre-commitment policy. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies
on the equilibrium path of these two sets are given as follows.
Set 1. Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) and produces quantity
x∗1g(NI, (s˜
∗1
NI , s˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
of green electricity. Government chooses subsidy levels (s˜∗1NI , s˜
∗1
I ) such that
s˜∗1NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
;
s˜∗1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n)±
√
2b2
N + 2
(
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
+ 4r(∆b1)2
)]
.
Firms of type 2 produce quantity
x∗2g(NI, (s˜
∗1
NI , s˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
of green electricity.
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Set 2. Firm 1 innovates and offers N licenses (IN ) in return of a royalty
υ˜∗ =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1 + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
per unit of green electricity produced by firms of type 2 and itself produces quantity
x∗1g(IN , (s˜
∗2
NI , s˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
of green electricity. Government sets subsidy levels (s˜∗2NI , s˜
∗2
I ) such that
s˜∗2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1)±
√
b2
(
b2(N + 2)3(cb − b1n + d1)2
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 4r(∆b1)2
)]
;
s˜∗2I =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Firms of type 2 innovate (I) and produce quantity
x∗2g(IN , (s˜
∗2
NI , s˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
of green electricity.
Proof: see Appendix on p.191.
7.3.2 Quota-based policy
Now we consider an extensive-form game with the structure presented in Figure 7.4. As under
the subsidy policy, there are two decision stages.
Stage I. Firm 1 decides either not to innovate (NI), to innovate and offer N licenses in the
competition stage II (IN ), or to innovate and offer no licenses in stage II (I0). Simultaneously,
the government determines the fine levels f˜NI for non-innovating and f˜I for innovating firms
in order to maximize social welfare.
Stage II. Given the innovation decision of firm 1 and the decision of the government about
the subsidy level, firms 1, 2, . . . , N + 1 compete in quantities.
(IIa) If firm 1 did not innovate, all firms have identical cost functions Cg(·) and compete in
quantities given the fine level f˜NI per unit of green electricity (subgame Γ˜
q
NI).
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Figure 7.4: Extensive-form game representation, pre-commitment case, quota policy
(IIb) If firm 1 did innovate and announced to offer N licenses in stage II, then it first offers
licenses to N competitors in return of a royalty υ˜q given the fine levels f˜I and f˜NI .
Firms 2, 3, . . . , N +1 can either accept or reject this offer. Since firms 2, 3, . . . , N +1
are identical, we assume that either all of them will reject the offer and operate with
cost function Cg(·) (competition in quantities will take place in subgame Γ˜qI,NI) or all
of them will accept it and operate with cost function Cgn(·) (competition in subgame
Γ˜qI,I).
(IIc) If firm 1 did innovate but announced that it will offer no licenses in stage 3, then firm
1, operating with cost function Cgn(·), and firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1, operating with cost
function Cg(·), compete in quantities given their fine levels f˜I and f˜NI , respectively.
Proposition 7.3.2. There exist two sets of subgame-perfect equilibria strategies in the pre-
commitment game with quotas. The subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium
path of this game are given as follows.
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Set 1. Firm 1 does not innovate (NI) and produces quantity
x∗1g(NI, (f˜
∗1
NI , f˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
of green electricity. Government sets fine levels (f˜∗1NI , f˜
∗1
I ) such that
f˜∗1NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
;
f˜∗1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n) + 4b2x¯I ± ξ
√
2b2
(N + 2)[b2 + (N + 1)d2]
]
,
where x¯I denotes the minimum quota to be produced by an innovating firm, and
ξ =
√
8b32x¯
2
I + 4(N + 1)
2(N + 2)d22δ + 4b
2
2+ b2η,
with
δ = r(∆b1)
2 − (cb − b1n)x¯I − (cb − b1)x¯NI ;
 = (N + 2)r(∆b1)
2 + 4(N + 1)d2x¯
2
I − (N + 2)[(cb − b1n)x¯I + d1x¯NI ];
η = (N + 2)[(cb − b1 + d1)2 − 2cbd1] +
+4(N + 1)d2[2(N + 2)r(∆b1)
2 + 2(N + 1)d2x¯
2
I + 2b1nx¯I − (N + 2)(cb + b1)x¯NI)].
Firms of type 2 produce quantity
x∗2g(NI, (f˜
∗1
NI , f˜
∗1
I )) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
of green electricity.
Set 2. Firm 1 innovates and offers N licenses (IN ) in return of a royalty
υ˜∗q =
b2(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
per unit of green electricity produced by firms of type 2 and itself produces quantity
x∗1g(IN , (f˜
∗2
NI , f˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
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of green electricity. Government sets fine levels (f˜∗2NI , f˜
∗2
I ) such that
f˜2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1n) + 2b2x¯NI ± ψ
√
2b2
4b2 + (N + 2)2d2
]
;
f˜∗2I =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
,
where x¯NI denotes the minimum quota to be produced by a non-innovating firm, and
ψ =
√
32b32x¯
2
NI − 2(N + 2)4κ− 16b22µ+ (N + 2)2b2ν + 2b1nρ+ 2d2τ
with
κ = r(∆b1)
2 − (cb − b1n)x¯I − (cb − b1)x¯NI ;
µ = 2r(∆b1)
2 + [N(cb − b1n + d1) + 2d1]x¯I + [2(cb − b1)− (N + 2)2d2x¯NI ]x¯NI ;
ν = (N + 2)[(cb − b1n + d1)2 + 2b1n(cb + d1)− 4(N + 2)d2x¯I ;
ρ = 2(N − 2)d2x¯I − (N + 2)(cb + d1);
τ = x¯NI [(N + 2)
2d2x¯NI − 8(cb − b1)]− 2cb(N − 2)x¯I − 8r(∆b1)2.
Firms of type 2 innovate (I) and each produce quantity
x∗2g(IN , (f˜
∗2
NI , f˜
∗2
I ) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + d1)
2[d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2]
of green electricity.
Proof: see Appendix on p.193.
7.3.3 Comparison between subsidy and quota-based policy
Under pre-commitment, the subsidy and quota policies again are equivalent in terms of social
welfare. However, the firms prefer the subsidy policy since they achieve higher profits than
under the quota policy.
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Furthermore, as under no pre-commitment, the profits achieved by the potential innovator
as well as by its competitors are lower under the quota policy (piq) than under the subsidy
policy (pis):
piq1(NI) = pi
s
1(NI)− f˜∗(NI)x¯NI ;
piq2(NI) = pi
s
2(NI)− f˜∗(NI)x¯NI ;
piq1(IN ) = pi
s
1(IN )− f˜∗(IN )x¯IN ;
piq2(IN ) = pi
s
2(IN )− f˜∗(IN )x¯IN .
Thus, the firms have a strict preference for the subsidy policy under pre-commitment, too.
Again, as in the no pre-commitment case, the innovation incentives are higher under the
subsidy policy:
∆pis1 −∆piq1 = f˜∗IN x¯IN − f˜∗NI x¯NI > 0. (7.7)
7.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Madlener et al. (2009) found that the conventional wisdom related to the equivalence of
tax (subsidy) and quota (certificate) schemes in terms of static efficiency may not hold if
markets for electric power are imperfectly competitive. Due to the inequivalence found in
terms of social welfare, the authors recommend targeted subsidies as being the preferable
policy instrument.
In this paper, we have followed up studying the merits of price and quantity control policies
for promoting renewable electricity generation. In particular, we study the role of government
regulatory pre-commitment when technical innovation is present.
In the pre-commitment case, the government is assumed to stick to its green electricity policy
(in terms of subsidy and quota) even under innovation. Possible reasons for pre-commitment
include: imperfect information, limited ability for short-run policy adjustments etc. Compared
to the no pre-commitment assumption, pre-commitment appears to be more realistic, because
in the real world there are always difficulties in adjusting policies, for reasons like the ones
described above. Besides, there may be other costs associated with policy adjustment, similar
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to the menu costs in the price adjustment case, that further stymies quick policy reaction to
innovations.
We maintain the basic assumptions made in the no pre-commitment case, except that the
quota and subsidy levels remain unchanged after the innovation occurred. We can conclude
that the difference is larger without pre-commitment, i.e. the subsidy scheme is preferred
more in the case of no pre-commitment.
Thus we find that the price (subsidy) policy is again preferred in terms of promoting innova-
tion of green electricity technology. The intuition behind the result is also the same as that
under the no pre-commitment case. Since technological improvement and innovation mainly
represent the dynamic aspect of energy efficiency for a firm (and also for an economy), our
results strongly support the subsidy policy in terms of its dynamic efficiency in general, no
matter which policy regime, pre-commitment or no pre-commitment, is feasible (or followed)
in the real world.
An important finding concerns the issue whether the existence of equilibrium solutions de-
pend on pre-commitment. The sets of subgame-perfect equilibria derived in this paper con-
firm that pre-commitment can influence the equilibrium conditions. In particular, under no
pre-commitment a sufficiently high cost reduction would necessarily lead to innovation and
exclude the possibility that no innovation occurs. By way of contrast, both equilibria are pos-
sible under pre-commitment even if the cost reduction by the innovation is high. Still, under
pre-commitment an equilibrium with innovation remains possible in a case of a relatively low
cost reduction as opposed to the no pre-commitment case. It follows that a government with
a preference for innovations being performed if the achievable cost reduction is high (and
otherwise not) should be in favor of the no pre-commitment regime.
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7.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7.2.1 Suppose that firm 1 does not innovate in stage I, i.e. it chooses action NI .
The subsidy level chosen by the government for all firms in stage II is sNI . Given a competitive market in
stage III, a representative power generator i faces the optimization problem
max
xib,xig
[pxib + (p+ sNI)xig − Cb(xib)− Cg(xig)], (7.8)
where xib and xig denote the amounts of electricity produced by firm i from fossil/nuclear (‘brown’) and
renewable (‘green’) energy sources, respectively, and p, the average market price for electricity. The f.o.c. for
an interior solution are
p −C′b[x∗ib] = 0 (7.9)
p +sNI − C′g[x∗ig] = 0. (7.10)
Inserting (7.9) into (7.10) reveals that in an optimum with xib > 0 and xig > 0, the government subsidy sNI
has to be equal to the difference (in absolute terms) between C′g[x
∗
ig] and cb, i.e. the marginal costs of green
electricity evaluated at the optimum and the constant marginal cost of brown electricity. The intuition behind
this result from an economic perspective is that if sNI > C
′
g[x
∗
ig] − cb, then all generators will exclusively
supply green electricity. In contrast, if sNI < C
′
g[x
∗
ig] − cb, no green electricity at all will be provided. Given
the assumptions of a competitive market and homogeneous costs, the subgame solution is described by (7.9)
and (7.10). In particular, all firms produce the same quantity of green electricity given by
xig(NI, sNI) =
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
, (7.11)
while each firm’s profit amounts to
pii(NI, sNI) =
(cb − b1 + sNI)2
4b2
. (7.12)
Proof of Lemma 7.2.2 Suppose that firm 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses. The govern-
ment determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels sNIN for non-innovating and sIN for innovating firms. We
denote the royalty for the new technology per unit of green power as υ. In equilibrium, it must not exceed the
cost difference Cg(x2g)− Cgn(x2g), as otherwise there is no incentive to switch to the new technology.
Subgame ΓIN ,NI . Suppose that firms 2, 3, . . . , N + 1 (from here on: firms of type 2) rejected firm 1’s offer.
Then firm 1 operates with the new cost function Cgn(x1g) while firms of type 2 continue to operate with the
cost function Cg(x2g). Thus, firm 1’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sIN )x1g −Cb(x1b)−Cgn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (7.13)
180
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (7.8) with i = 2 and sNI = sNIN . Thus, quantities
of green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are given by
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1 + sNIN
2b2
,
and firms’ profits therefore amount to
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
(cb − b1n + sIN )2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ,NI) =
(cb − b1 + sNIN )2
4b2
.
Subgame ΓIN ,I . Now suppose that firms of type 2 accept firm 1’s offer and pay a royalty of υ per unit of
green electricity produced. Then all firms operate with the new cost function Cgn(xg). The profit maximization
problems of firm 1 and firms of type 2 are respectively given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sIN )x1g −Cb(x1b)−Cgn(x1g) +Nυx2g −R(b1 − b1n)]; (7.14)
max
x2b,x2g
[px2b + (p+ sIN )x2g −Cb(x2b)−Cgn(x2g)− υx2g]; (7.15)
the quantities of green electricity produced are
x1g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
cb − b1n + sIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN
2b2
.
The firms’ profits thus amount to
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
(cb − b1n + sIN )2
4b2
+Nυ
cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN
2b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) =
(cb − (b1n + υ) + sIN )2
4b2
.
Firms of type 2 decide in stage IIIb whether to reject (NI) or accept (I) the offer, depending on the comparison
of the maximum profits calculated for subgames ΓIN ,NI and ΓIN ,I . Thus, their subgame-perfect equilibrium
actions are given as follows:

 NI if υ > υ
max := (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN )
I if otherwise.
In other words, υmax is the highest possible royalty level at which firms of type 2 innovate.
Firm 1’s decision in stage IIIb is based on the maximization of its profits w.r.t. royalty level υ. Notice that
firm 1’s profit, provided firms of type 2 accept the offer pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I), is always at least as high as
if they reject it as long as υ ∈ [0, cb− b1n+ sIN ]. Moreover, the profit function pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), υ, I) attains
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its maximum in υ at the royalty level υ = (cb− b1n+ sIN )/2. Thus, taking into consideration the possible case
of a corner solution, firm 1’s equilibrium offer υ∗ in stage IIIb is given by
υ∗ =


υmax = (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
2
otherwise.
This offer will always be accepted by a firm of type 2 in the equilibrium9. Green electricity produced by firm
2 in the subgame starting at node G2 thus amounts to
x2g(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
otherwise.
Firms’ profits in this subgame are thus given by
pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) = (7.16)
=


(cb − b1n + sIN )2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)+
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN )]
cb−b1+sNIN
2b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + sIN )2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n) otherwise,
pi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ), I) =


(cb − b1 + sNIN )2
4b2
if (b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) <
cb − b1n + sIN
2
;
(cb − b1n + sIN )2
8b2
otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 7.2.3 Suppose that firm 1 innovates but offers no licenses to competitors (I0). The
government determines welfare-maximizing subsidy levels (sNI0 , sI0). Firm 1, after innovating, operates with
the new cost function Cgn(x1g) and firms of type 2 continue to operate with the cost function Cg(x2g). Thus,
firm 1’s profit maximization problem is given by
max
x1b,x1g
[px1b + (p+ sI0)x1g − Cb(x1b)− Cgn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (7.17)
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (7.8) with i = 2 and sNI = sNI0 . The quantities of
green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are therefore given by
x1g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
.
9As usual, we assume that in a case of indifference firms of type 2 decide in favor of the adoption of the
new technology.
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Firms’ profits therefore amount to
pi1(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
(cb − b1n + sI0)2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n); (7.18)
pi2(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)) =
(cb − b1 + sNI0)2
4b2
. (7.19)
Proof of Lemma 7.2.4 Given the decision of firm 1 not to innovate, the government anticipates all
firms’ optimal quantity decisions in the subgame ΓNI and maximizes the social welfare function
WNI(sNI) = Q
(
a− Q
2
)
+ (N + 1)pii(NI, sNI)− sNI(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)
+d1(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)− d2[(N + 1)xg(NI, sNI)]2 (7.20)
=
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+ (N + 1)
(cb − b1 + sNI)2
4b2
− (N + 1)sNI cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
+(N + 1)d1
cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
− d2(N + 1)2 (cb − b1 + sNI)
2
4b22
(7.21)
with respect to sNI . The socially optimal subsidy level is thus given by
s∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, (7.22)
while the equilibrium quantities and profits are
xig(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
;
pii(NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
.
Proof of Lemma 7.2.5 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer N licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of subgames ΓIN ,NI , ΓIN ,I , as well as that of the royalty bargaining
subgame, and faces the social welfare function
WIN (sNIN , sIN ) = Q
(
a− Q
2
)
+ pi1(IN , (sNIN , sIN )) +Npi2(IN , (sNIN , sIN ))
−sINx1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))−NsIN x2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))
+d1 [x1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN )) +Nx2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))]
−d2 [x1g(NI, (sNIN , sIN )) +Nx2g(NI, (sNIN , sIN ))]2 .
Since the outcome of the following subgame crucially depends on whether condition
(b1 − b1n)− (sNIN − sIN ) ≥
cb − b1n + sIN
2
(7.23)
is satisfied, the welfare function in stage IIb is a piecewise-defined continuous function. We distinguish two
cases, depending on whether or not condition (7.23) is fulfilled.
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Case 1: condition (7.23) is satisfied. The government maximizes the welfare function
WIN (sNIN , sIN ) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+ 2(N + 1)
(cb − b1n + sIN )2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n)
−sIN (N + 2)
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
+d1(N + 2)
cb − b1n + sIN
4b2
− d2(N + 2)2 (cb − b1n + sIN )
2
16b22
with respect to (sNIN , sIN ) and subject to constraint (7.23). The socially optimal subsidy level is given by
s∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
. (7.24)
The maximum welfare level attained in this case is
W ∗(IN) =
(N + 2)2(cb − b1n + d1)2
4[(N + 2)2d2 + 4b2]
−R(b1 − b1n).
Case 2: condition (7.23) is not satisfied. The government maximizes the welfare function
W ′IN (s
′
NIN
, s′IN ) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+
(cb − b1n + s′IN )2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (s′NIN − s′IN )]
cb − b1 + s′NIN
2b2
+N
(cb − b1 + s′NIN )2
4b2
−s′IN
cb − b1n + s′IN
2b2
−Ns′IN
cb − b1 + s′NIN
2b2
+d1
(
cb − b1n + s′IN
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + s′NIN
2b2
)
−d2
(
cb − b1n + s′IN
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + s′NIN
2b2
)2
with respect to (s′NIN , s
′
IN
) and subject to constraint (7.23) reversed with <. The socially optimal subsidy
levels are given by
s′∗NIN =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1) + b2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
; (7.25)
s′∗IN =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
. (7.26)
The maximum welfare level to be attained is
W ′∗(IN) =
(N + 1)(cb − b1n + d1)2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
−R(b1 − b1n).
A simple computation shows that W ∗(IN) > W
′∗(IN) for any N > 0. Thus, the optimal decision of the
government in stage IIb is given by any combination of subsidies
(s∗NIN , s
∗
IN
) =
(
s∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
,
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where
s∗NIN ≥ (b1 − b1n) +
[b2(N − 2)− d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
.
Proof of Lemma 7.2.6 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer no licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcome of subgame ΓI0 and maximizes the welfare function
WI0(sNI0 , sI0) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+
(cb − b1n + sI0)2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n) +
+N
(cb − b1 + sNI0)2
4b2
− sI0
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
−NsNI0
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
+d1
(
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
)
−
−d2
(
cb − b1n + sI0
2b2
+N
cb − b1 + sNI0
2b2
)2
with respect to (sNI0 , sI0). The socially optimal subsidy levels in this subgame coincide for the innovating
firm and the non-innovating firms and are given by
s∗NI0 = s
∗
I0 =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
. (7.27)
Proof of Proposition 7.2.7 In stage I, firm 1 anticipates optimal decisions of the government and
other firms in the subsequent subgames and thus decides whether or not to innovate (and if so, whether to
offer licenses) based on its maximum profits to be attained given the utility-maximizing decisions of other
players. First of all, observe that, for any N > 0, pi1(IN , (sNIN ,sIN )) > pi1(I0, (sNI0 , sI0)). Thus, firm 1 will
never take the strictly dominated action I0 in stage I. Consequently, the solution depends on the comparison
of profits attained from playing NI and IN :
pi∗1(NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
;
pi∗1(IN) =
(N + 2)3b2(cb − b1n + d1)2
2[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− r(b1 − b1n)2.
IN is preferable if pi1(IN) ≥ pi1(NI). Condition pi1(IN) ≥ pi1(NI) is satisfied if
(N + 2)3b2(cb − b1n + d1)2
2[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− b2(cb − b1 + d1)
2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
≥ r(∆b1)2
or, equivalently, if
(r − 1)(∆b1)2 + 2β∆b1 − αβ2 ≤ 0. (7.28)
The solution of ineq. (7.28) depends on the value of concavity parameter r. In particular, if r = 1, condition
(7.28) is satisfied for ∆b1 ∈ (0, αβ/2). If r > 1, it is satisfied for any
∆b1 ∈
(
0,
β
r − 1
(√
1 + α(r − 1) − 1
)]
.
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Finally, if 0 < r < 1, this condition is satisfied for
∆b1 ∈
(
0,
β
1− r
(
1−
√
1− α(1− r)
)]
∪
[
β
1− r
(
1 +
√
1− α(1− r)
)
,∞
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium outcome depends on the R&D cost of innovation and thus on the marginal cost difference
∆b1. The subgame-perfect equilibrium action of firm 1 in stage I is given by IN for a sufficiently low value
of ∆b1 (with the notable exception of the case with r < 1 when sufficiently large values of r support this
equilibrium, too). By way of contrast, if ∆b1 is too high, then the only action of firm 1 sustainable in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium is NI .
Proof of Lemma 7.2.8 Suppose that firm 1 does not innovate in stage I by choosing action NI . The
fine and the quota levels chosen by the government in stage II are fNI and x¯NI . Given a competitive market
in stage III, a representative power generator faces the optimization problem
max
xib,xig
[p(xib + xig)− fNI(x¯NI − xig)− Cb(xib)− Cg(xig)], (7.29)
Quantities of green electricity produced by each firm and their profits are given by
xig(NI, fNI) =
cb − b1 + fNI
2b2
; (7.30)
pii(NI, fNI , x¯NI) =
(cb − b1 + fNI)2
4b2
− fNI x¯NI . (7.31)
Proof of Lemma 7.2.9 In stage IIIb, firm 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses in return of
a royalty of υq per unit of green electricity. The government determines welfare-maximizing quota and fine
levels (x¯IN , fIN ), (x¯NIN , fNIN ).
Subgame ΓqIN ,NI . Suppose that firms of type 2 reject firm 1’s offer. Then firm 1 operates with the new cost
function Cgn(x1g) while firms of type 2 continue to operate with the cost function Cg(x2g). Thus, firm 1’s
profit maximization problem is given by
max
x1b,x1g
[p(x1b + x1g)− fIN )(x¯NI − x1g)− Cb(x1b)− C1gn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (7.32)
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (7.29) with i = 2, fNI = fNIN , and x¯NI = x¯NIN .
Thus, quantities of green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are respectively given by
x1g(IN , (fNIN , fIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1n + fIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (fNIN , fIN ), υ,NI) =
cb − b1 + fNIN
2b2
,
with profits therefore amounting to
pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN ), υ
q, NI) =
(cb − b1n + fIN )2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)− fIN x¯IN ;
pi2(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯NIN ), υ
q, NI) =
(cb − b1 + fNIN )2
4b2
− fNIN x¯NIN .
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Subgame ΓqIN ,I . Now suppose that firms of type 2 accept firm 1’s offer and have to pay a royalty of υ
q
per unit of green electricity produced. Thus, all firms operate with the new cost function Cgn(xg). The profit
maximization problems of firm 1 and firms of type 2 are respectively given by
max
x1b,x1g
[p(x1b + x1g)− fIN )(x¯IN − x1g)−Cb(x1b)−Cgn(x1g) +Nυqx2g −R(b1 − b1n)];
max
x2b,x2g
[p(x2b + x2g)− fIN )(x¯IN − x2g)−Cb(x2b)−Cgn(x2g)− υx2g],
The quantities of green electricity produced are
x1g(IN , (fNIN , fIN ), υ
q, I) =
cb − b1n + fIN
2b2
;
x2g(IN , (fNIN , fIN ), υ
q, I) =
cb − (b1n + υq) + fIN
2b2
,
with profits thus amounting to
pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN ), υ
q, I) =
(cb − b1n + fIN )2
4b2
+Nυq
cb − (b1n + υq) + fIN
2b2
−R(b1 − b1n)− fIN x¯IN ;
pi2(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN ), υ
q, I) =
(cb − (b1n + υq) + fIN )2
4b2
− fIN x¯IN .
Firms of type 2 decide in stage IIIb either to reject (NI) or accept (I) firm 1’s offer depending on which of their
maximum profits attainable in subgames ΓqIN ,NI and Γ
q
IN ,I
is larger. Thus, its subgame-perfect equilibrium
actions with respect to the adoption of the new technology are given as follows:

 NI if υ
q > υqmax :=
√
(cb − b1 + fIN )2 + 4b2(fNIN x¯NIN − fIN x¯IN )− (cb − b1n + fIN )
I if otherwise.
In other words, υqmax is the highest possible royalty level at which firm of type 2 innovates.
Firm 1’s decision in stage IIIb is based on the maximization of its profits with respect to the royalty level
υq. Notice that firm 1’s profit if firms of type 2 accept the offer pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN ), υ
q, I), is always
at least as high as if the offer is rejected as long as υq ∈ [0, cb − b1n + fIN ]. Moreover, the profit function
pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN ), υ
q, I) attains its maximum w.r.t. υq at the royalty level υq = (cb−b1n+fIN )/2. Thus,
firm 1’s equilibrium offer υq∗ in stage IIIb will be given by
υ∗q =


υqmax if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
cb − b1n + fIN
2
otherwise.
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This offer will always be accepted by firms of type 2 in the equilibrium10. The quantity of green electricity
produced by any firm of type 2 in the subgame starting at node G2, x2g(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN , x¯NIN ), I), thus
amounts to


2(cb − b1 + fNIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + fIN )2 + 4b2(fNIN x¯NIN − fIN x¯IN )
2b2
if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
cb − b1n + fIN
4b2
otherwise.
Firms’ profits in this subgame are therefore given by pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN , x¯NIN ), I) =
=


(cb − b1n + fIN )2
4b2
− 2NfNIN x¯NIN + (2N − 1)fIN x¯IN −R(b1 − b1n)
+
N[3(cb−b1n+fIN )
√
(cb−b1+fIN
)2+4b2(fNIN
x¯NIN
−fIN
x¯IN
)−(cb−b1+fIN
)2−2(cb−b1n+fIN
)2]
b2
if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + fIN )2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n)− fIN x¯IN otherwise,
pi2(IN , (fNIN , fIN , x¯IN , x¯NIN ), I) =
=


[
2(cb − b1n + fIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + fIN )2 + 4b2(fNIN x¯NIN − fIN x¯IN )
]2
4b2
− fIN x¯IN
if υqmax <
cb − b1n + fIN
2
;
(cb − b1n + fIN )2
8b2
− fIN x¯IN otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 7.2.10 Now suppose that firm 1 innovates but offers no licenses to its competitors
by choosing I0. In stage II, the government determines the welfare-maximizing quota and fine levels x¯I0 , fI0 ,
x¯NI0 , fNI0 . Firm 1’s profit maximization problem is thus given by
max
x1b,x1g
[p(x1b + x1g)− fI0)(x¯I0 − x1g)−Cb(x1b)−Cgn(x1g)−R(b1 − b1n)], (7.33)
while firm 2’s profit maximization problem corresponds to (7.29) with i = 2, fNI = fNI0 , and x¯NI = x¯NI0 .
Thus, quantities of green electricity produced by firm 1 and firms of type 2 are respectively given by
x1g(I0, fNI0 ) =
cb − b1n + fI0
2b2
;
x2g(I0, fNI0 ) =
cb − b1 + fNI0
2b2
.
Firms’ profits therefore amount to
pi1(I0, (fI0 , x¯I0)) =
(cb − b1n + fI0)2
4b2
− fI0 x¯I0 −R(b1 − b1n);
pi2(I0, (fNI0 , x¯NI0)) =
(cb − b1 + fNI0 )2
4b2
− fNI0 x¯NI0 .
10By assumption, firms of type 2 adopt the new technology if indifferent.
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Proof of Lemma 7.2.11 Given the decision of firm 1 not to innovate, the government anticipates all
firms’ optimal quantity decisions in the subgame ΓqNI and faces the social welfare function
WNI(fNI , x¯NI) = Q
(
a− Q
2
)
+ (N + 1)pii(NI, fNI , x¯NI)− fNI(N + 1)xg(NI, fNI) +
+d1(N + 1)xg(NI, fNI)− d2[(N + 1)xg(NI, fNI )]2
=
a2 − c2b
2
+ (N + 1)
[
(cb − b1 + fNI)2
4b2
− fNI x¯NI
]
+(N + 1)fNI
(
x¯NI − cb − b1 + sNI
2b2
)
+
+(N + 1)d1
cb − b1 + fNI
2b2
− d2(N + 1)2 (cb − b1 + fNI)
2
4b22
.
One can immediately see that both expressions containing the quota levels cancel out. Thus, this welfare
function is identical with that in (7.21) with sNI = fNI . Consequently, the government maximizes the welfare
function with respect to fNI and sets the socially optimal fine level as
f∗NI =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, (7.34)
while the quota level x¯NI can be deliberately set by the government. The equilibrium quantities and profits
are thus given by
xig(NI) =
cb − b1 + d1
2[b2 + d2(N + 1)]
;
piqi (NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
− b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
x¯NI < pii(NI).
Proof of Lemma 7.2.12 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer N licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of subgames ΓqIN ,NI , Γ
q
IN ,I
, as well as that of the royalty bargaining
subgame, and faces the social welfare function W qIN (fNIN , fIN , x¯NIN , x¯IN ) specified below. Since the outcome
of the subsequent subgame crucially depends on whether or not condition
υqmax ≥ cb − b1n + fIN
2
(7.35)
is satisfied, the welfare in stage IIb is given as a piecewise defined continuous function. We distinguish two
cases, depending on whether condition (7.35) is fulfilled or not.
Case 1: condition (7.35) is satisfied (the ‘otherwise’ case in stage IIIb). The government maximizes
the welfare function
W qIN (fNIN , fIN , x¯NIN , x¯IN ) =
(a− cb)(a+ cb)
2
+ 2(N + 1)
(cb − b1n + fIN )2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n)− (N + 1)fIN x¯IN
+fIN
(
x¯IN −
cb − b1 + fIN
2b2
)
+NfIN
(
x¯IN −
cb − b1n + fIN
4b2
)
+d1(N + 2)
cb − b1n + fIN
4b2
− d2(N + 2)2 (cb − b1n + fIN )
2
16b22
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with respect to fNIN , fIN , x¯NIN , x¯IN and subject to constraint (7.35). Again, since the quota levels can be set
exogenously, the welfare function is identical with that in the subsidy case. The socially optimal fine level is
given by
f∗IN =
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
. (7.36)
The maximum welfare level attained in this case is therefore
W ∗q(IN) =
(N + 2)2(cb − b1n + d1)2
4[(N + 2)2d2 + 4b2]
−R(b1 − b1n).
Case 2: condition (7.35) is not satisfied. The government maximizes the welfare function
W
′q
IN
(f ′NIN , f
′
IN
, x¯′NIN , x¯
′
IN
) =
(cb − b1n + f ′IN )
2
4b2
− 2Nf ′NIN x¯
′
NIN
+ (2N − 1)f ′IN x¯
′
IN
− R(b1 − b1n)
+
N
[
3(cb − b1n + f ′IN )
√
(cb − b1 + f ′IN )2 + 4b2(f
′
NIN
x¯′NIN
− f ′IN x¯
′
IN
)− (cb − b1 + f ′IN )
2 − 2(cb − b1n + f ′IN )
2
]
b2
+N


[
2(cb − b1n + f ′IN )−
√
(cb − b1 + f ′IN )2 + 4b2(f
′
NIN
x¯′NIN
− f ′IN x¯
′
IN
)
]2
4b2
− f ′IN x¯
′
IN


+f ′IN
(
x¯′IN −
cb − b1n + f ′IN
2b2
)
+Nf ′IN

x¯′IN −
2(cb − b1 + f ′NIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + f ′IN )2 + 4b2(f
′
NIN
x¯′NIN
− f ′IN x¯
′
IN
)
2b2


+d1

 cb − b1n + f ′IN
2b2
+N
2(cb − b1 + f ′NIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + f ′IN )2 + 4b2(f
′
NIN
x¯′NIN
− f ′IN x¯
′
IN
)
2b2

−
−d2

 cb − b1n + f ′IN
2b2
+N
2(cb − b1 + f ′NIN )−
√
(cb − b1 + f ′IN )2 + 4b2(f
′
NIN
x¯′
NIN
− f ′
IN
x¯′
IN
)
2b2


2
with respect to (f ′NIN , f
′
IN
, x¯′NIN , x¯
′
IN
) and subject to constraint (7.35) reversed with <. It can be shown that,
as in the subsidy case, W ∗q(IN) > W
′q∗(IN) for any N > 0. Thus, the optimal decision of the government in
stage IIb is given by any combination of fines
(f∗NIN , f
∗
IN
) =
(
f∗NIN ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
where f∗NIN satisfies inequality
√
(cb − b1 + f∗IN )2 + 4b2(f∗NIN x¯NIN − f∗IN x¯IN ) ≥
3
2
(cb − b1n + f∗IN ). (7.37)
In this case, the government’s choice of the quotas x¯NIN , x¯IN is constrained by inequality (7.37).
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Proof of Lemma 7.2.13 Given the decision of firm 1 to innovate and offer no licenses, the government
anticipates the equilibrium outcome of subgame ΓqI0 . As in other subgames, welfare maximization is equivalent
to the subsidy case. Here we simply state the socially optimal fine level, which is given by
f∗NI0 = f
∗
I0 =
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, (7.38)
which is identical for the innovating and non-innovating firms as in the subsidy case.
Proof of Proposition 7.2.14 Firm 1 anticipates optimal decisions of the government and its com-
petitors in the subsequent stages and thus decides whether or not to innovate (and if so, whether or not to offer
licenses), based on the comparison of its maximum attainable profits given the utility-maximizing decisions of
other players. In contrast to the subsidy case, the profit functions in the quota case depend on the quotas set
by the government. However, as shown above, the quota levels are not determined from welfare maximization
but set exogenously11.
Here, we assume that the quota level x¯I set for any innovating firm is equal irrespective of its decision about
licenses, x¯I := x¯IN = x¯I0 . Then we can observe that, for any N > 0 and any fine level,
pi1(IN , (fNIN , fIN )) > pi1(I0, (fNI0 , fI0)).
Thus, firm 1 will never take action I0 in stage I. The optimal decision of firm 1 depends on the comparison of
maximum attainable profits from choosing NI and IN , respectively:
pi∗1(NI) =
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
4[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
− f∗NI x¯NI ;
pi∗1(IN ) =
(N + 2)3b2(cb − b1n + d1)2
2[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− r(b1 − b1n)2 − f∗IN x¯IN .
IN is preferable if pi
∗
1(IN) ≥ pi∗1(NI). As in the subsidy case, IN constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium
strategy for sufficiently low values of ∆b1, namely when the following inequality is satisfied:
A(∆b1)
2 +B∆b1 − C ≤ 0,
or, equivalently, for any
∆b1 ∈
(
0,
√
B2 − 4AC −B
2A
]
. (7.39)
By way of contrast, if ∆b1 exceeds the threshold value of
√
B2−4AC−B
2A
, then the only subgame-perfect equi-
librium action of firm 1 is NI (Not Innovate). Note, however, that under the quota policy the threshold level
of ∆b1 can be influenced by the government as the quota levels are set exogenously.
11With the notable exception of stage IIb, in which constraint (7.5) must be satisfied. However, this is the
only constraint for the choice of three variables, f∗NIN , x¯NIN , and x¯IN . In other words, for any free choice of
both quota levels, there exists a lower bound for f∗NIN
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Proof of Proposition 7.3.1 In stage III, competition takes place given firm 1’s decision in stage I
and the government’s decisions in stage II. Notice that subgame Γ˜NI is equivalent to ΓNI with sNI = s˜NI ,
subgames Γ˜I,NI and Γ˜I,I , respectively, to ΓI,NI and ΓI,I with (sNIN , sIN ) = (s˜NI , s˜I), and subgame Γ˜I0 , to
ΓI0 with (sNI0 , sI0) = (s˜NI , s˜I). The maximum profit levels of firm 1 in these subgames are therefore given
by:
pi1(NI, (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(cb − b1 + s˜NI)2
4b2
;
pi1(I0, (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(cb − b1n + s˜I)2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n);
pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
=


(cb − b1n + s˜I)2
4b2
−R(b1 − b1n)+
+N [(b1 − b1n)− (s˜NI − s˜I)] cb−b1+s˜NI2b2 if (b1 − b1n)− (s˜NI − s˜I) <
cb − b1n + s˜I
2
;
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + s˜I)2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n) otherwise.
Under the pre-commitment regime, the government (G) sets the subsidies without any information about
the innovation decision of firm 1. Moreover, firm 1 makes its decision whether to innovate or not (and if so,
whether to offer licenses) prior to the announcement of the subsidy levels set by the government. Therefore,
both decisions can be considered to be made simultaneously and can be modeled as a normal-form game taking
place in stages I and II. In this game, firm 1 chooses one of three actions {NI, IN , I0}, while the government
determines a pair of subsidies (sNI , sI).
In a Nash equilibrium of this normal-form game, any equilibrium strategy of a player must belong to the set
of best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the other player. The government’s best responses (BRG) to
firm 1’s actions are equivalent to its actions in stage II in the no pre-commitment case:
s1 = (s1NI , s
1
I) := BRG(NI) =
{(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, sI
)
: sI ∈ R
}
;
s2 = (s2NI , s
2
I) := BRG(IN ) =
{(
sNI ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
:
sNI ≤ 4b2(b1 − b1n)− d2(N + 2)
2(cb − b1) + b2(N − 2)(cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
}
;
s3 = (s3NI , s
3
I) := BRG(I0) =
=
(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
)
.
Firm 1’s best responses (BR1) to s
1, s2, and s3 can be derived by observing its profits as functions of subsidy
levels given in (7.12), (7.16), and (7.18). Notice that, since the government’s best response to IN is given by
s2 = (s2NI , s
2
I) as shown above, condition (7.23) cannot be violated in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if firm 1
chooses action IN in stage I it faces the profit function
pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + s˜I)2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n).
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Moreover, since pi1(IN , (s˜NI , s˜I)) > pi1(I0, (s˜NI , s˜I)) for any (s˜NI , s˜I)), action I0 is strictly dominated and thus
cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. Hence, action s3 = (s3NI , s
3
I) of the government cannot be supported
in an equilibrium since it constitutes a best response to the strictly dominated action I0 only. Action NI is a
best response of firm 1 to (s1NI , s
1
I) if pi1(NI, (s
1
NI , s
1
I)) ≥ pi1(IN , (s1NI , s1I)). A rearrangement shows that this
condition is satisfied if
s1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n)±
√
2b2
N + 2
(
b2(cb − b1 + d1)2
[b2 + d2(N + 1)]2
+ 4r(∆b1)2
)]
, (7.40)
where ∆b1 = b1 − b1n. Therefore, the first set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 does not innovate and
the government chooses (s1NI , s
1
I) with s
1
NI given above and s
1
I satisfying condition (7.40). By an appropriate
choice of s1I , the government is able to prevent or allow for the occurrence of this equilibrium. Action IN is a
best response of firm 1 to (s2NI , s
2
I) if pi1(IN , (s
2
NI , s
2
I)) ≥ pi1(NI, (s2NI , s2I)). After solving for s2NI , we obtain
the following condition:
s2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1)±
√
b2
(
b2(N + 2)3(cb − b1n + d1)2
[4b2 + d2(N + 2)2]2
− 4r(∆b1)2
)]
. (7.41)
The second set of Nash equilibria is given if player 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses, while the
government chooses (s2NI , s
2
I) with s
2
I given above and s
2
NI satisfying condition (7.41).
Proof of Proposition 7.3.2 We have shown in section 7.2.2 that, due to perfect competition, the op-
timal decisions of the agents in all subgames are equivalent under subsidy and quota-based policies. Therefore,
we derive the solution by considering the normal-form game obtained after the truncation of all subgames
following the decisions of the government.
In a Nash equilibrium of this normal-form game, any equilibrium strategy of a player must belong to the set
of best responses to an equilibrium strategy of the other player. As in the subsidy case, the government’s best
responses (BRG) to firm 1’s actions are equivalent to its actions in stage II in the no pre-commitment case:
f1 = (f1NI , f
1
I ) := BRG(NI) =
{(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
, fI
)
: fI ∈ R
}
;
f2 = (f2NI , f
2
I ) := BRG(IN) =
{(
fNI ,
[2b2N − d2(N + 2)2](cb − b1n) + 2(N + 2)b2d1
d2(N + 2)2 + 4b2
)
:
fNI ≤ 4b2(b1 − b1n)− d2(N + 2)
2(cb − b1) + b2(N − 2)(cb − b1n) + (N + 2)b2d1
4b2 + d2(N + 2)2
}
;
f3 = (f3NI , f
3
I ) := BRG(I0) =
=
(
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
,
b2d1 − d2(N + 1)(cb − b1)− d2(b1 − b1n)
b2 + d2(N + 1)
)
.
Firm 1’s best responses (BR1) to f
1, f2, and f3 can be derived by observing its profits as functions of the
fine levels. First notice that, since the government’s best response to IN is given by f
2 = (f2NI , f
2
I ) as above,
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condition (7.23) cannot be violated in a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if firm 1 chooses action IN in stage I it
faces the profit function
pi1(IN , (f˜NI , f˜I)) =
(N + 2)(cb − b1n + f˜I)2
8b2
−R(b1 − b1n).
Moreover, since pi1(IN , (f˜NI , f˜I)) > pi1(I0, (f˜NI , f˜I)) for any (f˜NI , f˜I)), action I0 is strictly dominated and
thus cannot be played in a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, action f3 = (f3NI , f
3
I ) of the government cannot
be supported in an equilibrium since it constitutes a best response to the strictly dominated action I0 only.
Action NI is a best response of firm 1 to (f1NI , f
1
I ) if pi1(NI, (f
1
NI , f
1
I )) ≥ pi1(IN , (f1NI , f1I )). A rearrangement
shows that this condition is satisfied if
f1I ∈
[
−(cb − b1n) + 4b2x¯I ± ξ
√
2b2
(N + 2)[b2 + (N + 1)d2]
]
. (7.42)
The first set of Nash equilibria is therefore given if firm 1 does not innovate and the government chooses
(f1NI , f
1
I ) with f
1
NI given above and f
1
I satisfying condition (7.42). By an appropriate choice of f
1
I , x¯NI , and
x¯I , the government is able to prevent or allow for the occurrence of this equilibrium.
Action IN is a best response of firm 1 to (f
2
NI , f
2
I ) if pi1(IN , (f
2
NI , f
2
I )) ≥ pi1(NI, (f2NI , f2I )). After solving for
f2NI , we obtain the following condition:
f2NI ∈
[
−(cb − b1n) + 2b2x¯NI − ψ
√
2b2
4b2 + (N + 2)2d2
,−(cb − b1n) + 2b2x¯NI + ψ
√
2b2
4b2 + (N + 2)2d2
]
. (7.43)
The second set of Nash equilibria is given if firm 1 innovates and announces to offer N licenses, while the
government chooses (f2NI , f
2
I ) with f
2
I given above and f
2
NI satisfying condition (7.43).
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The conclusion provides a discussion of possible extensions of the research presented in this
dissertation.
In Chapters 3 to 5, we elicited citizens’ willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution through
a Discrete Choice experiment performed in 2008. The average Swiss citizen is shown to
exhibit a negative marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for redistribution. In addition, a very
marked status quo bias would have to be overcome by another payment. Several hypotheses
concerning possible determinants of this WTP were tested. However, this analysis is subject
to several limitations. First, the chosen methodology allows to test hypotheses about the
WTP without any confounding supply-side influences. It should be taken seriously, however,
that preferences for redistribution might be subject to influence from political institutions as
suggested by the Public Choice literature. In particular, voters might use simplified heuristics
based on the positions of familiar parties to infer how a policy will affect them and to cast
a vote according to their interests. For instance, Schla¨pfer et al. (2007) in their Contingent
Valuation study show that party information significantly affects individuals’ attitudes with
respect to public spending. Thus, future work should be devoted to a detailed analysis of
political preferences in order to identify whether these factors also influence stated WTP for
redistribution. This analysis would, however, require addressing the identification problem
once again, since the supply of public redistribution is governed by political institutions.
Second, the status quo bias found in this paper calls for more detailed analysis. To the extent
that it reflects risk aversion, it should induce demand for redistribution - contrary to the
results presented here. One possible explanation why it is so high can be the fact that there
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are some preferences that are not fully formed [see e.g. Stutzer et al. (2007)]. Another possible
explanation might be the redistribution illusion, namely the fact that some respondents are
not aware of the actual status quo.
Various improvements and extensions can be identified with regard to chapters 6 and 7. In
Chapter 6, the analysis of optimal regulation policies in imperfect markets should be extended
to consider a Stackelberg oligopoly. One can think of many extensions to Chapter 7. First, the
results are obtained in a parameterized model in order to allow for an explicit calculation of
the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. An improvement might consist in the introduction
of a more general non-parameterized system of cost and demand functions, thereby allowing
for a qualitative comparison of the equilibrium outcomes with those from Chapter 6.
A natural extension of 6 and 7 would contain an econometric analysis of data on markets for
renewable energy, thereby allowing to test the theoretical predictions derived in both essays.
A particularly interesting empirical extension of these two studies would be to elicit con-
sumers’ preferences for renewable energy through a stated choice experiment, in particular
estimating the optimal energy portfolio from the point of view of households. The method-
ology to be applied would roughly correspond to the methodology used in Chapters 3 to 5
[see Schneider and Zweifel (2004, 2009) for a stated choice experiment in the field of energy
economics].
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